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This thesis examines the impact of personal managerial characteristics on the 
decision making of chief executives (CEOs) at a corporate level. The research suggests 
executives’ personal philanthropy and educational backgrounds have a potent effect on 
corporate malfeasance in financial reporting and corporate environmental engagement 
and performance.   
My thesis is comprised of two studies. The first study explores the impact of CEO 
personal altruism on corporate malfeasance in financial reporting. The results show that 
firms run by CEOs with altruistic preferences, as captured by their stock donations, are 
less likely to commit financial fraud and exhibit lower levels of real and accrual-based 
earnings manipulation. These effects are more pronounced for CEOs who do not backdate 
when making stock donations and who donate stocks outside the tax season. The results 
are robust to a battery of endogeneity checks, including examining the effect of CEO 
turnovers, using difference-in-difference models, and applying an instrumental variable 
approach. Overall, the results suggest that personal altruism of managers has a 
disciplining effect on corporate malfeasance in financial reporting.  
Subsequently, the next chapter addresses potential measurement error of personal 
managerial altruism and extends the research of the effect of CEO altruism on the 
readability of a firm’s annual financial report. Similar conclusions are obtained when 
proxying CEO altruism by five alternative measures other than CEO stock donations. 
Further, the results also show that financial reports are more comprehendible for firms 




Building on the theories of familiarity and self-efficacy, the second study 
investigates the relationship between CEO educational background in science and MBA 
degrees, and corporate environmental responsibility. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms, 
this research conducts difference-in-difference analyses utilizing CEO turnovers to 
highlight the impacts of CEOs backgrounds on corporate environmental ratings and 
performance. The results show that science-educated CEOs take greater environmental 
risks rather than refraining from investing in environmental strengths which result in 
lower overall environmental CSR ratings. Conversely, CEO holdings MBA degrees 
outperform non-MBA CEOs in overall environmental CSR performance because MBA 
CEOs are more risk-averse in taking additional environmental risks. The overall findings 
document that CEO educational background may be a potent predictor of differences in 
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This thesis examines novel aspects of personal managerial traits and the impact on 
the decision making of executives at a corporate level in two arenas. The first study 
investigates whether personal altruism of CEOs implies diminishing corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting. Specifically, I examine the effect of CEO altruism, 
which is captured by CEO personal stock donations, on three levels of corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting ranging from most serious (frauds), to intermediate 
(real activities manipulation), to least serious (discretionary accruals).  
Subsequently, I address potential measurement error of CEO altruism by extending 
the proxy of CEO altruism into five alternative measures other than CEO stock donations. 
I first investigate other psychological factors reflected in CEO personal philanthropic 
activities. I then examine the potential for opportunistic intentions when CEOs make 
stock donations by adopting various unique data sources. I also explore other types of 
charitable contributions in the form of CEO cash donations to political committees/parties 
with explicit social purposes. I also extend the first study on various forms of corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting by examining the effect of CEO altruism on the 
readability of firm annual financial reports.  
Second, I turn my attention to differences in CEO educational backgrounds and their 
impact on corporate environmental responsibility. Specifically, I explore how CEO 




influence CEO perceptions and risk-taking behaviours when CEOs formulate corporate 
environmental policies. 
This research is motivated by gaps in the growing literature on how top managers 
use their personal managerial traits to set organisational tone and to influence corporate 
decision-making outcomes. Research on this topic was largely limited until upper echelon 
theory was introduced by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Following the launch of this 
theory, prior empirical studies show that managerial fixed effects1 (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Fee et al., 2013) have an impact on corporate behaviour and performance. Other 
empirical studies on this topic take significant steps toward showing the effect of specific 
personal managerial characteristics rather than managerial fixed effects on corporate 
policies. Despite the heterogeneity of personal characteristics, these studies are limited to 
traditional CEO personal traits including CEO overconfidence (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005, 2008; Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), CEO optimism (Lin et al., 2005; Campbell et 
al., 2011; Langabeer and DelliFraine, 2011; Davis et al., 2015; Huang-Meier et al., 2016), 
CEO cultural background (Pan et al., 2017), political ideology (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta 
et al., 2017), education (Lewis et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2015; King et al., 2016; 
Henderson et al., 2018), family composition (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017), CEO expertise 
(Yermack, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2012; Custódio and Metzger, 2014a; Gounopoulos and 
Pham, 2018), and CEO personal risk preference (Sunder et al., 2017). Motivated by this 
literature, the research in this dissertation responds properly to an increased demand for 
investigating novel aspects of personal managerial traits and idiosyncrasies, and whether 
they have impact in explaining various corporate policies and decision-making outcomes, 
on which little previous research has been carried out. 
 




My research is built on the social psychology and economics literature. Specifically, 
the first study on CEO altruism and corporate malfeasance in financial reporting. The 
concept of CEO personal altruism in this study and its extended study rely on both social 
biology and prosocial behaviour theories which suggest that personal altruism is any 
prosocial behaviour which increases the welfare of others without considering a direct 
benefit to the person who performs it (Penner et al., 2005; Ariely et al., 2009; Dovidio et 
al., 2017). Human altruism thus directly affect individuals’ cognitive decision processes 
(Lieberman, 2010). Motivated by the psychological literature, the second study extends 
upper echelons theory by drawing on familiarization theory and self-efficacy theory, to 
develop a theoretical framework on how CEO self-perceived expertise, as derived from 
education (science and MBA degrees), can influence corporate environmental CSR 
ratings and engagement. Below I introduce each of these two studies and the extension 
of the first study in further details. 
 
1.1.  Study 1: CEO Altruism and Corporate Financial Reporting Malfeasance 
 
This study investigates the impact of personal managerial altruism on corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting. According to the annual report of philanthropy in the 
U.S. for the year 2017, Americans’ charitable donations were up to 410 billion dollars, 
of which a significant portion were extraordinary and large stock donations contributed 
by individual philanthropists who are also CEOs (Giving US 2018). While it is clear that 
these donations promote social welfare, little research has been conducted to examine the 
relationship between personal philanthropy and the decision-making of executives at a 




This research is also motivated by gaps in two streams of literature. First, this study 
is built upon the prior literature on managerial traits. Specifically, while prior research 
focuses on the aforementioned traditional personal traits of CEOs, this research is the first 
to examine personal managerial altruism – a novel aspect of personal managerial traits, 
which is captured by observing CEO personal stock donation behaviours. Second, my 
study tends to fill the gap from the literature on corporate philanthropy. Prior studies 
provide mixed evidence on the relationship between corporate philanthropy and 
corporate financial performance and firm value (Wang and Qian, 2011; Masulis and 
Reza, 2014; Su and Sauerwald, 2016). In addition, these studies focus on investigating 
corporate giving rather than executives’ personal charitable contributions, thus the 
estimated results are limited to provide a comprehensive distinction between the personal 
philanthropy preferences of executives and corporate philanthropy. This leads to an 
increasing demand for research investigating separately the role of personal philanthropy 
of executives in formulating corporate policies. Motivated by the demand for this 
research topic, the first study in my thesis explores whether the personal altruism of 
CEOs, which is a primary psychological motive for donating to charity, implies 
diminishing corporate malfeasance in financial reporting. 
Prior social psychology literature describes personal altruism as a prosocial 
behaviour which includes any of helping, sharing, caring and cooperating with others 
without a direct benefit or external payoffs and rewards (Batson and Powell, 2003; Penner 
et al., 2005; Ariely et al., 2009; Dovidio et al., 2017). Economic theory shows that 
personal altruism can influence the honesty of individual decision makers (Becker, 1976; 
Gneezy, 2005; Gino et al., 2013). Altruists are willing to sacrifice their own resources to 
improve the well-being of others, and thus they perceive higher costs of the harm that 




theory, I argue that altruistic CEOs are less likely to manipulate corporate earnings in a 
manner that is beneficial for them but comes at the expense of long-term shareholder 
value and future operating performance (Graham et al., 2005; Gunny, 2005; Bhojraj et 
al., 2009; Haynes et al., 2015).   
Based on the costs and associated risks of each form of earnings manipulation, I sort 
corporate malfeasance in financial reporting from most serious (corporate fraud), to 
intermediate (real activities management), to least serious (accruals earnings 
management). According to the degree to which CEO altruism can affect corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting, I examine the hypothesized CEO-altruism effect at all 
three levels of corporate malfeasance.  
To address my research question, I use CEO personal stock donations as a proxy for 
the personal altruism of CEOs because stock donations to charitable organisations are 
considered a type of generous giving that is primarily motivated by human altruism 
(Konrath and Handy, 2018). I collect data on CEO personal stock donations from the 
Thomson Reuters Insider Trading database from 1996 to 2016. Moreover, I employ two 
other data sources including the SEC’s series of published Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAERs) and COMPUSTAT to obtain data on corporate fraud 
and to capture earnings manipulation, respectively. The full sample construction 
methodology is discussed in more detail in Section 1.3 of Chapter Two.  
Previous research on charitable giving suggests that tax effects have a significant 
impact on the charitable decisions of donors (Randolph, 1995b; Auten et al., 2000). Prior 
research provides evidence that firm executives can backdate their stock donations to 
maximize their personal tax deductions (Yermack, 2009; Ghosh and Harjoto, 2011; Avci 




that CEO stock donations can present various degrees of an executives’ personal altruism. 
Specifically, I hypothesize that CEOs making stock donations without backdating 
behaviour or/and without tax-planning incentives demonstrate higher levels of personal 
altruism, and thus that their firms will be associated with greater reductions in all three 
levels of corporate malfeasance in financial reporting.  
To address my hypotheses, I first develop a theoretical framework modelling a 
utility-maximizing function of a CEO with altruistic preferences in the context of his/her 
decision making to commit earnings manipulation. I then use panel regressions modelling 
corporate financial malfeasance as a function of CEO personal altruism. The regression 
results also indicate firms run by CEOs with altruistic preferences, as captured by their 
stock donations, are less likely to commit financial fraud and exhibit lower levels of real 
and accrual-based earnings manipulation. These effects are more pronounced for CEOs 
who do not backdate when making stock donations and who donate stocks outside the 
tax season. My results are robust to a battery of endogeneity checks, including examining 
the effect of CEO turnovers, using difference-in-difference models, and applying an 
instrumental variable approach. Overall, my findings in the first research provide new 
empirical evidence that corporate executives can imprint their personal altruism to 
diminish the disciplining effect of corporate malfeasance in financial reporting. This 
study contributes to the literature on the benefits of hiring altruistic CEOs in minimizing 
corporate misconduct. Moreover, my research is the first to highlight the “bright-side” 
effect of how senior management utilize personal managerial caring to set organizational 




1.2.  An Extension of Study 1: Potential Measurement Error of CEO Altruism 
and The Readability of Financial Reports 
 
Chapter Three presents a two-way extension of the first study in Chapter Two. The 
first addresses potential measurement error of CEO altruism by observing and measuring 
another five alternative measures of CEO personal altruism other than CEO stock 
donations. This extension is motivated by a potential concern that the primary 
explanatory variable in the first study – CEO stock donations – may not completely 
capture all types of personal managerial altruism. For example, altruistic CEOs may also 
make other charitable contributions in the form of cash, real estate, time, or even blood 
and organ donations. Moreover, CEOs may demonstrate other opportunistic intentions 
rather than personal altruism when making stock donations. For example, CEOs may 
donate stock to their family charitable trusts or foundations rather than gifting stocks to 
external charitable organisations. Moreover, CEOs might look to time stock donations 
around favourable firm earnings announcements, or after receiving a significantly large 
value of stock awards. The second research extension in this chapter continues examining 
the effect of CEO altruism but focuses on another form of corporate malfeasance in 
financial reporting – the readability of a firm’s annual report. An opaque presentation of 
annual reports can reduce the readability of financial reports which in turn can make it 
easier to obfuscate poor financial information (Bloomfield, 2008; Li, 2008). I argue that 
the more readable and understandable financial statements are, the better they represent 
corporate financial performance to stakeholders (Lo et al., 2017). Therefore, the quality 
of the readability of financial reports also plays an important role in helping stakeholders 




In the first part of Chapter Three I explore alternative CEO personal philanthropic 
activities and potentially opportunistic incentives other than personal altruism when 
making stock donations. Below I introduce each alternative measure that proxies for the 
personal altruism of CEOs in more detail. 
Following the prior social psychology literature, I first observe CEO personal 
philanthropy in society by capturing whether CEOs have received humanitarian awards 
for their charitable contributions. I hand-collect data to compute this new alternative 
measure from the Marquis Who’s Who database. I then employ a propensity score 
matching approach to pair firms with CEOs who have received a humanitarian award 
with control firms whose CEOs have not. The average treatment effect results suggest 
that real activities and accrual management in firms with awarded CEOs are significantly 
lower than in firms with CEOs who have not been awarded. However, I find no 
significant difference in the probability of fraud between matched firms.  
My second alternative measure of CEO altruism captures the possibility that the 
recipients of CEO stock donations are external charitable organizations. Depending on 
the motivations of philanthropic CEOs, CEOs may donate stocks to family charitable 
foundations or family trusts in response to executives’ estate planning considerations and 
their tax savings on capital gains rather than personal altruism (Jung and Park, 2009; 
Yermack, 2009; Brown et al., 2017). In contrast, stock donations are gifted to external 
charitable foundations to improve community well-being and social welfare (Yermack, 
2009). As such, I argue that stocks gifted to external charitable foundations reflect CEO 
altruism more genuinely than stocks gifted to CEO-linked family charitable trusts or 
foundations. I hand-collect data from the footnotes of each insider gift transaction listed 
in Forms 4 and 5 SEC filings on the Thomson Financial Insider trading database. I 




The results when using this new proxy are consistent for real activities and discretionary 
accruals manipulation, but not significant for corporate fraud. 
Moreover, the prior social psychological literature on care-oriented feelings suggests 
that individual altruists in most cases, prefer to give priority to the needs of dependent 
others, and to improving the boarder well-being of the community (Bowlby, 1982; Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2003; Mikulincer et al., 2005; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Motivated by 
this theory, the third alternative measure of CEO altruism demonstrates another type of 
charitable donation in the form of individual cash contributions made by CEOs to 
political committees/parties with explicit social purposes for families, children, women, 
the elderly, health care, environmental issues, education, or animal welfare. Data for CEO 
personal political cash donations are extracted from the Federal Election Commission 
(FEC) from 1992 to 2018. I then hand-collect information about political committees and 
parties from various sources to identify if these bodies support and pursue community 
welfare objectives. Further details on data collection and sample construction are 
discussed in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter Three. Similar results as the previous are obtained 
when using the altruistic political cash donations as a new proxy for CEO altruism. 
The next alternative measure of CEO altruism represents the timing pattern of stock 
gifts made by CEOs relative to the dates of quarterly earnings announcements. Prior 
studies show that CEOs may take advantage of their insider information to time their 
trading (sales and purchases) of stock options just before negative (bullet-dodging), or 
just after positive (spring-loading) earnings announcements (Yermack, 1997; Lie, 2005). 
Likewise, CEOs may also have explicit opportunistic timing incentives around earnings 
announcements when making stock donations at an appreciated local stock price, and 
thus they can gain personal financial benefits from maximizing income tax deductions. 




equals one if a CEO donates stocks with no opportunistic timing incentives around 
earnings announcements (non-“bullet-dodging” and non-“spring-loading”), and zero if 
they use the “bullet-dodging” or “spring-loading” timing strategies when making stock 
donations. I discuss more details about the sample construction, empirical analyses and 
results in Section 3.2.4 of Chapter Three. I obtain similar conclusions when regressing 
on fraud and accruals management, but no evidence of a significant negative effect on 
real activities manipulation.  
The last of the five alternative measures of CEO altruism further addresses a potential 
concern of measurement error in CEO altruism. CEOs may have opportunistic incentives 
to actively rebalance their wealth portfolio by donating shares after being awarded a 
significantly large value amount of stocks. Building on modern portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1952) and prior literature on portfolio diversification (Ofek and Yermack, 
2000; Jin, 2002), this new proxy captures whether stock donations made by CEOs 
represent genuine personal altruism or a strategic asset diversification to optimize CEO 
personal wealth. In my empirical analysis, I define the new proxy of CEO altruism as 
equal to one if a CEO donates stocks even when receiving no stock awards or a relatively 
small amount of stock awards (in dollar value) in the same fiscal year, and zero if a CEO 
makes stock donations after receiving a significantly large value amount of stock awards 
in the same fiscal year. Data for this measure are obtained from the Incentive Lab 
database. Section 3.2.5 in Chapter Three provides further details on the data collection, 
sample restrictions, empirical analyses and results. Other than for real activities 
management, similar results are obtained as in the last research extension to address the 
potential measurement error of CEO altruism.  
The second part in Chapter Three extends the CEO altruism effect to the readability 




and an opaque financial disclosure to obfuscate undesirable financial performance 
(Bloomfield, 2008; Li, 2008; Lo et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2018). The reduced readability of 
financial reports thus may cause potential costs to shareholders and corporate future 
performance, and thus it can be considered as a least serious form of financial 
misreporting. Following Bonsall IV et al. (2017), I use data on the Bog index to measure 
financial reporting readability during the 1996 to 2016 period. I replicate all earlier 
baseline regressions in Chapter Two and turn my attention to the CEO-altruism effect on 
the Bog Index. The empirical results suggest that firms led by altruistic CEOs produce 
more comprehendible financial reports than firms with non-altruistic CEOs. My findings 
provide further consistent evidence in support for my earlier findings which highlight the 
benefits of hiring altruistic CEOs in diminishing corporate financial reporting 
misconduct.  
 
1.3. Study 2: Difference in Degrees: CEO Educational Background and 
Corporate Environmental Responsibility 
 
My second study investigates the effect of differences in CEO’s educational 
background on corporate environmental responsibility and engagement. Beyond 
developing corporate financial performance, firm managers also focus on improving 
corporate engagement with corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives (Flammer, 
2013; Flammer, 2015; Hawn and Ioannou, 2016). Corporate environmental violations are 
associated with not only more significant impact on eco-systems and polluted natural 
resources but also a substantial loss of shareholder wealth (Flammer, 2013). Despite the 
importance of corporate environmental responsibility, little research specifically 




(Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Walls et al., 2012; Liu, 2018). Moreover, while prior 
literature examines the effect of personal managerial traits on the heterogeneity of 
corporate financial policies and decision-making outcomes, far less is known about the 
relationship between managerial backgrounds and characteristics, and environmental 
engagement and CSR ratings at a corporate level. My second study responds to the gaps 
in these two streams of literature by investigating whether CEOs’ educational 
backgrounds in science and MBA degrees have significant predictive power over 
corporate environmental engagement, and how differences in CEO degrees may explain 
the heterogeneity in environmental policies and practice across corporations.  
Building on the psychological literature, I extend upper echelons theory (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984) to develop a new theoretical framework by extending familiarity 
theory and self-efficacy theory to a novel corporate setting. Prior studies suggest that 
individuals prefer to take greater risks when they become more familiar with a subject 
matter, and are more risk-averse when dealing with unfamiliar ones (Flanders and 
Thistlethwaite, 1967; Millon and Lerner, 2003). Likewise, individuals show more risk-
taking and tend to be more confident to outperform in areas in which they are experts 
(Custódio and Metzger, 2014a; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018; Henderson et al., 2018). 
Based on this theoretical framework, scientist CEOs are trained with better understanding 
of science and technology knowledge including environmental science and have greater 
familiarity with the environmental aspects of their firms’ operations. I first hypothesize 
that science-educated CEOs are more likely to adopt risker environmental policies that 
lead to worse environmental CSR ratings. Conversely, CEOs with an MBA degree 
possess greater levels of human capital to deal with complicated business cases (Grimm 
and Smith, 1991; Geletkanycz and Black, 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Lewis et al., 




environmental responsibility as a strategic opportunity to enhance firm value. 
Consequently, MBA CEOs by virtue of their competency and familiarity with pursing 
business strategy, show greater confidence and become more aggressive to pursue the 
benefits from outperforming in environmental CSR. However, CEOs with an MBA 
education are more risk-averse when taking on additional environmental concerns which 
are not in their area of specialization. My second hypothesis suggests that MBA CEOs 
outperform non-MBA CEOs in environmental CSR ratings by conducting more risk-
averse environmental policies and practices.  
The empirical analysis examines a sample of S&P 1500 firms during 2000-2015. 
Data on the educational background of CEOs are hand-collected from Marquis Who’s 
Who database. I obtain environmental CSR ratings by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini 
(KLD) from the KLD MSCI Database. I then separately observe the number of 
environmental strengths and environmental concerns from the KLD dataset to measure 
and distinguish a firm’s environmental engagement with positive eco-friendly initiatives 
from its environmental weaknesses in the form of environmental concerns.  
To address my hypotheses, I first employ panel least squares regressions to regress 
CEO educational degrees on environmental CSR ratings, environmental strengths and 
concerns. I then conduct difference-in-difference analyses utilizing CEO turnovers to 
highlight the impacts of scientist CEOs and MBA CEOs on corporate environmental CSR 
ratings and engagements. The empirical results indicate that science-educated CEOs take 
greater environmental risks which result in lower CSR ratings while MBA-educated 
CEOs outperform non-MBA CEOs in overall environmental CSR ratings because MBA 
CEOs are more risk-averse in formulating risky environmental policies and tend to avoid 
taking additional environmental risks. This study improves the literature in both 




differences in CEO educational background can be a potent predictor of the heterogeneity 
in corporate environmental ratings and engagement. From the theoretical perspective, my 
novel theoretical framework, utilizing familiarity and self-efficacy theories, enables 
future researchers to conduct further research on executives’ self-perceived expertise and 
risk-taking tendencies. Finally, my findings have practical implications for corporate 
executives and directors in relation to CEO selection, and for training programs aimed at 




The contributions of this dissertation to the literature on personal managerial 
behaviours and corporate policies and decision-making are twofold. This thesis provides 
two novel theoretical frameworks, first, for future research on personal managerial 
altruism and its impact on decision-making outcomes at a corporate level, and second, 
for future research on personal managerial qualifications and managerial risk-taking 
tendencies within areas of expertise. Specifically, the first study develops a theoretical 
framework modelling a utility-maximizing function of a CEO with altruistic preferences 
and their decisions to (not) manipulate corporate earnings. This framework optimises the 
function of costs and benefits when corporate executives with different altruistic 
preferences choose to commit corporate misdeeds. The second study extends upper 
echelons theory by drawing on the theories of familiarization and self-efficacy to explain 
how CEO self-perceived expertise and familiarity with various issues, derived from their 
educational background, can influence corporate environmental engagement by 





Second, the thesis contributes to the literature on managerial traits and corporate 
financial reporting and environmental responsibility, two novel empirical studies which 
have not previously been explored. The first study in Chapter Two provides an empirical 
methodology to identify and measure the personal altruism of executives. Moreover, this 
study is the first to investigate the “bright-side” effect of CEO personal altruism on 
diminishing corporate misdeeds in financial reporting. Subsequently, the research 
extension in Chapter Three also provides various unique alternative measures of CEO 
altruism, including other CEO personal philanthropic activities, CEOs potential 
opportunistic intentions in making donations and an additional type of CEO charitable 
donation in the form of cash. Moreover, the extended research on the readability of 
financial reports is the first to highlight the impact of personal managerial altruism on 
improved corporate financial report readability. The second study in this thesis explores 
the influence of CEO educational background on formulating corporate environmental 
CSR policies and practices. This study sheds light on the literature examining how 
differences in CEOs’ science and MBA educations can explain some of the heterogeneity 
in their firms’ over environmental CSR performance and engagement.  
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two provides the study of 
personal managerial altruism and its impact on corporate malfeasance of financial 
reporting. Chapter Three provides the extension of the first study by addressing potential 
measurement error of CEO altruism and offering a further extension to investigate the 
effect of CEO altruism on the readability of financial reports. Chapter Four provides the 
study of CEO educational background and corporate environmental responsibility. 
Chapter Five concludes with a summary of the findings, the significance of the 




CHAPTER 2  
CEO PERSONAL ALTRUISM AND  






In 2017 Americans donated 410 billion dollars to U.S. charities, an increase of 5.2% 
on 2016, with much of this difference driven by extraordinary and large stock donations 
from philanthropists who are also CEOs (Giving USA 2018).2 Prominent examples 
include; Michael Dell and his wife, who gifted 1 billion dollars of stock to their 
foundation; Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, who pledged to donate 99% of their Facebook 
stock; and Warren Buffett, who gave away 3.17 billion dollars in Berkshire Hathaway 
stock to charitable organisations (Reuters, July 11th 2017). This remarkable generosity is 
consistent with recent research showing that altruism is the primary psychological motive 
for donating to charity (Konrath and Handy, 2018). While it is clear that these donations 
promote social welfare, far less is known about the relationship between personal 
philanthropy and the decision making of executives at the corporate level. Specifically, 
does the personal altruism of CEOs imply diminishing corporate malfeasance in financial 
reporting? 
 





Economic theory shows that personal altruism can influence the honesty of 
individual decision makers (Becker, 1976; Gneezy, 2005; Gino et al., 2013). Human 
altruism is an unconditional kindness such that one is willing to sacrifice their own 
resources to improve the well-being of others, without concealed motives (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Altruists do care about the well-being of 
others, and thus they may be more sensitive to the harm that their acts can cause to others 
(Gneezy, 2005; Gino et al., 2013). In theory, when altruistic CEOs are faced with deciding 
whether or not to commit corporate misdeeds, they should place added weigh on the 
benefits of their decisions for firms, shareholders and stakeholders other than themselves. 
They might therefore also be less likely to ‘cook the books’ or manipulate corporate 
earnings – something which is beneficial for executives but comes at the expense of long-
term shareholder value and future firm operating performance (Graham et al., 2005; 
Gunny, 2005; Bhojraj et al., 2009; Haynes et al., 2015). 
In contrast, greedy or selfish CEOs are more likely to act dishonestly whenever they 
can extract benefits from their actions, even if they harm others (Haynes et al., 2015; 
Haynes et al., 2017). Suspect CEOs are also more likely to act opportunistically or 
unethically, and are more likely to commit corporate malfeasance, especially if they have 
a track record of personal indiscretions (Biggerstaff et al., 2015; Cline et al., 2017). These 
characteristics distinguish egoistic from altruistic CEOs and imply that the likelihood of 
engaging in corporate financial reporting malfeasance is contingent upon the costs to 
long-term firm performance and stakeholder well-being. 
Schipper (1989) defines earnings management as “a purposeful intervention in the 
external financial reporting process, with the intention of obtaining some private gain”. 





accepted accounting principles (GAAP), is corporate fraud. Prior studies show that 
corporate financial fraud is associated with increased firm cost of capital (Dechow et al., 
1996), greater risk of litigation losses (Bonner et al., 1998), and damaged firm reputation 
(Cline et al., 2017). Corporate malfeasance in financial reporting can also take other, less 
severe, forms. For instance, CEOs can manipulate firm earnings based on real activities 
or by using accrual-based earning management, both of which can also increase the risk 
of losses in firm value. Gunny (2005) finds that real activities geared at manipulating 
earnings have an economically significant and negative impact on subsequent firm 
operating performance, while Bhojraj et al. (2009) show that firms using accrual-based 
earnings management sacrifice future firm operating and stock performance to beat short-
term analyst forecasts. In addition, prior research also shows that accrual-based earning 
management increases the risk of audit and other regulatory scrutiny (Graham et al., 2005; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012), and that corporate financial misstatement harms 
shareholders via substantial litigation losses (Bonner et al., 1998; Palmrose and Scholz, 
2004). 
I sort corporate malfeasance in financial reporting from most serious (corporate 
fraud), to intermediate (real activities manipulation), to least serious (accrual-based 
earnings management), based on the costs and associated risks of each form of earnings 
manipulation. Given the significant repercussions of all three malfeasance levels for firm 
performance, shareholder wealth, and the well-being of stakeholders, I hypothesize that 
firms with altruistic CEOs will be less likely to commit fraud, and will also be less likely 






To address my hypothesized CEO-altruism effect, I use CEO personal stock 
donations as a proxy for CEO altruism because donating stocks to charity is a type of 
giving that is motivated by human altruism (Konrath and Handy, 2018). My sample 
consists of 32,741 stock donations from 4,014 unique CEOs listed on the Thomson 
Reuters Insider Trading database between 1996 and 2016. Since I am interested in the 
effect of CEO altruism on corporate financial reporting malfeasance, I use two main data 
sources to compute my dependent variables. First, I extract data on accounting fraud from 
the SEC’s series of published Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).3 
Second, I use COMPUSTAT to capture earnings manipulation, including both real 
activities management and discretionary accruals (Dechow et al., 1995; Roychowdhury, 
2006; Kim et al., 2012). My study also relies on control variables including firm 
characteristics, corporate governance measures, and executive incentives, all of which are 
extracted from COMPUSTAT, 13-F filings, Risk Metrics, EXECUCOMP and Marquis 
Who’s Who. 
Motivated by prior research on CEO backdating of stock gifts (Jung and Park, 2009; 
Yermack, 2009; Ghosh and Harjoto, 2011; Avci et al., 2016), my empirical analyses show 
that CEO stock donations can present various degrees of an executive’s personal altruism. 
Specifically, the stock donations of CEOs who intentionally time their endowments to 
maximize their tax deductions demonstrate less altruistic behaviour relative to stock 
donations by CEOs who do not time their endowments. I argue that CEOs who make 
stock donations without self-interested fiscal preferences (i.e. without backdating or tax-
 
3 The SEC takes enforcement actions again corporations and corporate executives, auditors and other 
insiders involved in violations of SEC and federal rules. The SEC reviews the financial statements of public 
firms each year and assesses firm compliance with GAAP. At the completion of a significant investigation 





based timing of donations) demonstrate stronger altruism. Following my first hypothesis, 
I hypothesize that CEOs with higher levels of altruism will be associated with greater 
declines in all three levels of corporate financial reporting malfeasance. 
My univariate results examine corporate financial reporting malfeasance against 
dummies for CEO donations, CEO backdating, and CEO tax planning incentives. These 
initial results are in line with my hypotheses and suggest that firms with CEOs who donate 
stock, without backdating and without acting according to tax incentives, are less likely 
to be the subject of SEC AAERs and have lower average values of abnormal accruals and 
abnormal real activities management, relative to firms without altruistic CEOs. 
To better examine my hypotheses, I use panel regression models of corporate 
financial malfeasance as a function of CEO personal altruism. My regression results also 
indicate that managerial altruism is associated with lower financial reporting 
malfeasance, after controlling for industry and year fixed effects, as well as firm and CEO 
characteristics. Specifically, I estimate that the probabilities of fraud, real activities and 
discretionary accrual-based earnings management each decrease by about 41.3%, 14.0% 
and 13.9%, respectively, when the number of times a CEO donates stock increases by one 
standard deviation. Second, I find evidence of an economic effect from higher levels of 
altruism, as captured through CEOs avoiding backdating and tax planning incentives. On 
average, firms with more altruistic CEOs, display probabilities of fraud, real activities 
and discretionary accrual-based earnings management which are about 58.1%, 90.7% and 
87.4% lower than those of firms with less altruistic CEOs who do not donate stock or 
who make self-interested donations. My findings are consistent both when using a 





One concern is that my results might be endogenously determined. First, the omission 
of unobservable characteristics can increase the risk of spurious correlation between CEO 
altruism and corporate financial reporting malfeasance. To address this issue, I control 
for time-invariant firm-specific characteristics. In this analysis, my sample includes only 
firms which experience a CEO turnover, and specifically those firms which go from 
having a more altruistic CEO to a less altruistic CEO, or vice versa. I use data on CEO 
turnovers from the EXECUCOMP database. I find that firms run by altruistic CEOs (i.e. 
those more likely to donate stock), on average, have a 2.6% lower probability of fraud, 
and 4.7% and 16.3% lower probabilities of using real activities and discretionary accruals, 
respectively. These results hold while I control for differences in firm characteristics, 
corporate governance variables, and CEO incentives, as well as when I include industry, 
firm and year fixed effects. Admittedly, I recognize that I cannot control for all potentially 
relevant CEO characteristics, and also that these can change due to CEO transitions. 
My firm effects regressions on the sample of transitioning CEOs may not be 
sufficient to address the possibility of selection bias among CEOs who experiences a 
turnover. To address this concern, I use propensity score matching estimators and 
different-in-different (DID) approach to compare differences in corporate financial 
reporting malfeasance between the treated firms (those experience a CEO replacement 
from a non/less-altruistic CEO to an altruistic CEO) and the control firms (those 
experience a CEO turnover from a non/less-altruistic to another non/less-altruistic CEO) 
from the pre-turnover to post-turnover periods. I employ a propensity score matching 
approach to pair-match each treated firms with a control firm that experiences a CEO 
turnover from a non/less-altruistic CEO to a non/less-altruistic CEO during the entire 





replacement of a more altruistic CEO for a non/less-altruistic CEO) on corporate financial 
reporting malfeasance, compared to the matched control firms. My results show that in 
the prior turnover period, the treated firms significantly manipulate discretionary accruals 
more than the control firm. However, in the post-CEO turnover period, the treated firms 
with a CEO transition of an altruistic CEO for a non-altruistic CEO, experience 37.4% 
lower average accruals management relative to control firms without a replacement to an 
altruistic CEO. The difference in differences of accruals management from the prior to 
the post-turnover period the between the treated and control firms is negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that the treatment effect (a CEO turnover of an 
altruistic CEO for a non-altruistic CEO) in the treated firms, decreases discretionary 
accruals, on average, by approximately, 15.2%, when compared to the average value of 
accruals management of firms in my sample. Similar conclusions are obtained when I 
examine changes in the probabilities of fraud and real activities manipulation for the 
sample of transition firms. 
Finally, another concern in my initial estimations might be driven by a potential 
simultaneity bias. The simultaneous causality may potentially arise because CEOs may 
donate more stocks when they manipulate earnings to be high such that the stock price 
goes up, to gain their personal tax benefits from their donations of appreciated stocks. To 
address this concern, I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions with a binary 
endogenous variable of CEO stock donations and a binary instrumental variable (IV) for 
CEOs who engage in child-caregiving activities. Data for this is again collected from the 
Marquis Who’s Who database. To select my IV I follow the attachment theory of 
Ainsworth et al. (1978) and Bowlby (1982), which argues that altruistic behaviour can be 





needs, and especially for infants and young children. Theoretically, my IV meets the 
relevancy condition because it is correlated with personal altruistic behaviours 
(Ainsworth et al., 1978; Bowlby, 1982; Mikulincer et al., 2005), and also satisfies the 
exclusion condition because there is no reason to think that managerial influence on 
corporate financial reporting will lead to changes in involvement with voluntary 
caregiving to children. The results from my 2SLS estimations continue to show a 
statistically significant negative effect of CEO altruism on corporate financial 
malfeasance. 
In addition, I also employ several alternative measures of CEO altruism to keep my 
results free from potential measurement errors of personal management altruism. 
Following the psychology literature, I first use a dummy based on the number of 
humanitarian awards received as an alternative proxy for CEO personal altruism. Data 
for this are collected from the Marquis Who’s Who database. I reach similar conclusions 
when I use this measure to proxy for CEO altruism.  
Moreover, to address common concerns on the complicated nature of recipients of 
CEO donations, I then inspect whether CEOs donate stocks to recipients who are external 
charitable organisations or who are family members, family funds and other entities 
related to CEOs’ own personal benefits. I use this measure as an alternative explanatory 
variable of the CEO-altruism effect. My results are consistent for real activities and 
discretionary accruals manipulation, but not significantly holding for corporate fraud. In 
addition, I reach similar conclusions when I investigate whether CEOs make cash 
donations (of $200 or more) with altruistic preferences to political committees and parties 
which primarily supports for family, child, female, elderly, health care, environment, 





My results might be further subject to measurement error that CEOs may donate 
stocks before negative earnings announcements or after positive earnings announcements. 
In either case, CEOs’ stock donations are more likely to reflect their exploitation of 
insider information and tax planning consideration. To address this potential concern, I 
examine the timing pattern of CEO stock donations around the quarterly earnings 
announcements. Specifically, I consider whether or not CEOs well-time their stock 
donations just before negative earnings announcements (bullet-dodging), or just after 
favourable earnings (spring-loading). I obtain similar conclusions when regressing on 
fraud and accruals management, but no evidence of a significant negative effect on real 
activities manipulation.  
Finally, another potential measurement error in my primary proxy of CEO altruism 
is that CEOs may donate more stocks after receiving additional stocks in their firms. To 
address this additional concern, I investigate the effect of CEO altruism, which 
alternatively is proxied by whether CEOs donate stocks without their strategic incentives 
to actively rebalance their wealth portfolio after receiving a significantly large value 
amount of their firm stocks. Other than real activities management, similar results are 
obtained in this robustness check.  
To examine the CEO altruism effect on a boarder forms of corporate financial 
reporting, I examine the effect of CEO altruism on corporate malfeasance in the context 
of the readability of annual financial reports that top managers can use complex disclosure 
to hide information from investors. My results also remain consistent and strongly support 
for my main hypotheses. 
My research contributes to three streams of literature. The first examines prosocial 





et al., 2001; Anderhub et al., 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; 
Tyran, 2004; Riedl and Tyran, 2005; Ackert et al., 2006; Cabrales and Charness, 2013), 
and corporate performance and portfolio choice (Riedl and Smeets, 2013; Haynes et al., 
2015). Much of this research uses laboratory or field data on generalised types of other-
regarding preferences rather than altruism as measured by significant acts of financial 
philanthropy. As far as I know, my study is the first to empirically investigate the effect 
of personal managerial altruism on corporate decision making in the context of financial 
reporting malfeasance. 
The second literature steam studies how senior management uses personal 
managerial caring to set organisational tone and to influence corporate decision making. 
Cronqvist and Yu (2017) find a positive association between CEO prosocial preferences 
and corporate social responsibility when CEOs have daughters. Although I also examine 
personal prosocial effect, my study provides novel evidence on the influence of CEO 
altruism on diminishing corporate malfeasance in financial reporting, after controlling for 
the prosocial effects of female socialisation captured by CEOs having daughters 
(Cronqvist and Yu, 2017). 
The third literature stream explores the ‘dark-side’ effect of personal managerial 
traits on corporate financial reporting misconduct. Prior studies focus on misdeeds 
revealed in personal lives of executives, including legal infractions (Davidson et al., 
2015); allegations of dishonesty, substance abuse, sexual misadventure, and violence 
(Cline et al., 2017); as well as marital infidelity (Griffin et al., 2017). In contrast, my study 
focuses on the benefits of having altruistic CEOs who are associated with reduced 





between the beneficial effects of personal and corporate philanthropy in minimizing 
corporate financial malfeasance. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
underlying theoretical framework of utility-maximizing altruistic executives and 
develops my CEO-altruism effect hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, sample 
construction and summary statistics. Section 4 presents univariate and multivariate 
analyses which investigate the effect of CEO altruism on corporate financial malfeasance, 
and further reports robust results for potential endogeneity concerns. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Theoretical and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Theoretical framework 
 
I present a simple theoretical framework modelling a utility-maximizing function of 
a CEO with altruistic preferences in the context of his decision making to manipulate 
corporate earnings. To illustrate, I assume that a representative executive can engage in 
earnings management (e) to generate private benefits4 B(e), where B(e) is an increasing 
function such that 
𝑑𝐵(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
 > 0 and 
𝑑2𝐵(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒2
 < 0. However, corporate misdeeds in the reporting 
of earnings can reduce the well-being of stakeholders and shareholders, denoted S(e), 
where S(e) is a decreasing function and 
𝑑𝑆(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
 < 0. To the extent that executives cannot 
 
4 These benefits include increased equity-based incentive compensation (Cheng and Warfield, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2008), 
increased insider stock trading benefits (Collins and Hribar, 2000; Beneish and Vargus, 2002; Sloan, 2005; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), and boosting operational flexibility and managerial control power 





commit corporate misdeeds without impunity, earnings manipulation also imposes 
potential costs to firms, corporate managers, and stakeholders5, which I denote C(e), 
where C(e) is an increasing function such that 
𝑑𝐶(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒
 > 0 and 
𝑑2𝐶(𝑒)
𝑑𝑒2
  > 0. The standard 
utility function of 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 is: 
𝑈𝑖 = 𝐵(𝑒) + 𝛼𝑖𝑆 − 𝐶(𝑒)                                                                                                               (𝟏) 
where 𝑈𝑖 is the utility of 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 and 𝛼𝑖  is the degree of personal altruism of 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖. I assume 
that 𝛼𝑖 is constant and that 0 ≤  𝛼𝑖  ≤  +∞ such that 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 either has no altruistic 
preferences (𝛼𝑖 = 0), or altruistic preferences (𝛼𝑖 > 0), represented in their utility 
function. The utility-maximising function of 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 can then be described by taking the 













= 0                                                                                  (𝟐) 
Proposition 1: CEOs with altruistic personal preferences will be less likely to manipulate 
firm earnings than CEOs with no altruistic preferences. 
















 ; ∀𝑒 (3b). From (3a) and (3b), I have 𝒆𝛼𝑖 > 0
∗ <  𝒆𝛼𝑖=𝟎
∗∗ . This implies that 
to maximize the utility of engaging in earnings management, altruistic CEOs, who care 
about the well-being of stakeholders, will manipulate earnings less than non-altruistic 
CEOs, who does not care about the well-being of stakeholders. 
 
5 The potential costs of earnings management include forced CEO turnover (Hazarika et al., 2012), 
transparency costs to shareholders (Leuz et al., 2003), increased costs of external financing (Dechow et al., 
1996), higher risk of auditor and regulatory scrutiny, and corporate ligation losses (Bonner et al., 1998; 





Proposition 2: Altruistic CEOs with higher levels of altruism will manipulate reported 
earnings less than altruistic CEOs who have lower levels of altruism.  
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, if I take the derivative of e with respect to 𝛼, and 
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 that results in 
𝑑𝑒
𝑑𝛼
 < 0 (4).This theoretical 
framework thus implies that earnings manipulation is negatively associated with the 
personal altruism of CEOs. In other words, altruistic CEOs with higher levels of personal 
altruism will manipulate reported earnings less than altruistic CEOs with lower levels of 
personal altruism. 
 
2.2.2 CEO personal characteristics and financial reporting 
 
Research on the effects of top executives’ personal characteristics on corporate-level 
decision outcomes was largely limited until Hambrick and Mason (1984) developed 
Upper Echelons Theory. This theory suggests that personal managerial characteristics 
affect how top executives assess and interpret the situations they face, and that this can 
lead their decision making at a corporate level (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick, 
2007). Consistent with the theory, prior empirical studies show that managerial fixed 
effects have an impact on corporate decisions and performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Fee et al., 2013), and on ethics in financial reporting (Bamber et al., 2010; Dyreng 





Other studies take significant steps toward showing the effect of specific managerial 
styles, rather than merely managerial fixed effects, on corporate decisions and policies. 
These studies report significant associations between CEO overconfidence and corporate 
investment and financing decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Malmendier et 
al., 2011; Yu, 2014b), CEO optimism and corporate investment and cash holdings 
policies (Lin et al., 2005; Campbell et al., 2011; Langabeer and DelliFraine, 2011; Davis 
et al., 2015; Huang-Meier et al., 2016), and CEO perquisite and professional abilities and 
corporate performance and financial policies (Yermack, 2006; Kaplan et al., 2012; 
Custódio and Metzger, 2014b). Moreover, previous studies also show behavioural 
consistencies between personal executive risk-taking experience and corporate risk 
(Malmendier and Nagel, 2011; Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Cain and McKeon, 2016), 
and CEO personal debt and corporate leverage (Cronqvist et al., 2012). 
Prior research also finds evidence linking the personal characteristics of executives 
to corporate financial reporting practices. Some examples are the relation between CEO 
overconfidence and earnings manipulation (Schrand and Zechman, 2012; Yu, 2014a), 
CEO facial masculinity and financial misreporting (Jia et al., 2014), and CEO military 
experience and corporate tax avoidance and financial fraud (Law and Mills, 2013; 
Benmelech and Frydman, 2015). Finally, some recent studies have linked executives’ 
personal misdeeds (i.e. allegations of dishonesty, legal infractions, criminal conduct and 
marital infidelity) to corporate financial misconduct and performance (Davidson et al., 






2.2.3 CEO personal altruism and corporate malfeasance in financial reporting 
 
My study also builds on the social psychology literature that describes personal 
altruism as a prosocial behaviour – any behaviour which increases the welfare of others 
without a direct benefit to the person who performs it (Penner et al., 2005; Ariely et al., 
2009; Dovidio et al., 2017). Prior research in social biology shows that there are areas of 
the human brain which are responsible for empathy, altruism and helping (Lieberman, 
2010), that in turn directly affect individuals’ cognitive decision processes. However, 
personal altruism can be more pronounced for some individuals, in part because of their 
biological nature and in part due to social learning from other people (Batson, 2011). I 
therefore expect that differences in the altruistic preferences of CEOs will lead to 
differences in terms of decision outcomes via changes in the cognitive process. In contrast 
to this, Becker (1968) suggests that the decision to commit fraud is the outcome of 
personal cost-benefit analyses. However, in the presence of altruistic preferences in the 
cognitive process, CEOs should consider not only their own costs and benefits, but also 
the well-being of other firm stakeholders. 
With respect to the trade-off between the costs and benefits of financial malfeasance, 
prior research suggests that corporate malfeasance including accounting fraud and 
earnings manipulations, purposely benefits a minority of shareholders and top managers 
at the expense of firms and the majority of other stakeholders.6 In addition, CEOs who 
behave altruistically are more likely to experience greater emotional costs from 
committing fraud. Indeed, in order to optimize their utility, altruistic CEOs will be less 
 





likely to commit corporate misdeeds where the costs to others outweigh any benefits. 
Thus, my first hypothesis is: 
H1: Firms with altruistic CEOs are less likely to engage in corporate financial 
reporting malfeasance. 
 
Specifically, conditional on the degree to which altruism can affect corporate 
malfeasance, I hypothesize: 
H1a: Firms with altruistic CEOs are less likely to commit fraud. 
H1b: Firms with altruistic CEOs are less likely to undertake real activities to 
manipulate corporate earnings. 
H1c: Firms with altruistic CEOs are less likely to engage in accrual-based 
earnings manipulation. 
 
2.2.4 Level of personal managerial altruism reflected in CEO stock donations 
 
Prior research on charitable giving indicates that the tax considerations of charitable 
donations are relevant to donors (Randolph, 1995a; Auten et al., 2002). For example, 
Auten et al. (2002) show that tax reform and changes in the relevant tax treatment of 
donations significantly affect the level of giving. Moreover, Randolph (1995) finds that 
donors may time their gifts in order to maximize deductions when tax rates are high. 
Other research also shows that firm executives can backdate their stock donations to 
maximize their personal tax deductions (Yermack, 2009; Ghosh and Harjoto, 2011; Avci 





historical stock price date as their gift date,7 and implies that such stock donations are 
reported with delays.8 The greater the time elapsed between the gift and filing dates, the 
greater the opportunity for CEOs to backdate their donation (Yermack, 2009). To the 
extent that CEOs cannot gain tax benefits from backdating without impunity, backdated 
stock donations can be recognized by shareholders as a signal of managers with self-
interested, rather than purely altruistic, incentives. For example, Ghosh and Harjoto 
(2011) find that shareholders react more negatively to donations that are announced later 
rather than earlier on in the year. Thus, CEOs making backdated stock donations 
demonstrate less altruism than CEOs who do not. 
Given the heterogeneity in stock donations, I further argue that, in addition to 
donation backdating, other tax-based incentives around the timing of stock donations can 
also provide insight into the motivations of philanthropic CEOs. Specifically, in the U.S. 
personal annual tax liabilities manifest in December. This is an ideal time for executives 
with tax planning incentives to donate stocks. I draw on the limited-capacity theory of 
attention, which suggests that humans are cognitively limited when processing 
information (Engle and Kane, 2004; Posner and Snyder, 2004), to argue that CEOs will 
not be able to focus on tax planning at all times. Instead, I expect that CEOs will pay 
greater attention to their tax affairs during the peak of the December tax season. 
Therefore, stock donations made around tax time can be interpreted as being driven at 
 
7 Gift date refers to the date reported in the SEC filing Form 4 in which a corporate insider (such as a CEO) 
gifts stock. Gift dates are different to filing dates – where a filing date is the date a corporate insider (such 
as a CEO) reports filing a Form 4 and submits it to the SEC. Filing dates must occur after a gift date. 
Donated stock transactions are only effective once the SEC receives a Form 4. 
8 The SEC requires that insiders report their stock gifts within 45 days of fiscal year end for the period in 





least in part by managerial self-interest. I characterize CEOs who make stock donations 
in line with their personal taxation interests as less altruistic than CEOs who do not. Thus, 
my second hypothesis is: 
H2: Firms with altruistic CEOs who donate stocks without personal financial 
motives have a lower probability of corporate financial reporting malfeasance. 
 
And, dependent on the degree to which it can impact corporate malfeasance: 
H2a: Firms with altruistic CEOs who donate stocks without personal financial 
motives are less likely to commit fraud. 
H2b: Firms with altruistic CEOs who donate stocks without personal financial 
motives are less likely to undertake real activities to manipulate corporate 
earnings. 
H2c: Firms with altruistic CEOs who donate stocks without personal financial 
motives are less likely to engage in accrual-based earnings manipulation. 
 
2.3 Data, Sample Construction and Summary Statistics 
2.3.1 CEO stock donations 
 
The identification of personal altruism is not straightforward. Limited information 
on the personal behaviours of CEOs and insufficient data on the psychological factors 
related to personal managerial altruism make it challenging to empirically identify and 
completely measure personal managerial altruism. To overcome these issues, I use CEO 





is a type of charitable giving that is motivated by human altruism (Konrath and Handy, 
2018) in order to contribute good works to society (Yermack, 2009; Avci et al., 2016). 
Further, it is also feasible to access data on managerial stock donations through U.S. SEC 
Form 4 filings. Another advantage is that CEO personal stock donations are, by definition, 
distinct from corporate charitable contributions, thereby allowing us to examine the effect 
of managerial altruism, separate from the effect of corporate charitable culture, on 
corporate financial disclosure malfeasance. 
Gifts of stock made by corporate CEOs are required to be publicly reported to the 
SEC either via Form 4 or Form 5 filings. Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, the SEC 
requires disclosures of open market sales and purchases on Form 4 filings within two 
business days of the transaction. However, older disclosure rules continue to apply to 
Form 5 for bona fide gifts of stock, such that the SEC allows filing to be submitted up to 
45 days after the end of a company’s fiscal year.  
I collect data on stock donations by corporate CEOs from the Thomson Financial 
Insider Trading database between 1996 and 2016 (TFN insider filing data).9 This data is 
compiled from the Form 4 and Form 5 SEC filings of corporate insiders. Since I am 
interested in stock donations by CEOs, I retrieve all transactions by way of gift 
(transaction code G) made by insiders who list one of their job titles as CEO (rolecode = 
CEO). I exclude observations that Thomson indicates are problematic or unable to be 
cleaned because of missing, invalid or inconsistent data. Following Yermack (2009), I 
exclude gifts of securities other than common stock (e.g. preferred stock or warrants). To 
 
9 To avoid missing data and sample selection bias when merging data on stock donations with other data 
used in my empirical analysis, I choose 1996 as the first year I look at, since data on corporate governance 





avoid double-counting donations, I also drop duplicated observations of gifts which are 
reported more than once. Moreover, to reduce heterogeneity in the CEO-altruism effect 
caused by a firm having multiple CEOs in a single fiscal year, I exclude a small number 
of observations where firms had more than one CEO donate stock during a year. This 
filtering leaves us with 32,741 unique stock donations from 4,014 unique CEOs between 
1996 and 2016. Using this sample, I then generate three measures of CEO stock 
donations. First, I create a dummy of stock donations (DumDonate) that equals one if a 
CEO made a stock donation during a calendar year, and zero otherwise. Second, I use a 
continuous variable which captures the total number of CEO stock donations (#Donate) 
in a given year. Finally, I calculate the ratio of shares donated to total shares owned in the 
firm (DonateRatio). 
Following Yermack (2009), I capture potential backdating of stock gifts by looking 
at the number of days elapsed between the reported gift date and its SEC filing date. 
Longer reporting delays allow CEOs to select from larger sets of dates for backdating 
purposes (Yermack, 2009; Ghosh and Harjoto, 2011; Avci et al., 2016). Moreover, prior 
studies show that reporting time lags can vary from short delays of three to twenty days, 
to long delays of more than twenty days (Avci et al., 2016), up to until the next calendar 
year (Yermack, 2009). I thus use a strict criterion and define CEOs as less likely to 
backdate when their donation is within two trading days of the filing date. For CEOs with 





all stock donations in that year are non-backdated (i.e. SEC filing is within two trading 
days of the donation date).10 
To capture CEO tax planning incentives, I develop a dummy for whether SEC filings 
occur during the off-peak period in the U.S. federal tax season. This covers all time 
periods except the period from the 1st of December to the 15th of April of the next calendar 
year. In keeping with my approach for CEOs who make more than one stock donation in 
a year, I calculate NonTaxplanning as a dummy equal to one for CEOs who have all of 
their stock donations filed outside of the peak tax season, and zero otherwise.11 
 
2.3.2 Levels of corporate malfeasance in financial reporting 
 
I first consider fraud – the most aggressive form of earnings management which 
violates the GAAP. Following Dechow et al. (2011), I extract data on accounting fraud 
from the SEC’s series of published AAERs. AAERs represent cases where the SEC has 
sufficient evidence of accounting or auditing misconduct against firms and corporate 
executives. I initially collect a sample of 1,327 AAERs, on 506 unique firms, released 
between 1996 and 2016. I then drop firms with missing GVKEY and inconsistent 
reporting periods, leaving us with 905 AAERs on 347 distinct firms in my final sample. 
Second, I look at real activities manipulation – purposeful managerial actions 
directed at operational activities which create abnormal changes in operational cash flow 
 
10 My results are also significant and consistent when I use two other criteria for calculating NonBackdate 
including (1) when CEOs have more than 50 percent non-backdated donations, or (2) when CEOs have at 
least one non-backdated donation in a calendar year. 
11 My results are also significant and consistent when I apply two similar criteria (when CEOs have more 





(OCF) (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). Roychowdhury (2006) shows that CEOs can 
influence reported earnings by manipulating sales, overproduction, or by cutting 
discretionary expenditures. These activities potentially impose greater long-term costs on 
certain shareholders because they can negatively affect future cash flows and may hurt 
long-term firm performance (Roychowdhury, 2006; Chi et al., 2011). Following 
Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), I use three 
proxies of real activities management, including abnormal OCF, abnormal discretionary 
expenditures, and abnormal production costs. To capture the overall effect, I sum the 
absolute values of all abnormal real activities to create an aggregate measure of real 
earnings management which reflects attempts to alter earnings in both positive and 
negative directions (Cohen et al., 2008; Chi et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012). 
Data to estimate my proxies of real activities management are from the 
COMPUSTAT database. I drop firms from the financial and utilities industries, and I 
require at least ten observations in each industry-year grouping for my regressions. To 
eliminate extreme observations, I also winsorize all measures of real earnings 
management at the top and bottom 1%. Following Roychowdhury (2006) and Cohen et 
al. (2008), I measure abnormal OCF, discretionary expenses and production costs as the 












+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                          (𝟓) 
where 𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is operational cash flow of firm i in year t (annual COMPUSTAT data item 
308); 𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is total assets in year t-1 (data item 6); 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is year t sales (data item 12); 



















+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                          (𝟔) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑖,𝑡 are production costs, defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (data item 









+  𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                 (𝟕) 
where 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 are discretionary expenses in year t, defined as the sum of advertising 
expenses (data item 45), R&D expenses (data item 46) and SG&A expense (data item 
189). Abnormal OCF, abnormal discretionary expenses, and abnormal production costs 
are then computed as the differences between the actual values and the levels predicted 
by equations (5) to (7), respectively. The aggregate measure of real activities management 
(RealActMan) is the sum of the absolute values of all three abnormal real activities. 
Third, I look at accrual-based earnings management – achieved when executives 
change the accounting methods or estimates within GAAP choices used to represent 
underlying firm activities (Zang, 2012). Income data on firms is again extracted from the 
COMPUSTAT database. I use the cross-sectional model of Jones (1991) to estimate firm 
discretionary accruals because this model outperforms time-series models in detecting 












+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                                                                        (𝟖) 
 
12 I also calculate discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 1995), the modified 
Jones model with book-to-market (Larcker and Richardson, 2004) and the modified Jones model with 
matched firm performance (Kothari et al., 2005). I obtain similar conclusions about the CEO-altruism effect 
on accrual-based earning management when using these measures of discretionary accruals, consistent with 





where 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the total accruals of firm i in year t, measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (COMPUSTAT data 
item 123) and operating cash flows (data item 308); and 𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is gross property, plant 
and equipment (data item 8). The residual 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 from equation (8) is the measure of 
discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Following Klein (2002), Cohen et al. (2008) and Hazarika et al. (2012), I use the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals (DisAcc) to detect accrual-based earnings 
management because corporate executives can use discretionary accruals both to increase 
or to decrease reported earnings. CEOs can inflate earnings upwards to boost their equity-
based compensation (Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et al., 2007) or to mislead certain 
stakeholders about firm performance when issuing new equity (Friedlan, 1994; Teoh et 
al., 1998). However, managers also have incentives to deflate reported earnings before 
re-issuing options (Coles et al., 2006), before share repurchases (Gong et al., 2008), or to 
strategically time-shift income to show stable growth over time (Hazarika et al., 2012). 
Taking the absolute value of abnormal accruals allows us to account for attempts to 
manipulate earnings in both directions. 
 
2.3.3 Control variables 
 
I follow Burns and Kedia (2006) and control for a number of standard firm 
characteristics that could affect financial reporting behaviour. Firm size (Size) is 
measured as the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Firm age (Age) is calculated 





for the potential effects of different firm lifecycle stages. Leverage is the long-term debt 
scaled by total assets, and controls for leverage-based incentives in earnings management. 
To control for firm performance I use ROA, defined as the ratio of earnings before interest 
and taxes to total assets. I also follow Armstrong et al. (2013) in controlling for other 
determinants of AAERs, real activities management, and discretionary accruals, 
including firm capital intensity (CAPEX), intangible assets (Intangibles), and the size of 
firms’ inventories (Inventory) and receivables (Receivables). Moreover, Bergstresser and 
Philippon (2006) and Jiang et al. (2010) suggest that the volatility of a firm’s operating 
environment can affect accruals management and earnings quality, so I control for cash 
flow volatility (CFOVol) and sales volatility (SalesVol). 
Following Burns et al. (2010) and Biggerstaff et al. (2015), I also control for 
corporate governance characteristics that could be related to the incidence of accounting 
fraud and earnings manipulation. Specifically, I use the level of institutional ownership 
(InstOwnership), obtained from the Thomson Financial 13-F database, and the percentage 
of independent directors (BoardIndep), obtained from the ISS database (Beasley, 1996). 
Moreover, to control for the CEO’s equity-based compensation incentives and agency 
conflicts, I also control for CEO ownership, defined as the percentage of total shares 
(excluding options) owned by a CEO (Biggerstaff et al., 2015). The data for these are 
extracted from the ExecuComp database. Finally, to proxy for any potential caring effect 
(i.e., female socialization), I also control for CEOs who have daughters (Cronqvist and 
Yu, 2017). I include Daughter in my regressions, a dummy equal to one for CEOs who 







2.3.4 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 1 shows summary statistics and correlations for the variables in my sample. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for my dependent variables. Specifically, 7.4% of 
the sampled firms commit accounting and financial fraud during my sample window. The 
average absolute values of abnormal real activities management and discretionary 
accruals are approximately 1.4% and 1.1% of lagged total assets, respectively. My sample 
includes 11.5% of CEOs who make stock donations and the average number of times a 
CEO in my sample donates within a year is 0.346. Also, CEO stock donations on average 
comprise 1.6% of the total stock owned by CEOs in their firms. 
Panel A of Table 2.1 also presents summary statistics for my firm, corporate 
governance, and CEO incentive variables. In particular, firms in my sample have an 
average market value of 0.485 billion dollars. Average firm age is approximately 2.5 
years. Sample firms have an average leverage ratio of 0.3, return on assets of -1.7%, a 
capital intensity ratio of 0.263, an intangibles-to-assets ratio of 0.265, and an inventory-
to-assets ratio of 0.155. On average, the volatilities of sales and cash flows are about 
17.7% and 9.8% over the most recent two years, respectively. My sampled firms also 
have, on average, 31.6% and 61.5% of total outstanding shares owned by institutional 
investors and CEOs, respectively. Independent directors account for around 18% of the 
total number of company directors. 
Table 2.1, Panel B provides correlations among the variables in my main tests. Real 
activities management is significantly and positively correlated with discretionary 
accruals (0.667), suggesting that some CEOs use both of these methods to alter reported 





between my donation variables (DumDonate, #Donate and DonateRatio) and my proxies 
for the level of altruism characterized in CEO stock donations (NonBackdate and 
NonTaxplanning), suggesting that CEOs are consistent in their altruism when making 
stock donations. Further, these altruistic behaviour variables are negatively correlated 
with all of the earnings management variables, but only have a significant negative 
correlation with Fraud. This suggests that the CEO-altruism effect might be more 
pronounced in preventing CEOs from committing corporate fraud, the most aggressive 





Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table presents descriptive statistics and correlations for my dependent variables, main variables of interest, and control variables. 






Panel B: Correlation Matrix  
  Mean Median Std. Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
Dependent variables                        
(1) Fraud 0.074 0.000 0.162 1.000                   
(2) RealActMan 1.388 0.452 46.278  0.008 1.000                   
(3) DisAcc 1.113 0.114 44.255  0.002 0.667a 1.000                  
Variables of interest                         
(4) DumDonate 0.115 0.000 0.334  -0.877a -0.005 -0.005 1.000                 
(5) # Donate 0.346 0.000 1.617  -0.165a -0.003 -0.003 0.607a 1.000                
(6) DonateRatio 0.016 0.000 0.101  -0.124a -0.002 -0.003 0.452a 0.397a 1.000               
(7) NonBackdate 0.029 0.000 0.171  -0.119a -0.002 -0.002 0.481a 0.189a 0.180a 1.000              
(8) NonTaxplanning 0.051 0.000 0.235  -0.171a -0.003 -0.003 0.648a 0.287a 0.293a 0.470a 1.000             
Primary Controls                         
(9) Size 0.485 0.363 0.640  -0.024b 0.032a 0.024a 0.070a 0.052a 0.028a 0.042a 0.046a 1.000            
(10) Age 2.526 2.565 0.512  -0.093a -0.004 0.000 0.075a 0.041a 0.032a 0.107a 0.051a -0.078a 1.000           
(11) Leverage 0.333 0.202 2.697  0.004 0.013a 0.012a -0.016a -0.009b -0.006 -0.009b -0.011a 0.142a -0.014a 1.000          
(12) ROA -0.017 0.110 5.075  0.005 0.456a 0.210a 0.007c 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.007c -0.076a 0.017a -0.051a 1.000         
(13) CAPEX 0.263 0.200 0.217  -0.090a -0.013a -0.008b 0.006 0.010a -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.155a -0.014a 0.014a 0.016a 1.000        
(14) Intangibles 0.265 0.022 11.815  -0.007 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.036a -0.016a 0.003 -0.008b -0.013a 1.000       
(15) Inventory 0.155 0.118 0.144  -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.010b -0.014a -0.017a -0.013a -0.003 -0.091a 0.032a 0.010b -0.013a -0.266a -0.012a 1.000      
(16) SalesVol 0.177 0.074 2.110  -0.007 0.008b 0.007c -0.010a -0.007c -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.070a -0.023a 0.190a -0.008b -0.022a -0.001 0.001 1.000     
(17) CFOVol 0.098 0.033 0.927  -0.006 0.081a 0.047a -0.015a -0.010a -0.008b -0.010b -0.012a 0.164a -0.040a 0.220a 0.210a -0.039a 0.012a 0.009b 0.537a 1.000    
(18) Inst. Ownership 0.316 0.154 1.468  -0.038a -0.003 -0.002 0.041a 0.026a 0.019a 0.029a 0.026a 0.002 0.054a -0.009b 0.007c -0.003 -0.003 -0.021a -0.007c -0.013a 1.000   
(19) BoardIndep 0.181 0.000 0.322  -0.058a -0.010a -0.008b 0.200a 0.134a 0.089a 0.125a 0.118a 0.049a 0.314a -0.023a 0.019a 0.032a -0.010b -0.077a -0.024a -0.041a 0.125a 1.000  





2.4 CEO Altruism and Corporate Malfeasance in Financial Reporting 
2.4.1 Univariate statistics  
 
I first examine mean differences in my corporate malfeasance variables when they 
are sorted by differences in CEO donations, CEO non-backdating behaviour, and CEO 
non-tax planning incentives. For my proxies of CEO stock donations, I also sort the 
means and the mean differences from low to high number of donations in a year and from 
low to high percentages of stocks donated. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows that firms with 
donating CEOs are on average 0.2% less likely to commit fraud, and that these firms also 
have significantly lower probabilities, of around 2.1% and 2.2%, to engage in real 
activities or to use discretionary accruals earnings, respectively. The univariate results in 
Panel A (Table 2.2) also show that firms with CEOs who donate more than 2.7% of their 
stock are 0.5% less likely to commit fraud than firms with CEOs who do not. 
Table 2.2, Panel B presents univariate results for differences in my corporate 
financial reporting malfeasance variables when sorted across my range of CEO non-
backdating variables. I find consistent results for all three measures of CEO non-
backdating. Specifically, the results show that firms with CEOs who donate without 
backdating, are less likely to commit fraud, have on average lower absolute values of 
abnormal real activities management, and are also less likely to engage in discretionary 
accrual. I replicate the univariate analysis in Panel B for CEOs who avoid tax planning 
when donating stock. Panel C (Table 2.2) shows that firms with CEOs who donate 
without regard to their tax-planning incentives have, on average, significantly lower 
levels of abnormal real activities than firms with CEOs who act in line with their tax 





Table 2.2 Univariate Statistics 
This table presents average values of, and mean differences in, Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc when sorting them by CEO donations (Panel A), CEO 
non-backdating on stock donations (Panel B), and CEO non-tax planning (Panel C). T-statistics for differences in mean are shown in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: CEO donations 
Sort by CEOs donate 
(DumDonate) 
Number of Donations CEO donated in a 
fiscal year (#Donate) 
Ratio of shares CEO donated over CEO total 
shares (DonateRatio) 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean 
 0-2 donations > 2 donations Difference 
in mean 
 0 – 2.7% > 2.7% Difference 
in mean Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Fraud 0.012 0.110 0.010 0.099 0.002** 
(2.57) 
0.012 0.107 0.011 0.104 0.001 
(0.55) 
0.057 0.231 0.007 0.083 0.050*** 
(7.32) 
RealActMan 3.151 51.641 1.065 11.202 2.086*** 
(4.25) 
3.003 49.810 0.869 5.392 2.134*** 
(11.72) 
3.026 50.255 1.394 16.814 1.632** 
(2.24) 
DisAcc 2.866 96.449 0.684 7.490 2.182** 
(2.39) 




93.849 0.889 11.231 1.852 
(1.36) 
 
Panel B: CEO non-backdating 
Sort by CEOs have all non-backdating  
stock donations (NonBackdate) 
CEOs have ≥ 50% of non-backdating stock 
donations (1/2NonBackdate) 
CEOs have at least one non-backdating 
stock donations (<1/2NonBackdate) 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean Mean SD  Mean SD Mean    SD  Mean     SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Fraud 0.012 0.108 0.007 0.081 0.005*** 
(3.12) 
0.012 0.108 0.006 0.079 0.006*** 
(3.73) 
0.012 0.109 0.006 0.076 0.006*** 
(4.36) 
RealActMan 2.968 49.444 1.093 11.011 1.874* 
(1.93) 
2.981 49.600 1.031 9.913 1.950** 
(2.23) 




92.159 0.843 7.114 1.828 
(1.01) 












Table 2.2 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: CEO non-tax planning 
Sort by CEOs have all non-tax planning 
incentives in stock donations 
(NonTaxplanning) 
CEOs have ≥ 50% of non-tax planning 
stock donations  
(1/2NonTaxplanning) 
     
CEOs have at least one non-tax planning 
stock donations  
(<1/2NonTaxplanning) 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean 
 No Yes Difference 
in mean Mean SD  Mean SD Mean    SD  Mean     SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Fraud 0.012 0.108 0.011 0.103 0.001 
(0.69) 
0.012 0.108 0.011 0.104 0.001 
(0.62) 
0.012 0.108 0.011 0.105 0.001 
(0.54) 
RealActMan 3.004 49.993 1.342 15.624 1.662** 
(2.37) 
3.042 50.417 1.207 13.681 1.835*** 
(2.97) 
3.057 50.578 1.163 13.113 1.894*** 
(3.19) 




94.136 0.766 9.046 1.991* 
(1.73) 







2.4.2 Regression analyses 
 
In order to examine the effect of CEO altruism on corporate malfeasance in financial 
reporting I estimate a series of panel regressions that take the form: 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑗𝑘 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙𝑘 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡   (𝟗) 
where Misreporting is one of three measures of corporate malfeasance in financial 
reporting (i.e. Fraud, RealActMan, or DisAcc), i indexes firms, j indexes CEOs, k indexes 
industries, and t indexes years. CEO altruism is one of five measures of altruistic 
behaviour reflected in stock donations (i.e. #Donate, DumDonate, DonateRatio, 
NonBackdate, or NonTaxplanning). Controls is a vector of standard firm characteristics, 
corporate governance characteristics and CEO incentives, 𝜙 are sets of industry and year 
fixed effects, and 𝜖 is an error term. That is, the model compares firms across CEO 
altruism for firms in the same industry and year, and with similar firm characteristics and 
CEO compensation incentives. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (White, 
1980) and clustered by industry and year to confront time-series correlation affecting the 
CEO-altruism effect. I also winsorize all explanatory variables and controls at the 99th 
percentile. 
Table 2.3 reports estimates from equation (9) when using the number of times a CEO 
made stock donations (#Donate) to measure CEO altruism as my primary explanatory 
variable. I find a significant negative relation between #Donate and all three measures of 
financial reporting malfeasance. The estimated coefficient of Fraud in the probit 





average, by approximately 41.3% (t-statistic = -5.79) when the number of CEO stock 
donations increases by one standard deviation in a given year. 
Table 2.3 also shows that the absolute values of abnormal real activities and 
discretionary accrual-based management are also significantly lower, by approximately 
0.195% (t-statistic = -2.53) and 0.155% (t-statistic = -2.63) of lagged total assets, 
respectively, when the number of donations by a CEO increases by one standard 
deviation in a given year (models 2 and 3). These decreases are about 14% of the average 
absolute values of both abnormal real activity management and discretionary accruals for 
firms in my sample. Overall, my results are consistent with the first hypothesis, and the 
related sub-hypotheses: firms with CEOs who have personal altruistic preferences are 
less likely to be subject to SEC AAERs, and have lower levels of earnings manipulation 
than firms with CEOs who have no altruistic preference.
 
 
Table 2.3 CEO Stock Donations and Corporate Malfeasance in Financial Reporting 
This table presents regression results for the effects of #Donate on Fraud, RealActMan and 
DisAcc. I include industry and year fixed effects in all of the models. For definitions of the 
variables in the table see the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC industry 
and year, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable of interest Fraud RealActMan DisAcc 
 (1) Probit (2) OLS (3) OLS 
#Donate  -0.155*** -0.120** -0.096*** 
 (-5.79) (-2.53) (-2.63) 
Controls    
Size 0.000 2.789** 1.773** 
 (0.01) (2.35) (2.00) 
Age -0.156*** -0.241 0.044 
 (-3.35) (-0.72) (0.22) 
Leverage 0.107*** 0.036 0.075 
 (2.70) (0.21) (0.60) 
ROA 0.004 4.686 2.082 
 (1.18) (1.45) (0.77) 





 (-5.49) (-2.61) (-0.66) 
Intangibles -0.378*** 0.007 0.004* 
 (-3.22) (1.61) (1.80) 
Ln (Operating cycle) 0.155*** -1.071** -1.014* 
 (3.93) (-2.17) (-1.82) 
Inventory -0.485** 3.574* 1.227 
 (-2.27) (1.91) (0.87) 
Receivables -0.668*** 0.725 4.678 
 (-3.03) (0.23) (1.37) 
SalesVol  -0.094 -2.760* -1.262 
 (-0.84) (-1.75) (-1.16) 
CFOVol -1.044** 12.364* 5.856 
 (-2.56) (1.76) (1.24) 
Inst. Ownership 1.687*** -0.079 -0.066 
 (17.00) (-1.30) (-1.35) 
BoardIndep -0.270*** -1.595** -1.147** 
 (-2.58) (-2.56) (-2.28) 
CEO Ownership 0.007 -0.049** -0.034** 
 (0.99) (-2.46) (-2.15) 
Daughter 0.264*** -0.465** -0.300** 
 (2.83) (-2.49) (-2.03) 
Constant -1.619*** 5.452* 2.986 
 (-6.85) (1.76) (0.88) 
Number of observations 18,830 66,583 66,583 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R2 0.206 0.256 0.057 
 
Table 2.4 presents results on corporate financial reporting malfeasance as a function 
of CEO non-backdating behaviour (NonBackdate), CEO non-tax planning 
(NonTaxplanning), and the interaction of Nonbackdate and NonTaxplanning. The results 
provide strong support for my second hypothesis that higher levels of altruism are 
associated with more pronounced reductions in corporate financial reporting 
malfeasance. Specifically, Table 2.4 shows that the coefficients of NonBackdate and 
NonTaxPlanning on Fraud are negative and statistically significant (t-statistics of -5.66 
and -5.94), indicating that the probability of fraud is 68.5% and 47.6% lower in firms 





incentives, respectively (models 1 and 2). The coefficient on the interaction term Non-
(Backdate & Taxplanning) is also statistically significant (t-statistic = -4.15, model 3). 
The interaction effect between CEO non-backdating and non-tax planning incentives is 
significant and negatively associated with a 58.1% reduction in the likelihood of firms 
being subject to an SEC AAER. These results suggest that the effects of NonBackdate 
and Nontaxplaning are more pronounced than the effect of increased stock donations in 
reducing the probability of fraud. 
I obtain similar results in all regressions of real activities manipulation (models 4-6) 
and discretionary accruals (models 7-9) in Table 2.4. Specifically, in models 4 to 6, 
abnormal real activities management decreases, on average, by approximately 0.162%, 
0.142%, and 0.174% of lagged total assets, respectively, when the number of times a 
CEO donates in a year increases by one standard deviation. These figures are additionally 
lower, on average, by about 1.149%, 0.836%, and 1.260% of lagged total assets, for 
CEOs not involved in either backdating or tax planning, or both, respectively. These 
additional effects are sizeable, and are an approximate decrease of 82.8%, 60.2%, and 
90.7%, respectively, when compared to the average RealActMan of 1.388% for firms in 
my sample. Similar results are obtained when regressing against discretionary accruals 
in models 7 to 9. 
In summary, the results show that reductions in real activities and accruals-based 
earnings management are more elevated for CEOs who are both unlikely to backdate and 
to plan around their personal tax incentives. Further, the findings also suggest that 
donating CEOs who either do not backdate, or do not plan for the tax implications of 
donating, are linked with greater reductions in the probability of fraud, real activities and 





Table 2.4 Non-Backdating and Non-Tax Planning Behaviours in CEO Stock Donations 
This table presents regression results for the additional effects of NonBackdate, NonTaxplanning, and Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning) in CEO stock 
donations on Fraud (models 1-3), RealActMan (models 4-6), and DisAcc (models 7-9). See the Appendix for the definitions of these variables. I include 
same controls (used in Table 2.3) and industry and year effect fixed effects in all models. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC industry and 
year, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Variable of interest Fraud RealActMan DisAcc 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
#Donate   -0.154*** -0.147*** -0.155*** -0.100** -0.088** -0.108** -0.080*** -0.071** -0.086*** 
 (-5.89) (-5.91) (-5.85) (-2.46) (-2.41) (-2.51) (-2.59) (-2.58) (-2.62) 
NonBackdate -0.685***   -1.149***   -0.882***   
 (-5.66)   (-2.59)   (-2.65)   
NonTaxplanning  -0.476***   -0.836***   -0.634***  
  (-5.94)   (-2.70)   (-2.68)  
Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning)   -0.581***   -1.261**   -0.973** 
   (-4.15)   (-2.47)   (-2.56) 
Constant -1.648*** -1.570*** -1.626*** 5.420* 5.492* 5.437* 2.962 3.017 2.975 
 (-6.95) (-6.59) (-6.87) (1.74) (1.77) (1.75) (0.88) (0.89) (0.88) 
Number of observations 18,830 18,830 18,830 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 
Industry Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2.5 shows results from using my alternative measures of CEO stock donations 
(DumDonate and DonateRatio). I replicate all regressions from Table 2.4 but substitute 
a dummy for CEO stock donations in Panel A and a ratio of stock donated over total stock 
owned in Panel B. Panel A shows that the coefficients of DumDonate are negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level against all three measures of corporate financial 
malfeasance (models 1, 5 and 9). This indicates that firms with altruistic CEOs are, on 
average, less likely to commit fraud by 157.3%, and less likely to engage in real activities 
and accrual-based management by approximately 62.1% and 59.2%, respectively, than 
firms whose CEO has not donated stock. 
My results further suggest that the estimated additional effects of CEO non-
backdating and CEO non-tax planning on real activities management are associated with 
significant reductions of 50.6%, 27.9% and 55.8% across models 6, 7 and 8, respectively. 
Similarly, discretionary accruals decrease on average, by approximately 48.6%, 26.9%, 
and 54.5% for CEOs who do not engage in backdating, tax planning, or a combination of 
both, respectively (see models 10-12). In addition, I also find that while the probability 
of fraud is lower by about 28.1% (t-statistic = -2.11) for CEOs who do not backdate 
donations (model 2), I also find no evidence of a corresponding negative effect of 
NonTaxplanning (model 3), or of the combined effect of Non-(Backdate & 
NonTaxplanning) (model 4). 
Table 2.5, Panel B presents my coefficient estimates of DonateRatio, which are 
negative and significant at the 1% level for all three measures of earnings manipulation 
(models 1, 5 and 9). This indicates a consistently negative relationship between the ratio 
of stock donated by CEOs and the likelihood of committing fraud and other earnings 





altruism alongside measures for the additional effects of CEO non-backdating 
(NonBackdate) and CEO non-tax planning (NonTaxplanning), I also find that higher 
levels of personal altruism are significantly associated with additional reductions in the 
probabilities of fraud (models 2-4), real activities management (models 6-8), and 
discretionary accruals manipulation (models 10-12). 
Collectively, the results in Table 2.5 are consistent with my results using #Donate as 
the primary measure of CEO altruism. In summary, I document that all three levels of 
corporate financial reporting malfeasance decrease significantly in firms run by CEOs 
with altruistic preferences. Furthermore, I find evidence to suggest that the negative effect 






Table 2.5 Dummy and Ratio Treatments of CEO Stock Donations 
This table presents robustness checks of the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 by examining two alternative proxies of CEO stock gifts. Panel A shows 
regression results for the effects of DumDonate, and NonBackdate, NonTaxplanning, and Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning) on Fraud (models 1-4), 
RealActMan (models 5-8), and DisAcc (models 9-12). Similarly, Panel B shows regression results for the effects of DonateRatio, and NonBackdate, 
NonTaxplanning, and Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning). See the Appendix for definitions of these variables. I include controls, industry and year fixed 
effects in all models for both panels. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC industry and year, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dummy of CEO stock donations 
Variable of interest Fraud RealActMan DisAcc 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DumDonate -1.573*** -1.534*** -1.643*** -1.556*** -0.862*** -0.696** -0.683** -0.741** -0.659*** -0.530*** -0.522** -0.565*** 
 (-11.37) (-11.31) (-11.54) (-11.32) (-2.61) (-2.43) (-2.25) (-2.54) (-2.70) (-2.59) (-2.50) (-2.67) 
NonBackdate  -0.281**    -0.703**    -0.548**   
  (-2.11)    (-2.10)    (-2.28)   
NonTaxplanning   0.152    -0.387*    -0.299*  
   (1.53)    (-1.69)    (-1.88)  
Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning)    -0.182    -0.774**    -0.607** 
    (-1.20)    (-2.06)    (-2.24) 
Constant -1.530*** -1.545*** -1.538*** -1.535*** 5.504* 5.472* 5.510* 5.486* 3.025 3.001 3.030 3.011 
 (-6.17) (-6.23) (-6.22) (-6.20) (1.78) (1.77) (1.78) (1.77) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) (0.89) 
Number of observations 18,830 18,830 18,830 18,830 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 66,583 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Ratio of CEO stock donated over CEO total shares 
Variable of interest Fraud RealActMan DisAcc 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DonateRatio -2.028*** -1.867*** -1.799*** -1.934*** -1.296** -0.955** -0.742** -1.040** -0.964** -0.698** -0.518** -0.759** 
 (-3.21) (-3.19) (-3.17) (-3.17) (-2.47) (-2.35) (-2.18) (-2.43) (-2.47) (-2.30) (-2.10) (-2.39) 
NonBackdate  -0.638***    -1.231**    -0.960***   
  (-5.63)    (-2.57)    (-2.67)   
NonTaxplanning   -0.449***    -0.905***    -0.727***  
   (-6.03)    (-2.67)    (-2.77)  
Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning)    -0.510***    -1.322**    -1.058*** 
    (-3.81)    (-2.44)    (-2.61) 
Constant -1.587*** -1.627*** -1.556*** -1.599*** 5.537* 5.494* 5.558* 5.513* 3.050 3.017 3.068 3.031 
 (-6.56) (-6.72) (-6.36) (-6.60) (1.78) (1.76) (1.79) (1.77) (0.90) (0.89) (0.90) (0.89) 
Number of observations 
18,145 18,145 18,145 18,145  65,597   65,597   65,597   65,597   65,597   65,597   65,597   65,597  
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






2.4.3 Transitioning firms 
 
I acknowledge that my baseline results are subject to endogeneity concerns. One 
potential problem is that there could be some unobservable factors which may increase 
the risk of spurious correlation between CEO altruism and the levels of corporate 
financial reporting malfeasance I observed. To address this issue, I conduct transition 
analysis by comparing new and departing CEOs with different altruistic preferences 
running the same firm. I also control for time-invariant firm characteristics that may be 
correlated with omitted explanatory variables by including firm fixed effects. 
In the transition analysis, my sample only includes firms which experience a turnover 
from a CEO who is more likely to donate stock (an altruistic CEO), to a CEO who is less 
likely to donate stock (a non/less-altruistic CEO), or vice versa. My panel regression 
model of transitioning firms is as follows: 
𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜙𝑗 + 𝜙𝑘 +  𝜙𝑡 +  𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑡   (𝟏𝟎) 
where DonateCEO is a dummy equal to one for CEOs (i) who have a track record of 
donating stock for at least half of their years in CEO tenure,13 and (ii) who experience a 
CEO turnover event. I use the same control set as in my regressions of equation (9). I 
include firm fixed effects together with year fixed effects. The standard errors are 
heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by firm and year. 
Table 2.6 presents my results for the effects of CEO altruism on Fraud, RealActMan 
and DisAcc when firms experience a change from a more to a less altruistic CEO, or vice 
 





versa. The results show that the probability of fraud remains statistically significant at the 
1% level for this cohort, and furthermore that it is lower by an estimated 2.6% for firms 
run by more altruistic CEOs, after controlling for differences in firm characteristics, 
corporate governance and CEO incentives, as well as for industry, firm and year fixed 
effects (model 1). Similarly, when regressing against RealActMan and DisAcc, I find that 
real activities management and discretionary accruals for transitioning firms, on average, 
are estimated to decrease by 4.7% and 16.3%, respectively (models 2 and 3).14 
 
Table 2.6 CEO Turnover and Corporate Malfeasance in Financial Reporting 
This Table reports panel regression results for the effect of CEO donations when there is a CEO 
turnover on Fraud (model 1), RealActMan (model 2) and DisAcc (model 3). I include industry, 
firm and year fixed effects in all models. See the Appendix for definitions of all variables in the 
table. I also include same controls (used in Table 2.3) in all models. Standard errors are clustered 
by firm and year, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In this analysis, I include only firms 
that experience CEO turnover from a CEO more likely to donate, to a CEO less likely to donate, 
or vice versa. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Variable of interest               Fraud     Real ActMan DisAcc 
 (1)              (2)  (3) 
DonateCEO -0.026*** -0.028* -0.077** 
 (-3.23) (-1.86) (-2.31) 
Number of observations 2,918 5,791 5,791 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 




14 My sub-sample of transitioning firms has mean absolute values of real activities management and 





2.4.4 Propensity score matching analysis and Difference-in-difference models 
 
To further address this concern, I use different-in-differences (DiD) models to evaluate 
the impact of a treatment effect (a replacement a non/less-altruistic CEO with an altruistic 
CEO15) on corporate financial reporting malfeasance, compared to control firms (those 
which experience a CEO turnover from a non/less-altruistic to another non/less-altruistic 
CEO).16 The treatment group includes firms experiencing the transition from a non/less 
altruistic to a more altruistic CEO. Specifically, I compare differences in corporate 
financial reporting malfeasance between treated and control firms from the pre-turnover 
to the post-turnover period. The advantage of the DiD approach is to mitigate potential 
biases in the post-turnover comparisons between the treated and control firms that may 
result from unobservable time-invariant differences between those firms at the pre-
turnover period, as well as biases from the before-and-after comparisons in the treated 
firms that may be the result of omitted time-variant variables. 
To mitigate any heterogeneity in firm characteristics, I employ a propensity score 
matching approach to pair-match each treated firm with a control firm that experiences a 
CEO turnover from a non/less-altruistic CEO to a non/less-altruistic CEO during the 
sample period. Propensity scores are estimated within industry-year categories, using all 
 
15 In the empirical analysis of CEO turnovers, I define an altruistic CEO as a more-likely donating stock 
CEO who has a track record of donating stock for at least half of their years in CEO tenure (greater than 
one year), and a non/less-altruistic CEO as a less-likely donating CEO who has a track record of donating 
stock for less than a half of their years in CEO tenure. 
16 For the sub-sample of firms experiencing a CEO turnover from altruistic to non/less-altruistic CEOs, I 
find a significant increase in the probability of fraud and accrual-based earnings management. However, I 
do not have enough control firms (i.e., firms always run by altruistic CEOs) from the same industry and 





firm characteristics, corporate governance, and CEO incentives variables included in my 
regression analyses. I set the difference between the propensity scores of firms run by 
altruistic CEOs and matched peers to not exceed 0.1% in absolute value. 
Table 2.7 presents the average values, differences in means between the treated and 
control firms, and the differences in Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc between the pre- 
and post-CEO turnover period for my sample. During the post-CEO turnover period, 
transitioning firms which move from non/less-altruistic to altruistic CEOs experience 
lower average rates of real activities and accruals management, at 34.7% and 37.4% 
respectively, relative to control firms without a CEO transition from a non/less altruistic 
CEO to an altruistic CEO. The estimated differences in real activities and accruals 
management from the prior to the post-turnover period between the treated and control 
firms are both negative and statistically significant (t-statistics of 1.65 and 2.71, 
respectively), indicating that the treatment effect (a replacement a non/less-altruistic with 
an altruistic CEO) decreases real activities management and discretionary accruals, on 
average, by approximately, 11% and 15.2%, respectively, when compared to the average 
values of real activities and accruals management of firms in my sample. My conclusions 
remain qualitatively the same when I examine the change in the probability of fraud. 
These results therefore provide additional evidence of changes in corporate malfeasance 






Table 2.7 PSM and Difference-in-Differences Models for Transitioning Firms 
In this Table, I use propensity score matching and difference in differences approaches to evaluate the treatment effect of a replacement of an altruistic 
CEO (a more-likely donating CEO) for  a non/less-altruistic CEO (a less-likely donating CEO), on Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc. I identify control 
samples of firms (those which experience a CEO turnover from a non/less altruistic CEO to another non/less-altruistic CEO) by employing a propensity 
score matching procedure. Propensity scores are estimated within industry-year categories, using all firm characteristics, corporate governance variables, 
and CEO incentives controls included in my regression analyses. The treatment group in this table includes firms experiencing a transition from a non/less-
altruistic CEO to an altruistic CEO. I set the difference between the propensity scores of firms run by CEOs more likely to donate and matched peers to 
not exceed 0.1% in absolute value. See the Appendix for definitions of the variables in the table. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Variable of interest 





 N Mean 
Difference 
(T-C) 
 N Mean 
Difference 
(T-C) 
 Before CEO turnovers 
         
Control group (less-likely donating CEOs) 2,096 0.084 -0.015** 6,127 0.365 -0.021 6,127 0.038 0.097*** 
Treatment group (less-likely donating CEOs)    877 0.069 (-2.38) 1,461 0.344 (-0.71) 1,461 0.135 (2.47) 










Control group (less-likely donating CEOs) 1,620 0.087 -0.083*** 6,038 0.496 
-0.173** 6,038 0.195 
-0.073* 
Treatment group (more-likely donating CEOs) 1,161 0.004 (7.84) 1,332 0.324 (2.33) 1,332 0.122 (1.72) 
          
 Difference in Differences     5,754       -0.068*** 14,958  -0.152* 14,958  -0.169*** 





2.4.5 Two-stage least squares and CEO child-caregiving activities 
One additional concern is that my results might be subject to simultaneity bias in that 
my dependent variables (fraud, real activities and accruals management) may affect my 
primary explanatory variable (CEO stock donations) in the baseline regressions. The 
simultaneous causality may potentially arise because CEOs may donate more stocks 
when they manipulate earnings to be high such that the stock price goes up and CEOs 
gain their personal tax benefits from their donations of appreciated stocks. To address 
this endogeneity issue, I use two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions to test the 
robustness of my results. The first-stage consists of a probit regression which models the 
probability of CEOs making stock donations through the use of an instrumental variable 
(IV). In the second-stage, I regress the dependent variables Fraud, RealActMan and 
DisAcc on the predicted probability of making stock donations estimated from the first-
stage probit regressions. 
The attachment theory of Ainsworth et al. (1978) and Bowlby (1982) defines 
altruism as caregiving behaviour, or the provision of care, support and protection to 
dependent others in response to their needs, especially infants and young children. I rely 
on this theory to construct a dummy for CEOs engaging in child-caregiving activities 
(Childcare), and use this as my IV. I argue that this IV meets the relevancy condition for 
an IV because it can be correlated with personal altruistic behaviour (Ainsworth et al., 
1978; Bowlby, 1982; Mikulincer et al., 2005). Furthermore, it meets the exclusion 
condition because there is no reason to expect that managerial influence on corporate 
financial malfeasance will lead to greater or lesser involvement in child-caregiving 





Table 2.8 reports the estimated results from my 2SLS regressions of corporate 
malfeasance with a dummy endogenous variable (DumDonate) and a dummy IV 
(Childcare).17 In the first-stage probit regressions (models 1, 3 and 5), the coefficients on 
Childcare are statistically significant and positive across all models (at the 1% and 5% 
levels), indicating that the probability of a CEO donating stock is positively correlated 
with the probability of engaging in child-caregiving activities. The results in the second-
stage regressions show a significantly negative relationship between the predicted 
probability of making stock donations and corporate malfeasance at all three levels of 
financial reporting: Fraud (model 2), RealActMan (model 4), and DisAcc (model 6).  
In summary, these findings provide strong support that the negative effect of CEO-
altruism on all three levels of corporate financial reporting malfeasance is robust after 
controlling for potential endogeneity in my original estimations. 
  
 
17 I reject the null hypothesis that the IV (Childcare) is weakly correlated with the endogenous regressor 
because the Cragg-Donald Wald F-test statistic is statistically significant and exceeds the Stock-Yogo IV 
critical value of 16.38 for single endogenous regressor at 10 percent relative bias (F = 169.98, p = 0.000) 





Table 2.8 Two-Stage Least Squares and CEO Child-Caregiving Activities 
This table reports two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions with a dummy endogenous variable 
DumDonate, and a dummy instrumental variable (IV) Childcare. The first-stage probit model 
shows the probability of CEOs having stock donations as a function of engaging in child-
caregiving activities (Childcare). The second-stage regressions present the treatment effects on 
Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc. In all models, I include same controls (used in Table 2.3) and 
industry and year fixed effects. See the Appendix for definitions of the variables in this table. 
Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC industry and year, and t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Fraud  RealActMan  DisAcc 






1st stage  
(4) 
2nd stage  
 
(5) 
1st stage  
(6) 
2nd stage  
Variable DumDonate Fraud  DumDonate RealActMan  DumDonate DisAcc 
DumDonate  -0.501***  -40.797***  -36.398** 
  (-4.20)  (-2.73)    (-2.39) 
IV: Childcare 7.245***  0.142**   0.142**  
 (27.35)    (2.03)     (2.03)  
Number of observations 21,614    21,614 67,417 66,583 67,417 66,583 
Industry fixed effects Yes      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes      Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
2.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The study in this chapter examines whether the personal altruism of corporate CEOs 
is related to corporate malfeasance in financial reporting, including fraud, manipulation 
of real activities, and accrual-based earnings management. I find that firms run by 
altruistic CEOs, who donate portions of their stock holdings, are less likely to be the 
subject of SEC fraud investigations, and exhibit lower levels of real activities and accrual-
based earnings manipulation. Furthermore, I find that CEOs who donate without self-
interested fiscal preferences, such as backdating donations or donating in line with tax 





support that more altruistic CEOs are associated with firms which experience greater 
reductions in the probability of fraud and other financial reporting malfeasance. 
While corporate financial reporting is a natural starting point, I suspect that CEO 
altruism also might influence other corporate financial policies (e.g. M&A, investment 
strategy, and employee compensation policies). This seems particularly relevant given 
that altruistic executives are often faced with difficult decisions requiring trade-offs 
between monetary incentives and altruistic motivations. Future research can therefore 
examine the interplay between CEO altruism and other factors which can influence CEO 
decision making. This would also have implications for firms hiring altruistic CEOs to 






POTENTIAL MEASUREMENT ERROR OF CEO ALTRUISM 






Chapter Three presents two-way extensions of the first study in the previous chapter. 
The first extension focuses on addressing potential measurement error of CEO altruism. 
The second part of this chapter extend the research on the CEO-altruism effect on the 
readability of a firm’s annual financial report.  
A potential endogeneity may raise that the estimated results in the first study might 
be biased because of CEO stock donations may not completely capture personal altruistic 
behaviours of CEOs. To address the potential measurement error of CEO altruism, the 
first extended study in this chapter explores other five alternative measures of personal 
altruism of CEOs other than using a primary proxy of CEO stock donations. Motivated 
psychological literature and prior studies on timing stock options (Yermack, 1997; Ofek 
and Yermack, 2000; Lie, 2005), I observe CEO personal philanthropic activities in 
society (i.e., CEOs have received humanitarian awards), other types of CEO charitable 
donations (i.e., CEO personal charitable cash donations), and other potential 
opportunistic incentives when CEOs make donations including stock donations (i.e., 
CEOs may donate stocks to their family charitable foundations, or CEOs may exploit 




announcements, or CEOs may donate stocks after receiving a significantly large value of 
stock awards to actively rebalance their wealth portfolio). These alternative proxies are 
constructed by employing hand-collecting data from unique data sources that I describe 
in more details in each sub-sections of Section 3.2. The overall results suggest that CEO 
personal altruism has a positive effect on diminishing various forms of corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting, after controlling for potential endogenous 
measurement error of CEO altruism. This extended study not only provides additional 
robustness evidence for the findings in the first study, but also contributes to the literature 
various empirical approaches to identify and measure properly personal managerial 
altruism of executives. 
The second extended study investigates the effect of CEO altruism on the readability 
of a firm’s financial report. This study extends the previous research by examining 
additional form of corporate financial reporting which may be associated with the least 
serious risks and costs of misreporting, compared to corporate fraud, real activities and 
accruals earnings manipulation. Despite the least serious level of financial reporting 
readability, prior studies suggest that firm managers may use complex words and an 
opaque disclosure in financial statements to obfuscate poor financial performance which 
may lead to shareholders’ serious financial misunderstanding and corporate losses 
(Bloomfield, 2008; Li, 2008; Lo et al., 2017; Xu et al., 2018). This extended study is 
necessary to provide a wide-ranging empirical analysis of the impact of CEO altruism on 
all forms of corporate financial reporting misconduct from corporate fraud to the poor 
readability of financial reports. The estimated results reveal that firms led by altruistic 
CEOs produce more comprehensive financial reports than firms with non-altruistic 
CEOs. Moreover, the CEO-altruism effect on the improvement in the financial reporting 




personal financial motives (including non-backdating and non-tax planning incentives in 
gifting stocks). This study is the first to highlight the impact of CEO altruism on 
improving the readability of a firm’s financial reports. This extended study together with 
my previous findings in the first study in Chapter Two, contribute to the literature an 
ample understanding of the positive effect of CEO altruism on diminishing corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting in various forms from most serious (corporate fraud), 
to intermediate (real activities manipulation), to least serious (accruals-based earnings), 
and to extremely least serious (the poor readability of financial reports). 
The rest of this chapter is structed as follows. Section 3.2 presents this first extended 
study that addresses potential measurement error of CEO altruism. Section 3.3 provides 
a research extension on the readability of a firm’s financial reports. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2 Potential Measurement Errors of CEO Altruism 
3.2.1 Alternative psychological measure of CEO altruism 
 
A further concern with my estimations is that CEO stock donations may not 
completely capture personal managerial altruism and hence my results might be subject 
to measurement error. To address this concern, I follow prior studies on psychology and 
construct a dummy capturing whether CEOs have received humanitarian awards for their 
charitable contributions (Humani). I use this variable as an alternative measure of CEO 
altruism because it highlights CEO personal philanthropy in society. Data for this are 
obtained from the Marquis Who’s Who database. 
Using this new measure, I examine corporate malfeasance as a function of CEO 




sample includes firms with CEOs who have received a humanitarian award. For each 
such firm in the treatment group, I find a matching control firm that has comparable firm 
characteristics, corporate governance, and CEO ownership, but does not have a CEO who 
has received a humanitarian award. This analysis allows us to identify a control sample 
of firms that are run by non-altruistic CEOs, but that exhibit no observable differences 
relative to firms run by altruistic CEOs. 
Table 3.1 reports average treatment effects on the treated (ATET) results of Humani 
on Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc. The results reveal that real activities and accrual 
management in firms with awarded CEOs are, on average, 35.6% and 50.8% lower, 
respectively, than in firms with CEOs who have not been awarded. The coefficients on 
these differences are statistically significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
However, I find no evidence of a significant difference in the likelihood of fraud between 
the matched firms. 
 
Table 3.1 Propensity Score Matching on Psychological Measure of CEO Altruism 
This table reports average treatment effects on the treated (ATET). I examine the treatment effects 
of Humani on Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc. The Humani treated sample includes firms with 
CEOs who have received a humanitarian award. For each such firm in the treatment group, I find 
a matching control firm that has comparable firm, corporate governance, and CEO characteristics, 
but whose CEO has not received a humanitarian award. See the Appendix for definitions of the 
variables in this table. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 








Fraud 0.071 0.048 0.023 
(0.46) 
RealActMan 0.536 0.832 -0.296* 
(-1.87) 







3.2.2. CEO stock donations to charitable recipients 
 
One concern with my primary proxy of CEO altruism is that CEOs may donate stocks 
to family foundations or family trusts (Yermack, 2009). In this case, stock donations are 
less likely to reflect CEO altruism. To address this concern, I further consider the 
recipients of stock donations by classifying two types of donees of CEO stock gifts. Stock 
gifts made by CEOs can be charitable contributions to external charitable foundations, or 
family stock gifts to CEOs’ family members, family trust funds and other CEO-related 
entities. Depending on the motivations of philanthropic CEOs, stock donations are gifted 
to external charitable foundations to improve community well-being and social welfare 
(Yermack, 2009). In contrast, family stock gifts may involve executives’ estate planning 
considerations and their tax savings incentives on capital gains and thus more likely be 
opportunistic rather than altruistic (Jung and Park, 2009; Yermack, 2009; Brown et al., 
2017).18 As such, stocks gifted to external charitable foundations are expected to reflect 
CEO altruism more genuinely than stocks gifted to a CEO’s family charitable trust or 
foundation.  
I create a dummy variable, Charitable Recipients, to indicate whether the recipients 
of CEO stock donations are external charitable organizations. I utilize the data of stock 
donations made by CEOs, compiled from the Form 4 and Form 5 SEC filings in the 
Thomson Financial Insider Trading database. Following the methodology in Yermack 
 
18 Jung and Park (2009) and Brown et al. (2017) find that CEOs with estate planning incentives, time the 
stock gifts to family members at the relative minimum stock price. The fair market value of stock gifts at 
the time of gifting, rather than the expected higher future stock price, will be counted for the estate tax 
base. Since the value of the taxable estate stock gifts will be “frozen” at a depressed price for the CEOs 
remaining lifetime period, CEOs thus can gain an economically significant estate tax savings and net family 




(2009), I hand-collect the footnotes information19 of each of these transactions from the 
original electric SEC filings of Form 4 and Form 5 on the SEC’s EDGAR Internet portal. 
To eliminate selection bias, I exclude all observations prior to 30 June 2003, the date on 
which the SEC officially began requiring electronic posting of SEC filings of Forms 4 
and 5. In cases where it is not clear how to classify the nature of the relationship between 
recipient foundations and donors, I search for further information using the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990-PF and Form 990 filings from the Foundation Center 
and Guidestar.org internet databases. I exclude all observations that have no footnote or 
indeterminate information on stock recipients. To avoid double-counting stock gifts, I 
also drop duplicated observations of amended gift transactions or same gifts reported 
more than once. For CEOs who gift more than once in a year, I define Charitable 
Recipients as a dummy equal to one if at least one of stock donations is gifted to external 
charitable organizations, and zero otherwise. This filtering leaves us with a final sample 
comprised of 4,247 firm-year observations.  
Using Charitable Recipients as my new measure of CEO altruism, I replicate my 
baseline regressions to examine the CEO-altruism effect on corporate malfeasance in 
financial reporting. Further, to mitigate the effect of heterogeneity in time-invariant 
characteristics on my panel regressions, I employ the entropy balancing (EB) approach 
(Hainmueller, 2012) to match treatment firms with CEOs who make stock donations to 
external charitable organizations with control firms run by CEOs who only make family 
 
19 The footnotes in Form 4 and Form 5 SEC filings present additional information about the nature of 
insider trading transactions such as who receives stock transfers, the relationship between stock owners 
and stock receivers, the nature of stock ownership before and after stock transfers. However, such 




stock gifts.20 The entropy covariate balance is estimated using all firm characteristics, 
corporate governance and CEO incentives variables included in my regression analyses. 
I set the balance constraints for all the covariates to the highest covariate moment so that 
the means, variances and skewness in the reweighted control group data match those from 
the treatment group. 
Table 3.2 presents the estimated results for the effects of Charitable Recipients on 
corporate malfeasance in financial reporting Fraud¸ Selectman and DisAcc. The 
estimated coefficients of RealActMan and DisAcc are negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels (t-statistics of -1.83 and -1.99), indicating that 
treatment firms with CEOs that donate stocks to external independent charitable 
organisations experience absolute values of real activities management and discretionary 
accruals, on average, 0.531% and 0.399% lower than lagged total assets, respectively 
(models 2-3), than control firms with CEOs that make all stock gifts to family members 
and family trust funds. These decreases are approximately 38.3% and 35.8% of the 
average absolute values of both abnormal real activities and accrual earnings 
management for firms in my sample.  
However, I find no significant difference between them in the likelihood of corporate 
financial fraud. One possible explanation for the insignificant association between 
charitable recipients of CEO stock donations and corporate fraud is that while different 
donation recipients reflect various levels of CEO altruism, such variation is not enough 
to cause a difference in accounting fraud which is associated with the most severe 
consequences among the different types of corporate financial reporting malfeasance. 
 
20 I employ EB rather than propensity score matching (PSM) because PSM would significantly reduce my 




In summary, these findings are consistent with the notion that CEO altruism plays a 
disciplining role on corporate malfeasance in financial reporting.  
 
Table 3.2 Charitable Recipients of CEO Stock Donations 
This table presents the estimated regression results for the effect of CEO stock gifts to Charitable 
Recipients on Fraud (model 1), RealActMan (model 2) and DisAcc (model 3). In the subsample 
of firms with CEOs making stock donations, I match firms with other firms having similar firm 
characteristics, corporate governance and CEO incentives, using the entropy balance matching 
approach. I include industry and year fixed effects and same controls (used in Table 2.3)  in all 
of the models. For definitions of the variables in the table see the Appendix. Standard errors are 
clustered by two-digit SIC industry and year, and t-statistics are reported on parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 








Charitable Recipients 0.242 -0.531* -0.399** 
 (0.87) (-1.83) (-1.99) 
Constant 0.989 -3.220 -2.846** 
 (0.96) (-1.19) (-2.02) 
Number of observations 572 2,293 2,293 
Industry Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R2 0.266 0.024 0.044 
 
3.2.3. CEO political cash contributions with altruistic preferences 
 
I use CEO stock donations as my primary proxy for CEO altruism, but in practice 
altruistic CEOs may also make other charitable contributions in forms of cash, real estate, 
time, or even blood and organ donations. However, there is limited information available 
on other types of individual donations. Among the other types of charitable contributions, 
I only find that data on individual political cash contributions are publicly available from 




of firm managers examine CEO political donations to the major parties in the U.S., the 
Democratic and Republican parties, (Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012; Francis et al., 2016; 
Elnahas and Kim, 2017), I examine CEO altruism by considering a CEO’s cash donations 
to political committees/parties with explicit social purposes for family, child, female, 
elderly, health care, environment, education, or animal welfare issues. 
The psychology and economics literature shows that individual altruists exhibit 
stronger social preferences in terms of care-oriented feelings and caregiving behaviours. 
In most scenarios, altruists give priority to the needs of dependent others, and to 
improving community well-being (Bowlby, 1982; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; 
Mikulincer et al., 2005; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). Motivated by this theory, I argue that 
CEOs with altruistic preferences are more likely to think about supporting and helping 
others, even when they make political contributions, and thus that altruistic CEOs may 
give priority to making political contributions to parties and committees which show 
support for dependent others (i.e. animals, children, women and elders) and the broader 
well-being of the community. In the empirics, I examine the CEO-altruism effect by 
employing a sample of individual CEO cash donations to political committees and 
parties, and then identifying whether these political parties and committees demonstrate 
support for family, child, female, elderly, health care, environment, education, or animal 
welfare issues.  
Data on cash political contribution by individuals are extracted from the FEC from 
1992 to 2018.21 I exclude individual donations which are not made by CEOs. Following 
the approach by Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), I add up all contributions to committees 
 
21 I chose the commencing year as 1992 because I match individual CEOs in the FEC database with those 




by a CEO in a calendar year and categorise them by committee profile and the registered 
party of the recipients (political action committees, and party committees). When a CEO 
donates to more than one committee in a given calendar year, they are categorized to the 
committee which received the bulk of their net cumulative cash contributions. I then 
hand-collect information from various sources about the main objectives of the 
committees, the registered party of the committees, and the policies of the supporting 
political party, to identify if these bodies support and pursue community welfare 
objectives. I replicate my baseline regressions but substitute my primary explanatory 
variable of CEO stock donation (#Donate) for my new alternative proxy of CEO altruism, 
Altruistic Political Donations, a dummy equal to one if a CEO makes individual cash 
donations of $200 or more to a political party/committee which supports family, child, 
female, elderly, health care, environment, education, or animal welfare issues, and zero 
otherwise. 
Table 3.3 presents the CEO-altruism effect of CEOs making individual political cash 
contributions with altruistic preferences (Altruistic Political Donation) on all three levels 
of corporate financial reporting malfeasance, Fraud (model 1), RealActMan (model 2) 
and DisAcc (model 3). I find no significant relationship between the probability of fraud 
and CEO altruistic political donations. The result provides evidence that CEOs with 
altruistic political preferences do not significantly differentiate themselves from those 
without such preferences. 
However, the estimated coefficients on real activities management and discretionary 
accruals manipulation are negative and statistically significant (t-statistics of -1.71 and -
2.22), indicating that firms which are run by CEOs who act in line with their altruistic 
preferences when making political donations, experience a significantly lower real 




of lagged total assets, than firms with CEOs who do not, respectively. These decreases 
are about 3.6% and 21.9% of the average values of abnormal real activities (1.388%) and 
accrual-based earnings management (1.113%) for firms in my sample. 
Overall, my results are consistent with models 2-3 in my baseline regressions, 
indicating that the CEO-altruism effect proxied by Altruistic Political Donations, is 
significantly associated with reductions in real activities management and discretionary 




Table 3.3 CEO Individual Political Contributions 
This table presents the estimated regression results for the effect of CEOs making individual cash 
contributions (of $200 or more) to parties supporting family, child, female, elderly, health care, 
environment, education, or animal welfare causes (Altruistic Political Donation) on Fraud 
(model 1), RealActMan (model 2) and DisAcc (model 3). I include industry and year fixed effects 
and same controls (used in Table 2.3)  in all of the models. For definitions of the variables in the 
table see the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC industry and year, and t-
statistics are reported on parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 








Altruistic Political Donation -0.766 -0.050* -0.244** 
 (-0.82) (-1.71) (-2.22) 
Constant -4.223 2.170 12.840 
 (-0.71) (0.41) (0.99) 
Number of observations 264 2,649 2,649 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 




3.2.4. Timing of CEO stock donations around earnings announcements 
 
Another concern with my primary proxy of CEO altruism is that CEOs may donate 
stocks before negative earnings announcements or after positive earnings 
announcements. In either case, CEO stock donations are more likely to reflect their 
exploitation of insider information and tax planning considerations (Yermack, 2009; 
Avci et al., 2016) rather than their altruism. To address this concern, I investigate the 
timing pattern of stock gifts relative to the dates of quarterly earnings announcements.22 
While insider trading (sales and purchases) is regularly prohibited during blackout 
periods (Bettis et al., 2000), stock gifts are exempted from SEC Rule 16b-5(a), which 
imposes insider trading restriction for open market sales.23 Consistent with prior studies 
on executive stock option award timing (Yermack, 1997; Lie, 2005), Yermack (2009) 
finds that CEOs also have timing incentives for their stock gifts, in that they may take 
advantage of their information advantage to time stock donations just before negative 
(bullet-dodging), or just after positive (spring-loading) earnings announcements. Such 
CEOs thus gain personal financial benefits from maximizing income tax deductions by 
donating stocks at an appreciated local stock price. Accordingly, I argue that CEOs who 
donate stock gifts with no explicit opportunistic timing incentives around earnings 
announcements (non-“bullet-dodging” and non-“spring-loading”) are more altruistic than 
 
22 I choose to examine stock gift timings around firm quarterly earnings announcements because earnings 
news represents firm performance and firm financial health directly affecting investors’ decisions and stock 
market prices. Moreover, all public companies must announce earnings news, thus earnings announcements 
are nearly universal schedule which renders them free of sample selection bias. 
23 SEC rule 16b-5(a) is current insider trading law and was amended in 1991. It states that “bona fide gifts 
present less likelihood for opportunities for abuse [compared to open market sales]” and provides an insider 




CEOs who use the “bullet-dodging” and “spring-loading” timing strategies when making 
stock donations. 
The data on company quarterly earnings announcements are obtained from the 
Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S database. In this analysis, I exclude firms with no donations or 
no earnings announcements. I follow Yermack (2009) and include only CEO stock gifts 
that are dated within five trading days prior to an earnings announcement (before earnings 
announcement) and those that are made on the earnings announcement day or subsequent 
four days (after earnings announcement). Then I define a new dummy variable, 
BeforePostive-AfterNegative, which equals one if a CEO donates stock within five 
trading days preceding a positive earnings announcement (non-“spring-loading”) or stock 
gifts are made on the day or the four days following a negative earnings announcement 
(non-“bullet-dodging”), and zero otherwise. To identify whether an earnings 
announcement is negative and positive, I compare actual firm quarterly earnings 
announcements with quarterly analyst earnings forecasts. A negative earnings 
announcement is when a firm’s actual earnings are lower than forecast earnings, and a 
positive earnings announcement is when a firm’s actual earnings meet or exceed forecast 
earnings. 
In the univariate test, I examine the mean differences in my corporate malfeasance 
variables Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc when sorting them by whether or not CEOs 
donate stocks without “bullet-dodging” and “spring-loading” (BeforePostive-
AfterNegative=1). The initial results in Panel A (Table 3.4) show that firms with CEOs 
who make stock donations before positive earnings announcements and who donate after 
negative earnings announcements, are 0.144% less likely to use discretionary accruals to 
manipulate earnings than other CEOs. We, however, find no significant mean differences 




Next, I replicate my baseline regressions, but use BeforePostive-AfterNegative to 
measure CEO altruism, as my new alternative explanatory variable. In this analysis, I also 
employ the entropy balancing approach to match characteristics of firms whose CEOs 
are not taking account of insider information about earnings announcements in making 
stock gifts with those of firms run by CEOs who use insider information and timing 
strategies. I apply a similar approach to generate the entropy covariate balance and set a 
balance constraint as discussed above in section 4.7. 
Table 3.4, Panel B reports that the estimated coefficients of Fraud and DisAcc 
(models 1 and 3) are negative and statistically significant (t-statistics of -1.69 and -2.03), 
indicating that firms with altruistic CEOs who do not use insider information to time their 
stock donations are, on average, less likely to commit fraud by 37.4%, and less likely to 
manipulate earnings using an accruals-based management approach by 11.1%, than firms 
whose CEOs take advantage of insider material to time stock gifts. However, I find no 
evidence of a significant decrease in manipulation of real activities in firms with altruistic 
CEOs who donate without using inside information about earnings and the timing 
strategies I outline. 
Other than for real activities management, the results in Table 3.4 are consistent with 
my baseline results. I find that the probabilities of fraud and accruals management 
decrease significantly in firms run by altruistic CEOs who do not exploit insider 






Table 3.4 Timing of CEO Stock Donation around Earnings Announcements 
This table presents estimates for the effect of CEOs timing stock donations around company 
quarterly earnings announcements (BeforePostive-AfterNegative) on Fraud, RealActMan and 
DisAcc. In this analysis, I include firms with CEOs making donations that are dated within the 
five trading days prior to an earnings announcement or firms with CEOs gifting stock on the 
earnings announcement day or subsequent four days. I match firms with similar firm 
characteristics, corporate governance and CEO incentives, using the entropy balance matching 
approach. Panel A presents values of mean differences in Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc when 
sorting them by timing of stock gifts prior to positive and following negative earnings 
announcements. Panel B shows the panel regression results of timing of stock gifts before 
positive and after negative earnings announcements on Fraud, RealActMan and DisAcc. I 
include industry and year fixed effects and same controls (used in Table 2.3) in all of the models. 
For definitions of the variables in the table see the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by 
two-digit SIC industry, and t-statistics are reported on parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Univariate test  
Sort by Timing of gifts [t-5, t-1] Before positive earnings announcement or [t0, t+4] After 
negative earnings announcement 
(BeforePostive-AfterNegative) 
  Yes  No Difference in 
mean (Yes-No) Mean SD  Mean SD 
Fraud 0.011 0.105 0.018 0.132 -0.007 
(-1.06) 
RealActMan 0.666 0.891 0.654 0.795 0.012 
(0.27) 




Panel B: Regression results 








BeforePostive-AfterNegative -0.374* -0.046 -0.123** 
 (-1.69) (-1.09) (-2.03) 
Constant -21.186** 6.085 25.115** 
 (-2.11) (1.05) (0.97) 
Number of observations 484 1,366 1,366 
Industry Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Year Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 




3.2.5. CEO stock donations non-after run-up stock awards 
 
My primary proxy of CEO altruism might raise a potential concern that CEOs may 
donate more stocks after receiving additional stock in their firms. Modern portfolio theory 
(Markowitz, 1952) suggests that investors can reduce their unsystematic risk by holding 
diversified portfolios. Prior studies show that CEO wealth (both their future human 
capital income and their financial assets in a firm) is strongly correlated with firm 
performance, and thus that without diversifying assets in their wealth portfolio, firm 
CEOs may bear a greater firm-specific risk than ordinary investors (Jin, 2002). Consistent 
to the literature, Ofek and Yermack (2000) find that once firm executives reach a certain 
ownership level, they sell their shares when receiving new options and stock awards for 
diversification to hedge the unsystematic risks of concentrating wealth in a single asset. 
Motivated by these findings, I argue that if CEOs actively rebalance their wealth portfolio 
by donating shares after being awarded a significantly large value amount of stocks, these 
stock donations are more likely to represent a strategic asset diversification to optimize a 
CEO’s personal wealth rather than CEO altruism. As such these CEOs are considered 
less altruistic than CEOs who donate stocks even when receiving no stock awards or a 
relatively small value amount of stock awards. 
I collect data on stock awards (in dollar values)24 from the Incentive Lab database. I 
define a new proxy of CEO altruism, Non-after run-up, which is equal to one if a CEO 
donates stocks even when receiving no stock awards or a relatively small amount of stock 
 
24 I use stock awards in dollar value instead of number of shares because a CEO’s wealth in dollar value 
depends on not only the number of shares but also on the stock price in dollar value. Therefore, I argue that 
a CEO’s incentive to diversify away the unsystematic risk associated with concentrating wealth in a single 




awards (in dollar value) in the same fiscal year, and zero if a CEO makes stock donations 
after receiving a significantly large value amount of stock awards in the same fiscal year. 
I define stock awards as significantly large if their dollar value in any given fiscal year is 
(i) greater than the average value of stock awarded to CEOs during their tenure in a firm, 
and (ii) contributes at least 50% of the total stock awarded to CEOs during their tenure 
in a firm. In this analysis, I include only firms run by CEOs who make stock donations 
and those with available data on CEO stock awards (in dollar value) in the Incentive Lab 
database. I then replicate all baseline regressions but replace my primary explanatory 
variable (#Donate) with Non-after run-up – my new proxy for CEO altruism. 
Table 3.5 presents the negative association between the Non-after run-up effect of 
CEO stock donations and corporate malfeasance in financial reporting. The estimated 
coefficient of Fraud in model 1 is negative and statistically significant (t-statistic of -
2.38), indicating that the probability of fraud is, on average, approximately 100% lower 
when CEOs make stock donations even though they are not awarded any stocks or receive 
a relatively small dollar amount of stock awards. 
Table 3.5 also shows that the absolute value of accruals management (DisAcc) is 
significantly lower, on average, by about 0.483% of lagged total assets (t-statistic -3.27), 
than it is in firms with CEOs who donate stocks to actively rebalance their wealth 
portfolio after being awarded a significantly large value amount of stock. This decrease 
is about 43.4% of the average absolute value of accruals management for firms in my 
sample. However, in this case I find no significant decrease in abnormal real activities 
management (RealActMan) for firms with altruistic CEOs. 
Overall, the results in Table 3.5, other than those for real activities management, are 




accruals manipulation decrease significantly for firms run by altruistic CEOs who make 
stock donations irrespective of any incentives to use strategic asset diversification to 
actively rebalance their wealth portfolios when being awarded a significantly large value 
amount of stock. 
 
Table 3.5 CEO Stock Donations Non-After Run-Up Stock Awards 
This table presents the estimated regression results for the effect of CEOs donating stockduring 
the period of non-after run-up of stock awards (Non-after run-up) on Fraud (model 1), 
RealActMan (model 2) and DisAcc (model 3). In the subsample of firms with CEOs making stock 
donations, I match firms with other firms having similar firm characteristics, corporate 
governance and CEO incentives, using the entropy balance matching approach. I include industry 
and year fixed effects and same controls (used in Table 2.3) in all of the models. For definitions 
of the variables in the table see the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC 
industry and year, and t-statistics are reported on parentheses.  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 








Non-after run-up -1.008** -0.028 -0.483*** 
 (-2.38) (-0.73) (-3.27) 
Constant 8.551** -0.063* 0.731*** 
 (2.12) (-1.89) (3.89) 
Number of observations 324 1996 1996 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted/ Pseudo R2 0.656 0.424 0.526 
 
 
3.3 Readability of Annual Financial Reports 
To provide additional evidence on the effect of CEO altruism on various forms of 
corporate malfeasance in financial reporting, I examine whether personal managerial 
altruism can also impact on the readability of a firm’s annual financial report. While it is 
technically not a form of misreporting, reducing the readability of the financial reports 
can make it easier to hide undesirable financial information (Bloomfield, 2008; Li, 2008). 




represent corporate financial performance to stakeholders (Lo et al., 2017). This also 
likely plays an important role in helping stakeholders avoid corporate losses camouflaged 
in unclear or unreadable financial reports. 
I follow Bonsall IV et al. (2017) and borrow data on the Bog index to measure financial 
reporting readability from 1996 to 2016. The Bog Index is a comprehensive measure of 
readability specified in financial applications, where a higher Bog Index value equates to 
a less readable document. I replicate my earlier regressions and turn my attention to the 
CEO-altruism effect on the Bog Index.  
Table 3.6 reports estimated coefficients of the effects of CEO stock donations 
(#Donate, DumDonate and DonateRatio) and higher levels of CEO altruism 
(NonBackdate, NonTaxplanning, and Non-(Backdate & TaxPlanning), on the BogIndex. 
The coefficients of #Donate and DumDonate are negative and statistically significant 
(models 1-8), indicating that the number of donations and the likelihood of gifting stocks 
are both associated with increased financial reporting readability. However, I have no 
significant evidence on the relationship between the ratio of stock donations and the 
readability of financial reports. 
With respect to CEO backdating and tax planning incentives, my results imply that, 
on average, financial reports are more comprehendible for firms with CEOs who do not 
backdate or who both fail to backdate and fail to engage in tax favorable planning when 
making stock donations (models 2, 6 and 10). In contrast, I find no evidence that the 
additional effect of NonTaxplanning alone (models 3 and 7) can account for further 




Table 3.6 Readability of Annual Financial Reports 
This table shows regression results on the effects of #Donate (models 1-4), DumDonate (models 5-8), DonateRatio (models 9-12) and NonBackdate, 
NonTaxplanning, and Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning) on financial report readability (BogIndex). See the Appendix for definitions of the variables in this 
table. I include controls as used in Table 2.3 (Chapter 2), industry and year fixed effects in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered by two-digit SIC 
industry and year, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable of interest BogIndex 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
#Donate -0.038** -0.030* -0.032* -0.033**         
 (-2.39) (-1.87) (-1.94) (-2.06)         
DumDonation     -0.263*** -0.179** -0.270*** -0.199**     
     (-3.35) (-2.00) (-2.65) (-2.35)     
DonateRatio         0.209 0.366 0.386 0.330 
         (0.83) (1.41) (1.49) (1.29) 
NonBackdate  -0.470***    -0.363**    -0.570***   
  (-3.39)    (-2.29)    (-3.98)   
NonTaxplanning   -0.167    0.015    -0.293**  
   (-1.54)    (0.11)    (-2.57)  
Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning)   -0.543***    -0.419**    -0.638*** 
    (-3.36)    (-2.39)    (-3.91) 
Constant 73.909*** 73.892*** 73.917*** 73.900*** 73.923*** 73.905*** 73.922*** 73.912*** 73.786*** 73.762*** 73.793*** 73.771*** 
 (132.31) (132.31) (132.46) (132.25) (132.65) (132.64) (132.63) (132.56) (127.75) (127.82) (127.85) (127.71) 
Number of observations 
56,290 56,290 56,290 56,290 56,290 56,290 56,290 56,290 55,345 55,345 55,345 55,345 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







This chapter addresses a potential measurement error of CEO personal altruism and 
extends the effect of CEO altruism on the readability of a firm’ financial reports. This first 
extended study extends the measurement of personal managerial altruism into the five 
alternative measures other than the use of CEO stock donations. These novel alternative 
proxies of CEO altruism are constructed by observing CEO personal philanthropic activities 
in community, examining CEO cash donations, and investigating if CEOs have other 
opportunistic incentives when making stocks donations.  The results reveal that all five 
alternative measures of CEO altruism are negatively associated with the probability of 
committing fraud, real activities and accruals earnings management. The findings provide a 
robust evidence that personal altruism of CEOs in diminishing corporate malfeasance in 
financial report after eliminating the potential measurement error of using CEO stock 
donations to proxy CEO altruism.  
The second extended study provides an additional evidence on how senior management, 
by their virtue of personal altruism, can influence a variety of corporate financial reporting 
misconduct, including the extremely least serious form of the readability of financial reports.  
The results indicate the number of stock donations and the probability of donating stocks are 
both aggregated with improved financial reporting readability. These effects are more 
pronounced if firms led by CEOs who donate stocks without personal financial motives, 
(non-backdating and non-tax planning incentives in gifting stocks). The overall findings 
enrich the literature by providing the novel empirical evidence on how personal managerial 






DIFFERENCE IN DEGREES: CEO EDUCATIONAL 






Corporate environmental responsibility (CSR) is an issue of increasing importance to 
investors and managers (Flammer, 2013; Flammer, 2015; Hawn and Ioannou, 2016). 
Environmental infringements by large companies not only harm eco-systems and pollute 
natural resources, but also destroy shareholder value (e.g. (Flammer, 2013). For example, 
following BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the onslaught of litigation resulted in combined 
settlements of $62 billion (Bomey, 2016). In 2017, The U.S. federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) charged environmental offenders $1.6 billion in administrative and 
civil judicia penalties and $2.98 billion in criminal enforcement cases (EPA, 2017b). These 
enforcement actions relate to the contamination of 20.5 million cubic yards of soil and 412 
million cubic yards of water, which potentially affect the safety of the drinking water of half 
a million people (EPA, 2017a). Karpoff et al. (2005) show that the legal penalty for an 
average lawsuit alleging an environmental violation amounted to 2.26 percent of the accused 





Prior literature finds that corporate governance as firm-level determinants of corporate 
environmental CSR responsibility (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Walls et al., 2012; Liu, 2018). 
For example, these studies suggest that larger board size and greater insider ownership are 
linked to poorer environmental performance (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Walls et al., 2012); 
whereas board independence (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002) and gender diversity improve CSR 
engagement and environmental performance (Walls et al., 2012; Liu, 2018). At the individual 
level, upper echelons theory postulates that managerial backgrounds and characteristics play 
an important role in determining strategic decision-making within a corporation (Hambrick 
and Mason, 1984; Carpenter et al., 2004; Hambrick, 2007). Consistently, prior research finds 
that CEO hubris is associated with socially irresponsible conduct (Tang et al., 2015). In 
contrast, firms led by CEOs with liberal political ideology (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 
2017) tend to have better CSR ratings. Further, CEOs’ family composition significantly 
predicts their engagements with CSR. According to Cronqvist and Yu (2017), CEOs who 
have daughters are more inclined to engage with CSR, as their values are influenced by 
female socialization through raising daughters.  
CEO education is one aspect of executive characteristics that can play a significant role 
in influencing corporate policies (Lewis et al., 2014; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018; 
Henderson et al., 2018).  However, only a small number of studies specifically examine the 
impact of CEO education on a firm’s strategy towards corporate environmental CSR 
responsibility. To address this gap in the literature, I posit that difference in CEOs’ 
educational background in science and MBA education degrees may have significant 





In addition, I examine corporate environmental responsibilities by observing firms’ 
overall environmental CSR scores, as well as separately examining firm-level determinants 
of environmental CSR engagements which are captured by environmental concerns and 
strengths. The separate investigation of environmental concerns and environmental strengths 
is crucial to distinguishing a firm’s engagement with positive eco-friendly polices from more 
aggressive approaches aimed at alleviating environmental concerns.  
In this study, I develop a new theoretical framework by extending familiarization 
theory and self-efficacy theory in the psychology literature to a novel corporate setting. 
Specifically, I investigate whether and how CEO education makes a difference in influencing 
environmental engagement and overall CSR rating scores. In developing my hypotheses, I 
draw on familiarization theory, which posits that individuals are more prone to risk-taking 
when they are more familiar with a subject matter, and are more risk-averse to deal with an 
unfamiliar one (Flanders and Thistlethwaite, 1967; Millon and Lerner, 2003). Further, self-
efficacy theory states that risk-taking increases when an individual perceives him/herself as 
competent in the subject matter of decision making (Krueger and Dickson, 1994). 
Meanwhile, prior studies also suggest that manager individuals show more confidence in 
their areas of expertise (Custódio and Metzger, 2014a; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018; 
Henderson et al., 2018). 
Based on this theoretical framework, I posit that CEOs with science-related education, 
by virtue of their technical advanced knowledge, have greater familiarity with the technical 
aspects of their firms’ environmental operations and, at the same time, are more likely to self-
perceive as experts in making green-related technology decisions. Specifically, science-





and technology-related issues including environmental aspects may have a stronger science 
content understanding and more proficient technical skills to better deal with increased risks 
of environmental violations, compared to non-science educated CEOs. Consequently, 
scientist CEOs are more likely to take risks in increasing environmental concerns that may 
violate environmental regulations but may potentially reduce firm costs (i.e. lower 
production costs), rather than investing in developing positive eco-friendly polices. I 
therefore first hypothesize that science-educated CEOs are more likely to adopt riskier 
environmental policies that lead to worse environmental CSR ratings.  
In contrast, prior studies show that MBA CEOs indeed have greater levels of human 
capital to outperform in more sophisticated business cases (Grimm and Smith, 1991; 
Geletkanycz and Black, 2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Lewis et al., 2014). Even though 
MBA CEOs may have a limited knowledge and capacity to deal more-in-depth with the 
technical aspects in environmental matters, MBA-educated CEOs possess greater familiarity 
with interpreting and managing corporate environmental responsibility as a strategic 
opportunity to enhance a firm’s value, compared to non-MBA CEOs (Giacalone and 
Thompson, 2006; Neubaum et al., 2009). CEOs with an MBA education thus show great 
confidence and can be more aggressive in pursuing firm profitable objectives, but they 
become more risk-averse when dealing with additional risks arising from what they are not 
familiar with and self-perceived expertise. Building on the familiarity and self-efficacy 
theories, my second hypothesis suggests that MBA CEOs outperform non-MBA CEOs in 
environmental CSR ratings by carefully undertaking more risk-averse environmental policies 






To test the hypotheses in my study, I examine a sample of Standard and Poor’s 1500 
(S&P 1500) firms during 2000–2015. I collect information on CEO educational backgrounds 
from Marquis Who’s Who Online Database, which provides biographical information of over 
one million individuals in the United States (U.S.). Following prior studies (Fernando et al., 
2017; Gupta et al., 2017; Flammer, 2018), I employ Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) 
environmental ratings, which capture the number of environmental strengths and concerns 
of a firm, in order to measure a firm’s policies and engagement with environmental CSR. 
The selection of science-trained CEOs and MBA-educated CEOs is potentially an 
endogenously determined firm decision. For example, firms with more pollution-prone 
operations (such as mining firms) may be more likely to employ CEOs with education in 
science due to the nature of their operations. In contrast, firms within more environmentally 
friendly industries (such as retail trading and financial service firms) may be more likely to 
hire CEOs with an MBA degree to pursue better overall environmental CSR and avoid 
increased environmental risks. I employ several different approaches to deal with potential 
endogeneity. My main identification strategy is utilizing a difference-in-difference 
methodology, which employs a propensity score matched subsample of firms that have 
experienced CEO turnovers. This enables us to compare a firm’s environmental CSR scores 
before and after a CEO turnover, ensuring that the observed differences are indeed due to the 
change in CEO and not other unobservable firm characteristics.  
Moreover, I also conduct additional tests to ensure that my results are not driven by 
alternative explanations. Another concern may arise from scientist CEOs being more 
skeptical about the “green-washing” nature of environmental CSR or that firms wishing to 





to further their agenda. In the same way, firms which pursue more environmentally friendly 
policies and practices intentionally employ MBA-educated CEOs to well-manage and 
achieve their objectives. I do this by isolating the CEO’s personal influence over corporate 
environmental policies, specifically, I observe whether other CEO personal traits, such as 
familial structure, moderate the relationship between science education and environmental 
CSR and strengthen the effect of MBA education on a firm’s environmental CSR (Cronqvist 
and Yu, (2017).  
My key findings support my hypotheses that firms with science-educated CEOs have 
poorer engagement in environmental CSR which is attributable to firms’ being less willing 
to invest more in developing environmental strengths, as well as an increased exposure to a 
greater number of environmental concerns. In contrast, the results suggest that firms with 
MBA-educated CEOs improve their environmental CSR ratings due to their risk-averse 
environmental policies by undertaking ventures with fewer environmental concerns. 
Moreover, the robust results show that CEO’s family composition moderately affects CEOs’ 
risk-taking behaviours in committing environmental concerns, and thus result in reducing the 
negative effect of science education but strengthen the positive effect of MBA education on 
a firm’s environmental CSR. 
This chapter makes several contributions to the existing literature. First, I bridge two 
important areas of research: the literature examining the impacts of CEO education on firm 
strategies (Lewis et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2015; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018; Henderson 
et al., 2018) and that investigating the determinants of firm CSR performance (Kassinis and 
Vafeas, 2002; Walls et al., 2012; Liu, 2018). Given the growing importance of corporate 





evidence of the impacts of CEO education on firms’ CSR engagements and explain why 
scientist CEOs (MBA CEOs) underperform non-scientist CEOs (outperform non-MBA 
CEOs) in a firm’s overall environmental CSR ratings and engagement. Second, I develop a 
new theoretical framework, drawing on the psychology theories of familiarization and self-
efficacy, to explain the link between CEO personal characteristics and firm policies. My 
findings add new depth to the existing evidence in support of upper echelons theory.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the underlying 
theories and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, sample constructions and model 
modifications. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics, my baseline empirical results, and 
further reports robustness checks. Section 5 discusses my findings and concludes. 
 
4.2. Theory and Hypotheses 
4.2.1. Upper echelons theory and CEO personal traits  
 
According to upper echelons theory, CEO personal backgrounds and idiosyncrasies 
play a role in determining strategic choices within a corporation (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Underlying this theory is the view that managerial decision-making is not a mere 
mechanical process of profit-maximization. Rather, like all human processes, managers are 
influenced by behavioural factors. Consequently, managers’ personal idiosyncrasies, 
developed through their upbringing and experience, can affect implicit assumptions during 
the decision-making process, and thus imprint their own values and cognitive styles to shape 
organizational policies and outcomes (Wally and Baum, 1994; Carpenter et al., 2004; 





Consistent with upper echelons theory, a myriad of executive personal traits are 
documented to influence corporate decision-making outcomes, including CEO personality 
(Nadkarni and Herrmann, 2010; Herrmann and Nadkarni, 2014; Malhotra et al., 2018), 
cultural backgrounds (Pan et al., 2017), political ideology (Chin et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 
2017), family structure (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017), education (Lewis et al., 2014; Miller et 
al., 2015; Henderson et al., 2018), career pathways (Custódio and Metzger, 2014a; 
Benmelech and Frydman, 2015; Cummings and Knott, 2018), awards and celebrity 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2009; Shi et al., 2017), and personal risk preference (Sunder et al., 
2017). These CEO characteristics have significant implications for firms’ policies and risk-
taking behaviours. For example, CEOs who are inclined towards personal risk-taking, as 
evidenced by owning private pilot licenses or having highly leveraged home loans, tend to 
lead firms that engage in higher corporate risk-taking in financing and investment policies 
(Sunder et al., 2017). 
In the specific context of CSR, recent studies show that CEO personal political and 
ideological values are important in determining a firm’s CSR engagement. Specifically, firms 
with socially liberal managers and employees are more likely to invest in CSR (Chin et al., 
2013; Gupta et al., 2017). In addition, firms led by CEOs who have daughters tend to have 
higher CSR ratings (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017), which the authors attribute to the CEOs’ 
evolving ethical values through socialization with female children. These studies show that 
engagement in corporate social responsibility is, at least in part, influenced by the personal 





4.2.2. CEO Educational Background and CSR Engagement 
 
Despite the fact that CEO education is an important personal trait that influences firm 
policies and outcomes (e.g. (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Custódio and Metzger, 2014a; 
Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018; Henderson et al., 2018), no prior study has examined how 
CEO education influences environmental CSR engagement and ratings. The close prior 
research which complements my study is conducted by Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2010) and 
Lewis et al. (2014). The former study suggests a positive relationship between an MBA 
education and corporate environmental performance (Slater and Dixon-Fowler, 2010). 
However, the results in this study are limited by using an aggregated measure of a firm’s 
environmental performance in a small sample size from 2003 to 2004, rather than examining 
a variety of determinants of environmental CSR performance by separately observing 
corporate environmental concerns and strengths. The following former research (Lewis et 
al., 2014) examines the impacts of CEO education on firms’ environmental disclosure. 
Although Lewis et al. (2014) do not focus on corporate environmental CSR performance, 
their evidence does show that a CEO’s education has an impact on the level of environmental 
disclosure that a firm provides to the public.  
Motivated by prior studies, this study examines the effect of CEO’s educational 
backgrounds on formulating corporate environmental policies and practices. I use the KLD 
environmental score as a measure of a firm’s engagement with corporate environmental 
responsibility, following prior studies (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Chava, 2014; Werner, 
2015). Specifically, KLD environmental scores measure the number of a firm’s 





capture positive environmental initiatives such as clean technology and waste management 
systems. Environmental concerns capture negative environmental indicators relating to 
climate change and other eco-harmful practices. One unitary score is calculated by deducting 
the total number of concerns from the total number of strengths. As KLD scores separately 
capture environmental strengths and concerns, this provides an additional advantage of 
allowing me to distinguish between a firm’s environmental engagement with positive eco-
friendly initiatives versus its weaknesses in the form of environmental concerns.  
 
4.2.3. Familiarization theory and self-efficacy theory 
 
This study also extends upper echelons theory by drawing on familiarization theory 
and self-efficacy theory from the psychology literature, to develop a theoretical framework 
on how CEOs’ self-perceived expertise, derived from their education, can influence 
corporate decision-making. Specifically, I postulate that managers engage in greater risk-
taking in their areas of specialized training. Research on familiarization theory shows that 
individuals take greater risks when they are familiar with the subject matter (Flanders and 
Thistlethwaite, 1967; Millon and Lerner, 2003; Figner and Weber, 2011). Burger (1986) 
posits that this is because an individual experiences a greater sense of control when 
performing a familiar task compared with an unfamiliar one. Custódio and Metzger (2014a) 
offer empirical evidence that CEOs with financial expertise tend to adopt riskier corporate 
financing policies, including holding less cash, issuing more debt, and engaging in more 





Second, perceived self-efficacy is another psychological factor that increases risk-
taking tendencies (Krueger and Dickson, 1994). Krueger and Dickson (1994) argue that self-
perceived competence affects individuals’ risk assessments by increasing the expectation of 
success and decreasing perceived likelihood of failure. Weber et al. (2005) find that investors 
exhibit a favourable bias towards stocks with familiar names, which they self-perceive to be 
less risky, because they feel more competent when evaluating stocks with more familiar 
names than with less familiar names.  
Although CEO educational backgrounds involve several different categories, this study 
focuses on a CEO’s science-related and MBA educations, which represent two common 
educational degrees taken by CEOs in publicly listed firms (Felicelli, 2008). Moreover, these 
two educational academic fields exhibit apparent differences in CEOs’ knowledge, abilities 
and self-perceived expertise about the technical aspects of environmental matters as well as 
strategic decision-making and business management skills at a corporate level. 
 
4.2.4. Science degree 
 
Building upon familiarization and self-efficacy theories, I extend the applications of 
these theories to the corporate boardroom setting. I posit that CEOs with science-related 
education are more familiar with science and technology-related fields including the green-
related technologies used in a firm’s environmental operations and have greater self-
perceived expertise. Therefore, I hypothesize that scientist CEOs, by virtue of their science 
advanced knowledge and self-perceived expertise in dealing with environmental science-





and practices by involving in more environmental violations and reducing investment in 
developing positive eco-environmental friendly activities. This increase in risk-taking results 
in greater environmental exposure and lower environmental CSR ratings.  Thus, I formulate 
the following hypothesis: 
H1: Scientist CEOs are associated with poorer overall environmental CSR ratings. 
And, as KLD scores separately capture environmental concerns and strengths, I hypothesize: 
H1a: Scientist CEOs are associated with more environmental CSR concerns. 
H1b: Scientist CEOs are associated with fewer environmental CSR strengths. 
 
In addition, the sub-hypotheses separately examining environmental strengths and concerns 
enable me to provide evidence on an alternative explanation for why scientist CEOs 
underperform in environmental CSR. Scientist CEOs may be more skeptical about the 
environmental impacts of CSR initiatives and view them as mere green-washing (Walker and 
Wan, 2012; Matejek and Gössling, 2014). If this alternative explanation is true then I should 
expect to observe significantly fewer environmental strengths in scientist-led firms, but no 
difference in the number of environmental concerns.  
 
4.2.5. MBA degree 
 
Prior research suggests that MBA education creates corporate executives with profit-
drive focus and a strategic management view on corporate decision-making rather than social 





corporate environmental responsibility is taught in MBA programs in business schools, it is 
considered within an economic context and an organization-centered worldview (Giacalone 
and Thompson, 2006). Specifically, business senior education teaches corporate 
environmental CSR as a business case of strategic decision-making to gain organizational 
profits and to promote firm reputation to organizational stakeholders (Giacalone and 
Thompson, 2006). MBA-educated CEOs thus possess a greater familiarity and self-perceived 
expertise in interpreting and dealing with corporate environmental responsibility as a 
strategic opportunity to enhance a firm’s value (Neubaum et al., 2009). Consequently, I argue 
that firms run by CEOs with an MBA outperform firms with non-MBA CEOs in overall 
environmental CSR ratings. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: MBA CEOs are associated with better overall environmental CSR ratings. 
 
Although MBA-educated CEOs may be more aggressive to achieve a better 
environmental CSR that is driven from their greater familiarity and competence in utilizing 
corporate environmental CSR as a strategic investment decision, prior studies suggests that 
CEOs with an MBA may not have adequate professional knowledge and a limited specialized 
competence to deal with the technical aspects of environmental matters (Bennis and O'toole, 
2005; Benn and Dunphy, 2009). Building on familiarity and self-efficacy theories, I argue 
that MBA-educated CEOs may be more risk-averse in dealing with more sophisticated 
environmental matters. Consequently, MBA CEOs are expected to invest in developing more 





risk-averse behaviours of MBA CEOs lead to a reduction of environmental concerns and 
greater environmental strengths. Thus, my next two sub-hypotheses are: 
H2a: MBA CEOs are associated with fewer environmental CSR concerns. 
H2b: MBA CEOs are associated with more environmental CSR strengths. 
 
4.3. Data and Methodology  
4.3.1. Sample selection and data collection 
 
I employ a sample of all Standard and Poor’s 1500 (S&P 1500) companies with 
available data from the Execucomp Database during 2000–2015. The sample consists of 
2,881 current and former S&P 1500 firms. Information on firm corporate governance, such 
as board composition and ownership structure, is obtained from ExecuComp and the 
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) Corporate Governance and Directors Databases. 
Accounting information is collected from Compustat Database. The panel dataset initially 
comprises of 10,477 firm-year observations. After removing firm-years with missing data 
from Compustat, Execucomp, KLD, or Marquis Who’s Who Databases (as detailed below), 
the final sample employed in the regression analyses comprises of 6,276 firm-year 
observations.  
 
4.3.2. Environmental CSR scores 
 
I employ three empirical proxies for corporate environmental responsibility. I first 





environmental concerns and environmental strengths to distinguish between a firm’s 
environmental engagement with positive eco-friendly initiatives (Env Strengths) versus its 
weaknesses in the form of environmental concerns (Env Concerns).  
I obtain environmental CSR ratings by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) from 
the KLD MSCI Database. The KLD dataset provides environmental CSR ratings for each 
firm-year, including the number of environmental strengths (Env Strengths) and weaknesses 
(Env Concerns), from which I calculate an aggregated rating that equals the number of 
strengths less the number of weaknesses (Env Ratings). A higher number of environmental 
strengths and overall environmental rating indicates greater engagement with environmental 
CSR, whereas a higher number of environmental concerns indicates poorer engagement with 
environmental CSR. 
Environmental CSR scores are inherently industry dependent. For example, the firms 
in the mining and oil industry (SIC 2), on average, have the worst environment CSR scores 
(-0.776) across all industries, which are attributable to increased environmental concerns 
(1.346). In contrast, firms in the retail trade (SIC 7) are, on average, 129.1 percent higher in 
environmental rating scores (0.226) and have 93.1 percent fewer environment concerns 
(0.093) than those in the mining and oil industry. To account for this substantial variation 
across industries, I adjust all of my measures of CSR ratings by the industry-mean (calculated 
within each one-digit SIC code), in order to capture a firm’s environmental CSR engagement 





4.3.3. CEO Science and MBA educations 
 
I obtain CEO biographic information from Marquis Who’s Who Online Database to 
construct my two key independent variables, Scientist CEO and MBA CEO. Scientist CEO 
captures whether a CEO has received at least one degree in the field of science, technology, 
engineering, or mathematics (STEM). The binary variable Scientist CEO is coded one if the 
CEO holds a degree in STEM and zero otherwise.25 Similarly, MBA CEO is a binary variable 
to capture the effect of an MBA education. I coded MBA CEO as one if the CEO has received 
a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree and zero otherwise.  
 
4.3.4. Control variables 
 
My selection of firm-level accounting variables to serve as controls in my regressions 
is based on following prior research (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Walls et al., 2012; Liu, 
2018). I use a series of control variables, including the natural logarithm of total assets (Firm 
Size), firm age (Firm Age), market-to-book ratio (Market-to-Book), performance as proxied 
by return on assets (ROA) and a binary variable capturing negative earnings (Loss), debt-to-
equity ratio (leverage), growth potential as proxied by sales growth (Sales Growth) and 
 
25 As a CEO is a senior managerial position, I expect that all CEOs will have obtained their STEM degree prior 
to becoming a CEO. I confirm this assumption in the data: no CEO in my sample has obtained a STEM-related 





research and development spending (R&D), firm valuation (Tobin’s Q), and accounts 
receivable (Receivables). All control variables are lagged by one year. 
Prior studies also find that corporate governance plays an important role in determining 
firms’ environmental performance. Specifically, firms with larger boards and greater insider 
ownership have worse environmental performance, whereas more gender-diverse boards are 
associated with superior environmental performance (Liu, 2018). There is inconsistent 
evidence over whether board independence is associated with better or worse environmental 
CSR (Kassinis and Vafeas, 2002; Walls et al., 2012). In light of these prior findings, I also 
control for corporate governance quality as proxied by board characteristics, including size 
(Board Size), the proportion of independent directors (Board Indep), and board gender 
diversity as proxied by the proportion of female directors (Female Directors). In addition, I 
control for firm ownership structure, which is shown to be an important determinant of firms’ 
engagement with CSR (Walls et al., 2012), including institutional ownership (Inst 
Ownership) and executive shareholdings (CEO Ownership). Finally, I control for other CEO-
level characteristics, including age and gender, as both are commonly controlled for 
characteristics when examining corporate decision makers (e.g. (Cumming et al., 2015). 
  
4.3.5. Baseline regression models  
 
I first run panel least squares regressions in my baseline models to test my hypotheses. 





𝐸𝑛𝑣𝐶𝑆𝑅 | 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠 | 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑀𝐵𝐴 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽12𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽14𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1
+ ∑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑡
𝑖 + ∑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                   (𝟏) 
 
My model includes both year and industry fixed effects (based on two-digit SIC code 
industries) to account for any other unobservable factors that might influence the dependent 
variable. I also follow prior research and employ lagged independent variables (Scientist 
CEO and MBA CEO at year t-1) to alleviate concerns over potential reverse causality 
(Harford et al., 2008; Joecks et al., 2013). One potential source of reverse causality is that 
firms with poor (better) past environmental ratings may be more inclined to hire scientist 
CEOs (MBA-educated CEOs). Using lagged independent variables reduces the possibility 
that such reverse causality is driving the results. 
 
4.3.6. Difference-in-difference models to deal with endogeneity  
 
While I use lagged independent variables to deal with potential endogeneity, this may 
not suffice by itself. Endogeneity is a potential concern as appointments of CEOs with 
science or MBA backgrounds are not randomly determined. To deal with this, I employ a 





CEO replacement for a non-scientist CEO) on a firm’s environmental CSR scores. 
Specifically, treated firms (those that experience a CEO turnover from a non-scientist CEO 
to a scientist CEO) are compared to control firms (those that experience CEO turnover from 
a non-scientist to another non-scientist CEO). I compare changes in a firm’s environmental 
CSR scores from before to after a CEO turnover in treated firms and those in control firms. 
The advantage of using this DID approach is that I can mitigate potential biases that arise 
from post-turnover comparisons between the treated and control firms due to unobservable 
time-invariant differences between firms during the pre-turnover period, as well as biases 
that arise from the before-and-after comparisons in the treated firms that are a result of 
omitted time-variant variables. I assign a value of one to the dummy variable Treated if the 
firm belongs to the treated sample, and a value of zero to the control firms. I assign a value 
of one to the dummy variable Treated if the firm belongs to the treated sample, and a value 
of zero to the control firms. The time period dummy, Post, takes a value of one for post-
turnover years, and otherwise has the value of zero.  
I employ a propensity score matching approach to pair-match each firm from the 
treatment group with a control firm in the same industry and year, using all control variables 
as covariates to ensure that there are no other significant differences between the treated and 
control samples. I use the nearest neighbour matching methodology while allowing a 
maximum difference in propensity score between the treated and control observation 
(calliper) to be 0.01.26 I observe the average CSR ratings of the firms before and after the 
 
26 I am able to obtain precise matches because there are relatively few treatment observations 





turnover over a three-year period (plus or minus one year depending on the timing of the 
CEO turnover). Using this propensity score matched sample, I estimate Equation (2) below 
by replacing the Scientist CEO variable in Equation (1) with the difference-in-difference 
estimators, namely Treated, Post, and an interaction term of Treated and Post, to isolate the 
predictive power of a treatment effect of a turnover from a non-scientist CEO to a scientist 
CEO in the treated firms, compared to the control firms. Finally, I repeat these difference-in-
difference procedures by reversing the nature of the treatment and control groups. 
Specifically, in my second set of analyses, I propensity-score-match treated firms, which 
have CEO turnovers from a scientist CEO to a non-scientist CEO, with control firms that 
have CEO turnovers from a scientist CEO to a scientist CEO, to re-examine the differences 
in the changes in firms’ environmental CSR scores.  
In the same way, I replicate the previous propensity-score matching and difference-in-
difference models in Equation (2) for MBA-educated CEO turnovers. Specifically, in my 
third set of analyses, treated firms experience a switch from a non-MBA educated CEO to an 
MBA-educated CEO while control firms have CEO turnovers from a non-MBA CEO to a 
non-MBA CEO. Finally, following the difference-in-difference procedures above, I reverse 
the nature of the treatment and control groups. Specifically, in my final set of analyses, I 
propensity-score-match treated firms, which have CEO turnovers from a MBA CEO to a 
non-MBA CEO, with control firms that have CEO turnovers from a MBA CEO to a MBA 
CEO, to re-examine a treatment effect (a CEO switch from an MBA CEOs to a non-MBA 





𝐸𝑛𝑣𝐶𝑆𝑅 | 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ𝑠 | 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖,𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽10𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽13𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽14𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽16𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽18𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽20𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑡
𝑖 + ∑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                               (𝟐) 
 
 
4.4. Empirical Results  
4.4.1. Descriptive statistics and Univariate test 
 
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the variables 
employed in the baseline regression model. Within the sample, 33.1 percent and 33.5 percent 
of the firm-year observations have a science-educated CEO and an MBA-educated CEO, 
respectively. The mean industry-adjusted environmental rating is 0.020, and an average 
sample firm has 0.051 environmental concerns and 0.071 environmental strengths. As 
reported in the correlation matrix, the Pearson correlation coefficients are all below 0.69, 
indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern. Additionally, all the regressions 





Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table presents descriptive statistics and correlations for dependent variables, main variables of interest, and control variables. 
The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
    Descriptive 
     Statistics 
Correlation 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
Dependent variables                       
(1) Env Ratings 0.020 0.963                    
(2) Env Concerns 0.051 0.727  -0.559a 1.000                  
(3) Env Strengths 0.071 0.821  0.678a 0.230a                 
Variables of interest                       
(4) Scientist 0.331 0.471  -0.042a 0.080a 0.022c                 
(5) MBA 0.335 0.472  0.041a 0.033a 0.077a 0.096a                
Primary Controls                       
(6) Firm Size 8.279 1.531  0.065a 0.334a 0.373a 0.021c 0.121a               
(7) Firm Age 10.380 5.315  0.192a 0.060a 0.279a 0.027b 0.033a 0.289a              
(8) Market-to-book 2.842 2.771  0.059a -0.029b 0.044a 0.037a 0.017 -0.061a 0.052a             
(9) ROA 0.049 0.070  0.069a 0.002 0.083a 0.037a 0.021c -0.046a 0.071a 0.319a            
(10) Loss 0.109 0.312  -0.064a 0.006 -0.069a 0.006 -0.043a -0.069a -0.040a -0.096a -0.614a           
(11) Leverage -1.854 1.256  -0.013 0.097a 0.070a -0.035a 0.029b 0.225a 0.068a -0.001 -0.144a 0.048a          
(12) Sales Growth 0.087 0.196  -0.021c -0.037a -0.058a 0.035a 0.017 -0.048a -0.096a 0.091a 0.219a -0.204a -0.010         
(13) Board Size 9.764 2.311  0.011 0.226a 0.213a -0.032b 0.092a 0.554a 0.174a -0.001 -0.012 -0.062a 0.153a -0.074a       
(14) Board Indep. 0.759 0.132  0.053a 0.154a 0.199a 0.060a 0.091a 0.173a 0.194a -0.000 0.019 -0.023c 0.052a -0.095a 0.074a      
(15) Inst. Ownership 0.161 0.196  0.064a 0.014 0.087a -0.003 0.008 0.195a 0.124a 0.047a -0.013 0.055a 0.103a -0.034a 0.065a 0.004      
(16) Female Directors 0.121 0.092  0.110a 0.083a 0.203a -0.050a 0.099a 0.278a 0.171a 0.081a 0.039a -0.040a 0.107a -0.119a 0.257a 0.236a 0.081a     
(17) CEO Ownership 1.561 4.172  -0.034a -0.063a -0.095a -0.062a -0.083a -0.200a -0.027b 0.005 0.038a -0.016 -0.105a 0.042a -0.157a -0.230a -0.021c -0.114a   
(18) CEO Age 56.081 6.711  -0.015 0.059a 0.035a 0.024b -0.005 0.070a 0.186a -0.045a 0.030b -0.042a 0.052a -0.037a 0.070a -0.027b -0.030b -0.039a 0.192a  




Table 4.2 presents univariates statistics to examine mean differences in corporate 
environmental CSR ratings and environmental engagement variables when they are 
sorted across a range of CEO educational backgrounds (Scientist CEO and MBA CEO). 
The initial results reveal that firms with scientist CEOs take greater environmental 
concerns, and experience poorer overall environmental CSR performance than firms with 
non-scientist CEOs. However, I find no significant difference in environmental strengths 
between these firms. Conversely, firms with CEOs holding an MBA degree strategically 
invest more in environmental strengths and achieve better overall environmental CSR 
ratings than those in firms with non-MBA educated CEOs.  
In summary, the univariate results initially support my main hypotheses that 
scientist CEOs underperform non-scientist CEO in the firms’ overall environmental CSR 
ratings due to firms’ being more willing to take greater environmental risks. Meanwhile, 
MBA-educated CEOs are more risk-averse by engaging in fewer environmental 
concerns, and thus leading to better overall environmental CSR ratings.  
 
Table 4.2 Univariate Test 
This table presents average values and standard deviation of, and mean differences in Env 
Ratings, Env Constraints and Env Strengths when sorting them by whether or not a CEO is a 
Scientist CEO, and whether or not a CEO is an MBA CEO. T-statistics for differences in mean 
are shown in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Sort by  Scientist CEO 
(#Obs = 10,477) 
MBA CEO 
(#Obs = 10,477) 
 Yes No Difference 
in mean 
 Yes No Difference 
in mean Mean SD  Mean SD Mean SD  Mean SD 
Env Ratings -0.051 1.016 0.026 0.782 
-0.077*** 
(-4.27) 





0.055 0.811 -0.027 0.571 
0.082*** 
(5.98) 





0.003 0.791 -0.002 0.713 
0.005 
(0.34) 







4.4.2. Baseline regression results 
 
Table 4.3 reports the results from the panel regressions estimating the effect of a 
CEO’s science and MBA educations on environmental CSR scores and engagements. 
The results show that Scientist CEO is statistically associated with a decrease in overall 
environmental ratings (t-statistic = -3.09) while MBA CEO shows a statistically 
significant increase in the environmental CSR scores (t-statistic = 3.07). To determine 
how economically meaningful it is, given that I use industry-adjusted CSR measures, I 
examine the extent to which the coefficient leads to a proportional movement across the 
dispersion (one standard deviation) of the dependent variable’s distribution. The Scientist 
CEO coefficient value of -0.086 (Model 1) implies that when a firm has a science-
educated CEO, the environmental CSR rating reduces by 8.9 percent of one standard 
deviation (σEnvRatings = 0.963) from the average industry-adjusted environmental ratings 
for firms in my sample. In contrast, as reported in Model (4), the coefficient of MBA CEO 
of 0.073 indicates that firms with CEOs with an MBA degree, experience an increase in 
environmental CSR rating of 7.6 percent of one standard deviation (σEnvRatings = 0.963) 
from the average industry-adjusted environmental ratings for firms in my sample. These 
findings support H1 and H2 by indicating that scientist CEOs are associated with poorer 
overall environmental ratings than non-scientist CEOs. Conversely, CEOs with an MBA 
education are associated with superior overall environmental CSR performance than non-
MBA-educated CEOs. 
In addition, I separately examine environmental strengths and concerns. Consistent 
with H1a and H1b, the coefficient of Scientist CEO is statistically associated with more 
environmental concerns and fewer environmental strengths in Models (2) (b = 0.037, t-





scientist CEO, there is a 5.1 percent rise in average industry-adjusted environmental 
concerns (σEnvConcerns = 0.727) and a 6.1 percent proportional reduction in environmental 
strengths relative to its standard deviation (σEnvStrength = 0.821). These results show that 
the overall poorer environmental ratings associated with scientist CEOs are attributable 
to firms’ being less willing to invest in developing environmental strengths, as well as an 
increased exposure to a greater number of environmental concerns.  
I replicate the panel regressions on firms’ environmental concerns and strengths but 
focus on the effect of a CEO’s MBA education. My results are consistent with H2a but 
not significantly consistent with H2b. The coefficient of MBA CEO is statistically 
significant and negative with the firms’ environmental concerns in Model (5) (b = -0.044, 
t-statistic = -2.52). The results imply that firms which are led by an MBA-educated CEO 
experience a 6.1 percent proportional reduction in environmental concerns relative to its 
standard deviation (σEnvConcerns = 0.727). However, I find no statistically significant 
increase in environmental strengths (b = 0.029, t-statistic = 1.51). My findings suggest 
that CEOs with an MBA education outperform non-MBA CEOs in firms’ overall 
environmental CSR ratings. This better environmental CSR performance is due to MBA 
CEOs’ risk-averse behaviours in committing fewer environmental concerns, but no 
significant evidence for firms’ being willing to invest more in developing environmental 
strengths.  
My evidence provides empirical support for familiarization and self-efficacy 
theories in the corporate setting (Burger, 1986; Krueger and Dickson, 1994; Millon and 
Lerner, 2003; Figner and Weber, 2011). CEOs with science-related education, by virtue 
of their familiarity with a firm’s environmental operations and self-perceived expertise, 





evidenced by poorer CSR ratings. In contrast, MBA-educated CEOs are more familiar 
with treating environmental CSR ratings as a strategic business opportunity, thus appear 
to be more aggressive in pursuing superior environmental CSR performance, as 
documented by better environmental CSR ratings. However, MBA CEOs become more 
risk-averse when dealing with additional risks arising from environmental threats, as 
evidenced by undertaking less risky environmental policies and having fewer 
environmental concerns.  
 
Table 4.3 CEO Educational Backgrounds and Environmental Ratings 
This table presents the results from the regressions using CEO science education to predict 
environmental CSR scores, concerns, and strengths. All control variables are lagged by one year. 
Definitions of all variables are contained in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are used in all 
regression estimations, and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable of 
interest 
Env Ratings Env Concerns 
Env 
Strengths 
Env Ratings Env Concerns 
Env 
Strengths 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Scientist CEO -0.086*** 0.037** -0.050**    
 (-3.09) (1.99) (-2.13)    
MBA CEO    0.073*** -0.044** 0.029 
    (3.07) (-2.52) (1.51) 
Controls       
Firm Size 0.048** 0.185*** 0.233*** 0.043** 0.187*** 0.231*** 
 (2.20) (13.54) (13.78) (1.97) (13.48) (13.74) 
Firm Age 0.017*** -0.008*** 0.009*** 0.017*** -0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (5.77) (-4.63) (3.87) (5.90) (-4.73) (3.94) 
Market-to-Book 0.008 -0.001 0.007 0.009 -0.001 0.007 
 (1.33) (-0.39) (1.34) (1.35) (-0.42) (1.35) 
ROA 0.722*** 0.295* 1.017*** 0.704*** 0.302* 1.006*** 
 (3.19) (1.88) (5.31) (3.11) (1.93) (5.25) 
Loss -0.058 0.091** 0.033 -0.055 0.089** 0.034 
 (-1.21) (2.45) (0.90) (-1.13) (2.39) (0.93) 
Leverage 0.028*** -0.023*** 0.005 0.028*** -0.023*** 0.005 
 (3.52) (-4.03) (0.72) (3.50) (-4.03) (0.73) 
Sales Growth -0.139** -0.073 -0.212*** -0.147** -0.069 -0.216*** 
 (-2.11) (-1.34) (-4.20) (-2.24) (-1.27) (-4.28) 
R&D 2.970*** -1.342*** 1.627*** 2.782*** -1.257*** 1.525*** 
 (7.51) (-5.20) (4.42) (7.14) (-4.84) (4.26) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002 -0.010 -0.008 -0.000 -0.009 -0.009 





Receivables -0.287*** 0.183** -0.104 -0.316*** 0.198*** -0.118 
 (-2.77) (2.38) (-1.18) (-3.02) (2.59) (-1.35) 
Board Size -0.007 0.022*** 0.015*** -0.007 0.022*** 0.015*** 
 (-1.11) (3.90) (3.45) (-1.11) (3.92) (3.46) 
Board Indep -0.248*** 0.388*** 0.140** -0.258*** 0.394*** 0.136** 
 (-2.97) (6.86) (2.21) (-3.11) (7.00) (2.15) 
Inst.Ownership 0.053 -0.126*** -0.073 0.053 -0.127*** -0.073 
 (0.79) (-2.96) (-1.45) (0.80) (-2.97) (-1.44) 
Female Director 0.561*** -0.165** 0.396*** 0.546*** -0.154* 0.393*** 
 (4.04) (-2.02) (3.32) (3.92) (-1.89) (3.26) 
CEO Ownership -0.008*** 0.009*** 0.000 -0.007*** 0.008*** 0.001 
 (-3.14) (4.11) (0.28) (-2.97) (4.00) (0.49) 
CEO Age -0.003** 0.001 -0.002* -0.004*** 0.001 -0.002* 
 (-2.43) (1.20) (-1.76) (-2.62) (1.30) (-1.86) 
CEO Gender 0.045 0.092 0.137 0.064 0.082 0.146 
 (0.49) (1.25) (1.35) (0.72) (1.09) (1.45) 
Constant -0.423** -1.864*** -2.286*** -0.344* -1.903*** -2.247*** 
 (-2.13) (-13.00) (-14.33) (-1.70) (-13.04) (-14.14) 
N 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 6,276 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.329 0.325 0.211 0.330 0.325 
 
4.4.3. Difference-in-difference results 
 
The results from the difference-in-difference regressions are reported in Panel A, 
Table 4.4. The estimated coefficient of Post reveals that for firms in my sample there is 
a general rise in Env Ratings (b = 0.207, t-statistic = 3.96) from pre-turnover to post-
turnover periods among the control firms, reflecting that CEO turnover is generally a 
positive event for a firm’s environmental ratings, regardless of whether a replacement is 
a scientist CEO. Importantly, the estimated difference-in-difference coefficient 
(Treated*Post) is negatively associated with Env Ratings (b = -0.164, t-statistic = 2.43) 
in Model (1), highlighting that the changes in environmental ratings from the pre- to post-
turnover period in the treated firms (which switch from a non-scientist to a scientist CEO) 





scientist CEO for a non-scientist CEO) moves a firm’s environmental ratings by 17 
percent of one standard deviation (σEnvRatings = 0.963) below the mean. Overall, my 
evidence shows that while the event of a CEO turnover, in general, can improve a firm’s 
environmental ratings, if the replacement is a scientist CEO (from a non-scientist CEO), 
there is a tangible decline in the firm’s environmental ratings.  
I next separately examine environmental strengths and concerns in Models (2) – 
(3) of Panel A, Table 4.4. The coefficient of Treated*Post is positively related to Env 
Concerns (b = 0.133, t-statistic = 1.80), but it does not have a strong association with 
Env Strengths (b = -0.031, t-statistic = -0.61). These results provide support for H1b but 
not H1a, by indicating that the deterioration in overall environmental ratings is more 
attributable to increased exposure to environmental concerns, rather than reduced 
investment in building environmental strengths. This evidence gives support to the 
argument that scientist CEOs take more environmental risks by increasing firms’ 
exposure to environmental concerns rather than suggesting scientist CEOs invest in fewer 
eco-friendly initiatives due to professional skepticism.    
Conversely, if scientist CEOs underperform non-scientist CEOs in environmental 
CSR, after a scientist CEO is replaced by a non-scientist CEO, I should observe 
improvements in firm environmental ratings. To test this conjecture, I repeat the 
propensity score matching process by pair-matching firms that have undergone a CEO 
turnover from a scientist to a non-scientist CEO (treated firms), with those firms that are 
consistently run by scientist CEOs both before and after a CEO turnover. As the 
Treated*Post interaction term captures the treatment effect of a turnover from a scientist 
to a non-scientist CEO in the treated firms, I would expect it to be positively related to 





I re-estimate the difference-in-difference models and report the results in Panel B, 
Table 4.4. In Model (1), the coefficient of Treated*Post, representing changes from pre- 
to post-turnover periods between the treated firms that have switched from a scientist 
CEO to a non-scientist CEO and the control firms which replace a scientist CEO with 
another scientist CEO, I find a positive improvement in a change of Env Ratings (b = 
0.406, t-statistic = 4.45). Further, the results in Models (2) – (3) show that the positive 
difference in environmental CSR scores from the turnover is attributable to reducing 
environmental concerns, rather than increasing environmental strengths. Specifically, 
Treated*Post is negatively associated with both Env Concerns (b = -0.652, t-statistic = -
5.69) and Env Strengths (b = -0.246, t-statistic = -2.57) in Models (2) – (3), respectively. 
The difference-in-difference results indicate that non-scientist CEOs, overall, do not 
invest in building more environmental strengths than scientist CEOs and improve 
environmental CSR scores by taking fewer environmental concerns.  
These results provide further evidence to eliminate the alternative explanation that 
scientist CEOs underinvest in environmental CSR due to their professional skepticism 
about greenwashing. Consistent with familiarization and self-efficacy theories, my 
evidence suggests that scientist CEOs tend to take greater environmental risks, evidenced 
by a decrease in the number of environmental concerns after a non-scientist CEO replaces 
a scientist CEO. 
I repeat the difference-in-difference analyses for CEO turnovers from a non-MBA 
CEO to an MBA CEO and further present the results in Panel C, Table 4.4. In Model (1), 
the coefficient of Treated*Post, represents changes from pre- to post-turnover periods 
between the treated firms that have switched from a non-MBA-educated CEO to an MBA 





The estimated coefficient of treatment effect (Treated*Post) is statistically significant 
and positively associated with Env Ratings (b = 0.510, t-statistic = 2.16) in Model (1), 
highlighting that the changes in environmental ratings from the pre- to post-turnover 
period in the treated firms (which switch from a non-MBA to a MBA CEO) is 0.510 
greater than those in the control firms. Further, the results in Models (2) – (3) show that 
the positive difference in environmental CSR scores from the turnover is attributable to 
reducing environmental concerns, rather than investing in more environmental strengths. 
Specifically, Treated*Post is statistically significant and negatively associated with Env 
Concerns (b = -0.434, t-statistic = -2.84) but no significantly positive difference in Env 
Strengths (b = 0.077, t-statistic = 0.49) in Models (2) – (3), respectively. This evidence 
supports my baseline line regression results, indicating that MBA-educated CEOs are 
more risk-averse than non-MBA CEOs by taking fewer environmental concerns instead 
of building more environmental strengths.  
The different-in-difference results in Panel D, Table 4.4 provide additional 
evidence to support the argument that CEOs with MBA education outperform non-MBA 
CEOs in environmental CSR performance by undertaking more risk-averse 
environmental policies. I repeat the propensity score matching process by pair-matching 
firms that have undergone a CEO turnover from an MBA-educated CEO to a non-MBA 
CEO (treated firms), with those firms that are consistently led by MBA CEOs both before 
and after a CEO turnover. The coefficient of Treated*Post captures the treatment effect 
(a CEO turnover from an MBA CEO to a non-MBA CEO in the treated firms). The results 
in Model (1) present the changes in environmental ratings from the pre- to post-turnover 
period in the treated firms is significantly 0.599 lower than those in the control firms (b 
= -0.599, t-statistic = -2.29). Further, the results in Models (2) – (3) show that after MBA 





environmental concerns but make no significant difference in environmental strengths. 
Specifically, the coefficient of Treated*Post is statistically significant and positively 
associated with Env Concerns (b = 0.684, t-statistic = 3.89), but it is not statistically 
significant with Env Strengths (b = 0.085, t-statistic = 0.43) in Models (2) – (3), 
respectively. Overall, the results indicate that non-MBA CEOs underperform MBA 
CEOs in environmental CSR ratings since they are more willing to take risks by 
committing more environmental concerns but showing no significant difference in 
environmental strengths, when compared to MBA-educated CEOs. 
 
Table 4.4 Difference-in-Difference (DID) Analysis 
In this table I present the difference-in-difference regressions predicting environmental ratings, 
concerns and strengths, using a subsample of treatment and control firms that have experienced 
CEO turnovers, pair-matched using propensity scores and within the same industry-year. In Panel 
A, the treated firms are those that have experienced a turnover from a non-scientist CEO to a 
scientist CEO and the control firms are those that have consistently had a non-scientist CEO in 
before and after the turnover. In Panel B, the treated firms are those that have experienced a 
turnover from a scientist CEO to a non-scientist CEO and the control firms are those that have 
consistently had a scientist CEO in before and after the turnover. In Panel C, the treated firms are 
those that have experienced a turnover from a non-MBA CEO to An MBA CEO and the control 
firms are those that have consistently had a non-MBA CEO in before and after the turnover. In 
Panel D, the treated firms are those that have experienced a turnover from an MBA CEO to a 
non-MBA CEO and the control firms are those that have consistently had an MBA CEO in before 
and after the turnover. All control variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of all variables 
are contained in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are used in all regression estimations and 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Non-Scientist CEO to Scientist CEO 
Variable of interest Env Ratings Env Concerns Env Strengths 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post 0.207*** -0.087** 0.119* 
 (3.96) (-2.27) (1.92) 
Treated -0.046 0.033 -0.013 
 (-0.99) (0.85) (-0.32) 
Treated * Post -0.164** 0.133* -0.031 
 (-2.43) (1.80) (-0.61) 
N            1,669           1,669            1,669 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: Scientist CEO to Non-scientist CEO 
Variable of interest Env Ratings Env Concerns Env Strengths 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post 0.040 0.112 0.152 
 (0.76) (1.25) (1.77) 
Treated -0.254*** 0.381*** 0.127* 
 (-3.16) (4.88) (2.02) 
Treated * Post 0.406*** -0.652*** -0.246** 
 (4.45) (-5.69) (-2.57) 
N         1,125 1,125 1,125 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.281 0.247 
 
Panel C: Non-MBA CEO to MBA CEO 
Variable of interest Env Ratings Env Concerns Env Strengths 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post -0.025 0.112 0.087 
 (-0.22) (1.52) (0.94) 
Treated 0.498*** -0.409*** 0.089 
 (2.51) (-3.14) (0.83) 
Treated * Post 0.510** -0.434*** 0.077 
 (2.16) (-2.84) (0.49) 
N            752 752 752 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.386 0.386 0.393 
 
Panel D: MBA CEO to Non-MBA CEO 
Variable of interest Env Ratings Env Concerns Env Strengths 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post 0.014 -0.061 -0.047 
 (0.05) (-0.53) (-0.40) 
Treated -0.119 0.291** 0.173 
 (-0.50) (2.54) (1.29) 
Treated * Post -0.599** 0.684*** 0.085 
 (-2.29) (3.89) (0.43) 
N 423 423 423 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  Yes Yes Yes 





4.4.4. CEO personal volition: moderating effects of familial composition 
 
One alternative explanation for my baseline findings is that firms wishing to adopt 
more aggressive environmental practices deliberately choose to hire scientist CEOs, who 
have the technical qualification and expertise to further this agenda. In contrast, firms 
which purse more environmentally friendly policies to enhance firms’ performance and 
reputation, may intend to employ MBA-educated CEOs, who have greater familiarity and 
competence to recognize and manage corporate environmental CSR as a strategic 
business opportunity.  
To rule out this alternative explanation, I examine the role of CEO’s personal values 
in mitigating the relationship between science and MBA education and environmental 
CSR. If a scientist CEO is hired to implement a firm’s pre-existing agenda to move 
towards more environmentally aggressive practices, then the CEO’s own volition, driven 
by personal perspectives and circumstances, should not play a significant role in 
influencing the way in which the CEO carries out the firm’s agenda as intended by their 
hiring committee. In contrast, if my expectation is true that scientist CEOs are motivated 
by their own familiarity and self-efficacy to take greater environmental risks, I would 
expect this risk-taking tendency to be moderated by other individual-level circumstances. 
Similar arguments for MBA-educated CEOs are employed when examining the effects 
of other CEO personal traits and circumstances on the relationship between MBA 
education and environmental CSR.  
Specifically, Cronqvist and Yu (2017) find that CEOs who have daughters tend to 
outperform their peers in CSR efforts. The authors attribute this finding to gender 





and exhibit greater universalism and benevolence than men (Carlson, 1972; Gilligan, 
1977; Adams and Funk, 2012). Cronqvist and Yu (2017) argue that CEOs tend to 
internalize the value of caring for others, which is more pronounced in girls than boys, 
through raising daughters. Such value in turn influences the CEO to have superior CSR 
engagement and to care for stakeholder groups. In light of this prior evidence, I expect 
that having daughters would mitigate the relationship between science education and 
poorer environmental CSR engagements.  In contrast, I expect that the effect of MBA 
education on environmental CSR would be more pronounced when CEOs have 
daughters.  
To test these propositions, I collect information about CEOs’ children from the 
Marquis Who’s Who Online Database. I compute a binary variable, Daughter, which 
equals one if the CEO has one or more daughter(s) and zero otherwise. I then divide my 
observations into two subsamples: firm-years where scientist CEOs have daughters 
versus those with no daughters. I then re-estimate my baseline regressions in Equation 
(1) using each subsample. I repeat the empirical procedure for two subsamples of firm-
years where MBA-educated CEOs have a daughter against those with no daughter. 
In Panel A, Table 4.5, I report the regression results using the subsample where 
scientist CEOs do not have daughters in Models (1) – (3), and the results using the 
subsample where scientist CEOs have daughters in Models (4) – (6). As reported in the 
no-daughter subsample, the coefficient of Scientist CEO is statistically significant and 
associated with worse overall environmental ratings (b = -0.669, t-statistic = 1.88) and 
fewer environmental strengths (b = -0.826, t-statistic = -3.03). There is no meaningful 
association with environmental concerns (b = -0.157, t-statistic = -1.54). In contrast, 





have daughters in Models (4) – (6), the coefficient of Scientist CEO is no longer 
associated in predicting worse Env Strengths (b = -0.030, t-statistic = -0.27) in Models 
(5). Moreover, the economic magnitude of the coefficient of Scientist CEO in predicting 
Env Ratings (b = -0.192, t-statistic = -1.74) in Model (4) represents a 28.7 percent decline 
in the economic magnitude relative to the estimated coefficient in Model (1). Taken 
together, these results show that the negative impacts of having a scientist CEO on firm 
environmental CSR are reduced when the CEO has a daughter.  
In Panel B, Table 4.5, I present the regression results for MBA-educated CEOs in 
two subsamples including MBA CEOs without daughters (Models 1 – 3) and those with 
daughters (Models 4 – 5). In the no-daughter sample, I find no statistically significant 
effect of having an MBA-educated CEO on a firm’s overall environmental CSR, 
environmental concerns and strengths in Models (1) – (3). In contrast, in the having-
daughter sample, the coefficient of MBA CEO is statistically significant and associated 
with a reduction in Env Concerns (b = -0.142, t-statistic = -2.47) and an improvement of 
Env Strengths (b = 0.131, t-statistic = 2.52) in Models (5) – (6), respectively. Moreover, 
as reported in Model (4), the coefficient of MBA CEO is positive and statistically 
significant with Env Ratings (b = 0.273, t-statistic =3.73), indicating the positive effects 
of leading by an MBA-educated CEO on environmental CSR are pronounced when the 
MBA CEO has a daughter.  
While I cannot rule out that some scientist CEOs (and MBA CEOs) are deliberately 
selected to lead firms towards more aggressive (more risk-averse) environmental policies 
and practices, I find no evidence of this when I analyse my data en-masse. In contrast, 
my results show that a CEO’s personal ethics, derived from raising daughters, play a 





education, (an MBA education). This indicates that the relationship between scientist 
CEOs (MBA CEOs) and worse (better) environmental CSR ratings is attributable to the 
CEOs’ own perspectives and assumptions as developed through their educational 
backgrounds, consistent with upper echelons theory, rather than driven by firms’ pre-
existing agendas towards environmental CSR as manifested through the selection of 
scientist CEOs or MBA CEOs.  
The above results further shed light on the possible mechanisms that explain why 
firms led by scientist CEOs receive poorer environmental ratings. If the worse 
environmental ratings are due to scientist CEOs refraining from investing in 
environmental strengths because they perceive such initiatives to be mere greenwashing, 
then having a daughter should not make any difference to a CEO’s professional 
skepticism and hence to their inclination to invest in environmental CSR. In contrast, if 
scientist CEOs tend to take greater environmental risks due to their own psychological 
factors including familiarity and self-perceived expertise, then other CEO personal 
idiosyncrasies (such as their values developed from the socialization process of raising 
daughters (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017)) are expected to mitigate the effects of their science 
education. My results are consistent with this second view, by indicating that CEOs’ 
family composition of having daughters indeed mitigates the negative effects of their 
scientist education on the firms’ environmental CSR ratings. 
Similarly, my findings provide a potential explanation why firms run by MBA-
educated CEOs achieve better environmental CSR. If MBA CEOs improve a firm’s 
overall environmental ratings by investing more in developing environmental strengths 
such as green-washing strategies, I then expect having a daughter would have a negative 





environmental strengths and lead to poorer environmental ratings. Conversely, if an MBA 
education creates personal psychological impacts on an MBA CEO’s risk-averse 
behaviours to take fewer environmental risks, I then expect that other CEO personal 
perspectives and circumstances (such as their values of female socialization developed 
from parenting daughters) may have a moderating effect on the level of CEO’s risk-
taking. Overall, my results support the second argument, by indicating that CEOs’ family 
composition of having a daughter strengthens the positive effects of their MBA education 
on the firms’ environmental CSR. 
 
Table 4.5 Moderating Effects of CEO Familial Composition 
This table presents regression results from the subsample analyses that examine the additional 
effect of CEO having daughters on the existing effect of CEO educational backgrounds on 
environmental CSR ratings, concerns, and strengths. Panel A presents the role of scientist CEOs 
having daughters in mitigating the predictive power of CEO scientist education. Panel B presents 
the role of MBA CEOs having daughters in strengthening the predictive power of CEO MBA 
education. In each panel, Models (1) – (3) report the results from the regressions estimated using 
a subsample of firms where scientist CEOs have no daughters. Models (4) – (6) report the results 
from the regressions estimated using a subsample of firms where the scientist CEOs have 
daughters. All control variables are lagged by one year. Definitions of all variables are contained 
in the Appendix. Robust standard errors are used in all regression estimations and t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Scientist CEO 
 
Scientist CEOs having no 
daughters 
Scientist CEOs having daughters 














 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Scientist CEO -0.669* -0.157 -0.826***  -0.192* 0.162 -0.030 
 (1.88) (-1.54) (-3.03)  (-1.74) (1.50) (-0.27) 
N 298 298 298  925 925 925 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 





Panel B: MBA CEO 
 
MBA CEOs having no 
daughters 
MBA CEOs having daughters 













 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
MBA CEO -0.023 -0.071 -0.093  0.273*** -0.142** 0.131** 
 (-0.10) (-0.40) (-0.62)  (3.73) (-2.47) (2.52) 
N 298 298 298  925 925 925 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.682 0.407  0.290 0.446 0.375 
 
4.5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 
An extensive literature on upper echelons theory shows that CEO personal 
background and experiences play an important role in shaping corporate policies and 
outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Barker and Mueller, 2002; Carpenter et al., 2004; 
Hambrick, 2007). Yet despite the growing importance of corporate environmental 
responsibility, very little research has examined CEO education on corporate 
environmental policies and performance. I fill this gap in the literature by producing 
evidence on the extent to which science-educated CEOs and MBA-educated CEOs 
engage with environmental CSR and how well they perform in overall environmental 
CSR ratings. My study extends upper echelons theory by establishing a link between 
CEO education in science and MBA educations and corporate environmental policies and 
engagements, which is hitherto uninvestigated. Using a sample of S&P 1500 firms, I 





environmental engagement, which is captured via both environmental concerns and 
environmental strengths. 
I extend psychological theories of familiarization and self-efficacy (Flanders and 
Thistlethwaite, 1967; Krueger and Dickson, 1994; Millon and Lerner, 2003) by 
demonstrating their applications in the corporate upper echelons setting. I build upon 
familiarization and self-efficacy theories to develop a theoretical framework that extends 
upper echelons theory by postulating that CEO education constitutes a significant 
predictor of risk-taking in the CEO’s self-perceived area of expertise. Consistent with 
this framework, my results show that firms led by scientist CEOs take greater 
environmental risks and have poorer engagements with environmental CSR. In contrast, 
I find evidence that MBA-educated CEOs outperform non-MBA CEOs in environmental 
CSR ratings due to their risk-aversion in formulating less risky environmental policies 
and practices by committing fewer environmental concerns. 
My findings offer practical implications for corporate executives and directors in 
relation to both CEO selection and subsequent executive training. First, my evidence 
provides important insights into psychological factors that influence CEO decision-
making, which can inform the development of executive training programs. Specifically, 
consistent with familiarization and self-efficacy theories (Flanders and Thistlethwaite, 
1967; Krueger and Dickson, 1994; Millon and Lerner, 2003), CEOs are more likely to 
take greater risks in their areas of expertise. Consequently, my results provide useful 
insights into designing executive training programs and ongoing support, to increase 
executives’ self-awareness of such tendencies. Such training programs can benefit the 
firm by ensuring that any increased risk-taking in the CEOs’ areas of expertise is chosen 





Furthermore, CEO selection is one of the most important decisions that a board of 
directors can make. My findings highlight the significant and multi-faceted impacts of 
CEO education on corporate policies and performance in the areas of the CEO’s 
expertise. These findings help members of CEO selection committees to match CEOs’ 
educational backgrounds with a firm’s desired future strategic direction. For example, if 
a firm wishes to adopt riskier strategies in a particular area of operation, it can benefit 
from hiring a CEO with expertise in that area, as such a CEO may be more willing to take 
risks. Conversely, MBA-educated CEOs are aggressive at pursuing superior 
environmental CSR performance by formulating more environmentally friendly policies 
and practices. However, it is important to ensure that any changes in the level of risk-
taking result from deliberate strategic choices in alignment with the firm’s vision, rather 
than mere by-products of the CEO’s own psychological inclinations arising from 
familiarity and self-perceived expertise.  
While I document CEO science and MBA educations as potent predictors of 
corporate environmental engagement and performance, my study nonetheless has 
limitations which offer opportunities for future research. In particular, this study design 
does not distinguish between firms’ environmental CSR engagement ratings and firms’ 
actual environmental outcome and actual corporate environmental performance, such as 
corporate environmental lawsuits. The usage of commercial CSR ratings (such as KLD 
scores which are based on binary ratings) might be limited to provide a more-in-depth 
measure of the nature and extent of environmental violations committed by a firm. Future 
studies may be interested in expanding my research to examine whether CEO science and 
MBA educations may affect CEO’s capacity to manage the increased level of 






Moreover, this study design does not investigate the practical avenues through 
which scientist CEOs and MBA CEOs pursue the desired level of environmental risks. 
There are two common mechanisms for a CEO to influence corporate conduct, through 
explicitly changing corporate policies or implicitly influencing firm culture. For example, 
a scientist CEO may be more likely to foster a culture of thoroughness, exactness, and 
attention to detail in the technical areas of the firm’s operations, which in turn may 
enhance the firm’s ability to navigate the increased level of environmental risks 
associated with having more CSR concerns (e.g. Davidson et al. (2015); Hutton et al. 
(2015)). 
In addition, the scope of my investigation is limited to CEOs. I do not examine 
whether managers at other levels of management throughout a firm’s hierarchy also 
exhibit similar increases in risk-taking tendencies and risk-management abilities in their 
areas of expertise. Such an examination is potentially important, as the findings can assist 
practitioners with managerial appointment decisions, specifically to ensure cohesion in 
risk perceptions across managers at different levels, to prevent unnecessary risk-taking 
due to self-perceived expertise, and to make the best use of managers with specialized 
training by matching their qualifications with high-risk areas of operations. The novel 
theoretical framework, which is developed by drawing on familiarization and self-













This dissertation contributes to the growing body of work with two studies that 
explore novel aspects of personal managerial traits, and investigate the influence of these 
CEO personal idiosyncrasies on corporate decision-making in financial reporting and 
environmental responsibility. From a theoretical perspective, this thesis provides two 
novel theoretical frameworks. The first framework is constructed from both psychology 
and economic theories to model a utility-maximizing function of a CEO with different 
levels of altruism preferences in their decision-making regarding committing corporate 
misdeeds in financial reporting. The second utilises familiarity and self-efficacy theories 
to explain the relationship between CEO educational background and their risk-taking 
behaviours in formulating environmental policies. From an empirical perspective, this 
thesis provides two novel empirical studies which have not been previously explored. 
The first study and its extended study provide unique empirical measures of personal 
managerial altruism by observing CEO stock donations and other CEO psychological 
idiosyncrasies and opportunistic incentives in making donations. The second study 
introduces further evidence on how CEO educational background can explain the 
heterogeneity of corporate environmental engagement. My findings in this thesis also 
offer practical implications for corporate executives and boards of directors in relation to 
the benefits of CEO selection and subsequent executive training programs which aim to 
diminish corporate wrongdoing in financial reporting and to enhance corporate 





consists of a summary of findings and contributions from each study, research limitations 
and directions for future research.  
 
5.1 Summary and Contributions 
 
In Chapter Two, the first study examines whether the personal altruism of CEOs has 
an impact on diminishing corporate malfeasance in financial reporting. I proxy for the 
personal managerial altruism of CEOs by observing the number of stocks donated by 
CEOs to charitable organisations. I examine the effect of CEO altruism on three sorted 
forms of corporate malfeasance in financial reporting from the most serious (corporate 
fraud) to intermediate (real activities management), to least serious (accruals earnings 
management), based on the costs and associated risks of each form of earnings 
manipulation. Given the heterogeneity in stock donations, I further identify and measure 
different levels of CEO altruism by examining whether CEOs make stock donations with 
personal financial motives including backdating and tax-planning incentives around the 
timing of gifting stocks. I first design a theoretical framework modelling a utility-maxing 
function of executives with/without altruistic preferences in their decision-making to 
manipulate earnings, and then conduct panel baseline regressions to empirically examine 
my hypotheses.  
The theoretical framework predicts altruistic CEOs are less likely to manipulate 
earnings and the probability of committing earnings manipulation is negatively 
associated with the level of personal managerial altruism of CEOs. Moreover, the 
empirical regression results also suggest that firms run by CEOs with altruistic 





and exhibit lower levels of real and accrual-based earnings manipulation. These effects 
are more pronounced for CEOs who do not backdate when making stock donations and 
who donate stocks outside of the tax season. To eliminate potential endogenous biases in 
my estimated results, I conduct several robustness checks, including employing the 
dummy and ratio of CEO stock donations, examining the effect of CEO turnovers, using 
difference-in-difference models, applying an instrumental variable approach, and using 
alternative measures of CEO altruism. Overall, the results suggest that personal altruism 
of managers has a disciplining effect on corporate malfeasance in financial reporting.  
The first study contributes a novel theoretical framework which models CEO 
altruism as a personal psychological factor which explains corporate wrongdoing in 
financial reporting. Moreover, this study also provides novel empirical evidence that 
highlights the “bright-side” effect of hiring altruistic CEOs to diminish corporate 
financial reporting malfeasance. My findings also offer practical implications for 
corporate executives and boards in relation to CEO selection, and methods to minimise 
corporate losses and to protect shareholders’ wealth from corporate financial misconduct. 
Chapter Three presents a two-way research extension of the first study. The first 
extension in this chapter addresses potential measurement error of CEO altruism by 
observing other personal philanthropic activities in society of CEOs and other 
opportunistic incentives when CEOs make stock donations. I extend the primary 
explanatory variable of CEO stock donations in the first study into the five new 
alternative proxies of CEO altruism including (i) CEO receiving humanitarian awards; 
(ii) charitable recipients of CEO stock donations; (iii) CEO political cash contributions 
with altruistic preferences; (iv) CEO non-timing stock donations before negative earnings 





non-after a run-up of stock awards. The findings show that firms with CEOs who have 
received a humanitarian award, are less likely to commit fraud and have lower abnormal 
real activities management and abnormal accruals. The results remain consistent for real 
activities and accruals management, but are not significant for corporate fraud when using 
charitable recipients and CEO political cash donations to proxy for CEO altruism. In 
addition, the results hold for accruals management and corporate fraud but no evidence 
is found for real activities manipulation when regressing for the non-timing patterns of 
CEO stock donations around earnings announcements and non-after a run-up of stock 
awards. Overall, my findings in this extended study provide a novel empirical 
methodology to identify and capture various forms of CEO altruism, other than that 
captured via the use of CEO stock donations as a proxy. The overall results also highlight 
the positive effect of CEO personal altruism in diminishing various forms of corporate 
malfeasance in financial reporting, after addressing all potential endogenous 
measurement error of CEO altruism.  
The second part of this chapter extends the research of the CEO-altruism effect on the 
readability of a firm’s annual financial report. I measure financial reporting readability 
by borrowing data on the Bog Index from Bonsall IV et al. (2017). In the empirical 
analysis, I replicate all earlier baseline regressions in Chapter Two and turn my attention 
to the effect of CEO altruism on financial report readability. The results in this extended 
study reveal that financial reports are more comprehendible for firms with altruistic 
CEOs. Moreover, firms led by CEOs who make stock donations without personal 
financial motives (non-backdating and/or non-tax-planning incentives) have a greater 
improvement in the readability of financial reports, compared to firms run by CEOs who 
backdate and consider tax-planning incentives when gifting stock. Overall, my findings 





altruistic preferences may be a potent determinant of an improvement in the readability 
and comprehension of financial statements, a research area which has not been previously 
investigated.  
In Chapter Four, the second study investigates the influence of CEO educational 
background on corporate environmental CSR performance and engagement. Specifically, 
building on the familiarity and self-efficacy theories, this study posits that science-
educated CEOs possess greater familiarity and self-perceived expertise in dealing with 
the technological aspects in environmental matters. Scientist CEOs thus are confident to 
take greater environmental risks which, in turn, lead to a poorer overall environmental 
CSR performance. Conversely, MBA-educated CEOs are more aggressive in pursuing 
better environmental CSR performance because MBA CEOs are well-trained to perceive 
and interpret environmental CSR engagement as a business strategy to enhance a firm’s 
performance and minimize potential shareholder losses from the risks of corporate 
environmental infringements.  
In the empirical analysis, I first run panel least squares regressions of scientist CEO 
and MBA CEO on overall environmental CSR ratings and engagement in environmental 
strengths and concerns, respectively. The baseline results show that the overall poorer 
environmental ratings associated with scientist CEOs are attributable to firms being less 
willing to invest in developing environmental strengths, as well as an increased exposure 
to a greater number of environmental concerns. In contrast, firms led by MBA-educated 
CEOs are associated with better overall environmental CSR performance and commit 
fewer environmental concerns. To address potential reverse causality bias in the 
estimated results, I conduct difference-in-difference analyses utilizing CEO turnovers to 





ratings and engagement. The results suggest that firms are associated with poorer overall 
environmental performance when a non-scientist CEO is replaced by a scientist CEO, 
and vice versa. In contrast, a treatment effect of replacing a non-MBA CEO by an MBA 
CEO has a positive effect on overall environmental CSR ratings, and vice versa. 
Moreover, the robustness results also indicate that a CEO’s personal ethics, derived from 
parenting daughters, play a significant role in offsetting (pronouncing) the effect of 
having a science-related education (MBA education).  
Overall, this study highlights that CEO educational background can be a potent 
predictor of the heterogeneity in firm environmental CSR performance and engagement. 
Specifically, my findings not only suggest that scientist CEOs underperform non-scientist 
CEOs in the firm’s overall environmental CSR ratings, but also offer a potential 
explanation that worse environmental ratings are due to scientist CEOs tending to take 
greater environmental risks rather than refraining from investing in environmental 
strengths. In contrast, MBA-educated CEOs outperform non-MBA CEOs because MBA 
CEOs are more risk-averse in taking additional environmental risks rather than 
undertaking green-washing strategies by investing more in developing environmental 
strengths. Moreover, this study also offers practical implications for corporate executives 
and directors in relation to top management selection and firm executive training 
programs. 
 
5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
 
I acknowledge a number of limitations in each study and suggest future areas of 





characteristics from the Marquis Who’s Who database. Although previous literature 
presents an increase in the use of the Marquis database to capture data on personal traits 
of executives (Parrino, 1997; Palia, 2000; Huson et al., 2001; Hwang and Kim, 2009; 
Cronqvist and Yu, 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Gounopoulos and Pham, 2018), this database 
may sometimes contain incomplete or self-reported information on executives. To 
address missing information from the Marquis database, I also access other databases, 
including Wikipedia, Notable Names Database, the search engines to do across data 
checks. While I may not eliminate all potential biases from using this database, the 
Marquis Who’s Who is suggested as one of the most comprehensive databases providing 
personal biographical details on CEOs (Cronqvist and Yu, 2017). Future research may 
be encouraged to discover additional alternative databases which would contain more-in-
depth and objective personal biographical information on corporate executives. 
Alternatively, future studies may also develop theoretical research on various managerial-
specific traits instead of conducting empirical studies to overcome these potential data 
biases.  
In addition, the scope of my investigation is limited to CEOs. I do not examine 
whether managers at other levels of management throughout a firm’s hierarchy also 
similarly exhibit personal managerial altruism and risk-taking tendencies in their areas of 
expertise. Some scholars, for example, investigate the impact of CFOs’ personal styles 
on corporate financial and accounting policies (Jiang et al., 2010; Ge et al., 2011). Thus 
future research could extend my work by examining personal altruisms and differences 
in educational background across other top corporate executives and directors to further 
capture the influence of personal altruism and risk perceptions at different corporate 





Motivated by my study, future research could also investigate how alignment in 
altruistic behaviour between top management and directors, as reflected by their stock 
donations, may affect corporate financial policies and governance. Building on my 
findings, shared altruistic values between CEOs and directors may promote more ethical 
behaviours between executives and directors, and thus may reduce corporate misconduct 
because both altruistic CEOs and directors align to maximise firm value and the well-
being of stakeholders and shareholders.  
Last but not least, the research design in the second study on CEO educational 
background does not distinguish between corporate environmental CSR performance and 
corporate actual environmental performance, such as that captured by corporate 
environmental lawsuits. The use of corporate CSR ratings might be limited to provide a 
more-in-depth measure of the nature and extent of environmental violations committed 
by a firm. Further research may be interested in expanding on my results to examine 
whether scientific and MBA educations of CEOs can affect their capacity to manage 
environmental risks to avoid some of the negative consequences arising in the form of 





Appendix A – Chapter 2 
Variable Definition 
A. CEO stock donations  
DumDonate CEO stock donation dummy equal to one if a 
firm’s CEO has stock donations reported to the 
SEC in a given fiscal year (zero otherwise) 
#Donate  Number of reported CEO stock donations in a 
given fiscal year 
DonateRatio Ratio of CEO donated shares to CEO total 
shares in a firm in a given fiscal year 
NonBackdate CEO non-backdating dummy equal to one if a 
CEO has all of their stock donations non-
backdated (zero otherwise) 
NonTaxplanning CEO non-tax planning dummy equal to one if a 
CEO did not tax plan any of their stock 
donations (zero otherwise) 
Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning) Interaction of CEO non-backdating and CEO 
non-tax planning (NonBackdate* 
NonTaxplanning) 
B. Fraud & earnings management  
Fraud Dummy of SEC AAER frauds equal to one if a 
firm is recorded as the subject of a financial 
fraud in a given fiscal year (zero otherwise) 
DisAcc The absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
where discretionary accruals are computed 
using the Jones (1991) model 
RealActMan The absolute value of combined abnormal 
operating cash flows, production costs, and 
discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
BogIndex A measurement of financial reporting 






C. Firm characteristics  
Size Natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
(MVE) 
Age Natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
years the firm has been in COMPUSTAT 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to book value of assets (DLTT + 
DLC)/AT 
ROA Operating income before depreciation divided 
by total assets (OIBDP/AT) 
CAPEX Capital expenditures net of sales of plant, plant, 
property, and equipment scaled by total assets 
(PPENT/AT) 
Intangibles Ratio of sum of research, development and 
advertising expenses to total assets 
(XRD+XAD)/AT 
Ln (Operating cycle) Natural logarithm of firm’s operating cycle 
calculated as  
ln((360/(SALEi,t/(RECTi,t+RECTi,t-
1)/2)))+(360/(COGS/((INVTi,t + INVTi,t-1)/2)))). 
Inventory Ratio of inventory to total assets (INV/AT) 
Receivables Ratio of receivables to total assets (RECT/AT) 
SalesVol Standard deviation of sales (SALE) scaled by 
total assets (AT) over the prior 2 years 
CFOVol Standard deviation of cash flows from operation 
(OANCF-XIDOC) scaled by total assets (AT) 
over the prior 2 years 
D. Corporate governance  
Inst. Ownership The fraction of outstanding shares owned by 
institutional investors 
BoardIndep The fraction of total independent directors to 
total number of directors 





E. Donating CEO turnover  
DonateCEO Dummy for donating CEO turnover equal to one 
if (i) a CEO has donated in at least 50% of the 
years during their CEO tenure, and (ii) their firm 
experiences a turnover from a CEO likely to 
donate to one less likely to donate, or vice versa. 
F. CEO personal characteristics  
Daughter Dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO has 
a female child (including stepchildren) (zero 
otherwise) 
Childcare Dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO 







Appendix B – Chapter 3 
Variable Definition 
A. CEO stock donations  
DumDonate CEO stock donation dummy equal to one if a 
firm’s CEO has stock donations reported to the 
SEC in a given fiscal year (zero otherwise) 
#Donate  Number of reported CEO stock donations in a 
given fiscal year 
DonateRatio Ratio of CEO donated shares to CEO total 
shares in a firm in a given fiscal year 
NonBackdate CEO non-backdating dummy equal to one if a 
CEO has all of their stock donations non-
backdated (zero otherwise) 
NonTaxplanning CEO non-tax planning dummy equal to one if a 
CEO did not tax plan any of their stock 
donations (zero otherwise) 
Non-(Backdate & Taxplanning) Interaction of CEO non-backdating and CEO 
non-tax planning (NonBackdate* 
NonTaxplanning) 
B. Corporate fraud, Earnings 
management, and readability 
 
Fraud Dummy of SEC AAER frauds equal to one if a 
firm is recorded as the subject of a financial 
fraud in a given fiscal year (zero otherwise) 
DisAcc The absolute value of discretionary accruals, 
where discretionary accruals are computed 





RealActMan The absolute value of combined abnormal 
operating cash flows, production costs, and 
discretionary expenses (Roychowdhury, 2006) 
BogIndex A measurement of financial reporting 
readability, sourced from Bonsall IV et al. 
(2017) 
F. CEO personal characteristics  
Humani Dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO has 
received a humanitarian award (zero otherwise) 
G. Alternatives of CEO altruism  
Charitable Recipients Dummy equal to one if the recipients of CEO 
stock donations are external charitable 
organizations (zero otherwise) 
BeforePostive&AfterNegative Dummy equal to one if a CEO donates stock 
within five trading days preceding a positive 
earnings announcement, or a stock gift is made 
on the day or the four days following a negative 
earnings announcement, and zero if he donates 
within five days before a negative earnings 
announcement, or on the earnings date and 
continuing four days after a positive earnings 
announcement (zero otherwise) 
Non-after run-up  Dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO 
donates stocks even when receiving no stock 
awards or a relatively small amount of stock 
awards (in dollar value) in the same fiscal year, 
and zero if CEO makes stock donations after 
receiving a significantly large amount of stock 
awards (in dollar value) in the  same fiscal year. 
Altruistic Political Donation Dummy equal to one if a CEO make individual 





party/committee which primarily supports for 
family, child, female, elderly, health care, 
environment, education, or animal welfare 
issues (zero otherwise) 
G. Alternatives of CEO altruism  
Charitable Recipients Dummy equal to one if the recipients of CEO 
stock donations are external charitable 
organizations (zero otherwise) 
BeforePostive-AfterNegative Dummy equal to one if a CEO donates stock 
within five trading days preceding a positive 
earnings announcement, or a stock gift is made 
on the day or the four days following a negative 
earnings announcement, and zero if he donates 
within five days before a negative earnings 
announcement, or on the earnings date and 
continuing four days after a positive earnings 
announcement (zero otherwise) 
Non-after run-up  Dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO 
donates stocks even when receiving no stock 
awards or a relatively small amount of stock 
awards (in dollar value) in the same fiscal year, 
and zero if CEO makes stock donations after 
receiving a significantly large amount of stock 
awards (in dollar value) in the  same fiscal year. 
Altruistic Political Donation Dummy equal to one if a CEO make individual 
cash donations of $200 or more to a political 
party/committee which primarily supports for 
family, child, female, elderly, health care, 
environment, education, or animal welfare 






Appendix C – Chapter 4 
Variable Definition 
A. Environmental Performance  
Env Ratings  Industry-adjusted overall corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) scores on environmental 
issues in year t. 
Env Concerns Industry-adjusted number of environmental CSR 
concerns in year t. 
Env Strengths Industry-adjusted number of environmental CSR 
strengths in year t. 
B. CEO educational background  
Scientist CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO holds 
a degree in fields related to science, technology, 
engineering and math (STEM) in year t–1 and 
zero otherwise.  
MBA CEO Dummy variable that equals one if the CEO holds 
an MBA degree in year t–1 and zero otherwise. 
C. Firm characteristics  
Firm Size Natural logarithm of total assets in year t–1. 
Firm Age Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years 
(as at year t–1) since the firm’s first appearance in 
the Compustat Database.  
      Market-to-Book Market value of equity divided by book value of 
equity in year t–1. 
ROA Net income divided by total assets in year t–1. 
Loss Dummy equal to one if return on assets is negative 





Leverage Ratio of long-term debt and debt in current 
liabilities to book value of assets in year t–1. 
Sales Growth Growth rate of sales from year t–1 to year t.  
R&D Ratio of sum of research and development 
expenses to total assets in year t–1. 
Tobin’s Q Ratio of sum market value of equity and liabilities 
divided by total assets in year t–1. 
Receivables Ratio of receivables to total assets in year t–1. 
D. Corporate governance  
Board Size The total number of board directors in year t–1. 
Board Indep The fraction of total independent directors to total 
number of directors in year t–1. 
Inst. Ownership The fraction of outstanding shares owned by 
institutional investors in year t–1. 
Female Director The fraction of total female directors to total 
number of directors in year t–1. 
CEO Ownership The fraction of total shares held by the CEO in 
year t–1. 
E. CEO personal characteristics  
CEO age Current age of the CEO in year t–1. 
CEO gender Dummy equal to one if a firm’s CEO is male in 
year t–1and zero otherwise.  
Daughter Dummy equal to one for firms whose CEO has a 
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